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INTRODUCTION

Foreign drug kingpins, rogue dictators; state-sponsored terrorists. These "bad guys" are the leading threats to America's national security, replacing the old Soviet Union and a China that
is no longer "Red." Conceptually, fighting the new bad guys is
not as easy as fighting the old threats: "nuking" the Soviet Union or China always remained an option, however foolish. Overwhelming military force, however, was not designed to handle
unconventional threats posed by drug dealers and terrorists and
may be an inappropriate method of containing or crushing
some dictators. Increasingly, the United States is turning to a
new unilateral weapon - international trade measures - regardless of opposition from its allies and trading partners.
The United States has used this new weapon three times in
the last decade. To fight foreign drug kingpins, the United
States enacted the Narcotics Control Trade Act of 1986 ("1986
Narcotics Act"). 1 To fight Fidel Castro, the United States enact- ed the Helms-Burton Act of 1996, formally known as the Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 ("Helms-Burton
Act"). 2 To fight Iran's mullahs and Libya's Muammar Qaddafi,
the reputed godfathers of international terrorism, the United
States enacted the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 ("1996
Sanctions Act"). 3
' Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 9001, 100 Stat 3207-164 (1986) (codified as amended at 19

u.s.c. §§ 2491-2495 (1994)).

• Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat 785 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.A §§ 6021-0091
(West Supp. 1997)). Guidelines and implementing regulations for the Helms-Burton Act
have been published. See Cuban Assets Control Regulations; Indirect Financing in Cuba,
Civil Penalties, 61 Fed. Reg. 37,385 (1996) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt 515) (bringing
Cuban asset control regulations into conformity with Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (UBERTAD) Act of 1996); Guidelines Implementing Title IV of the Cuban Liberty
and Democratic Solidarity Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 30,655 (1996) (implementing provisions of Act
allowing Secretary of State and Attorney General to deny visas to certain aliens); Summary
of the Provisions of Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (UBERTAD)
Act of 1996, 61 Fed. Reg. 24,955 (1996) (summarizing portions of Act discussing persons
who knowingly and intentionally traffic in confiscated properties).
For a fascinating consideration of the Helms-Burton Act in relation to the major tenets of liberal international relations theory - namely, promoting economic interdependence, international law, international institutions, and democracy - see generally David
P. Fidler,IJBEJITAD v. Liberalism: An Analysis of the Helms-Burton Act from Within Liberal International Relations Theury, 4 IND. J. GLORAL LEGAL STUD. 297 (1997).
' Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat 1541 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.A § 1701 note
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The new threats to America's national security and the highly
controversial legislation the United States has enacted in response raise a fundamental problem for international trade
lawyers who adopt a narrow view of their field. Their field encompasses tariffs, non-tariff barriers, and trade remedies such as
anti-dumping, countervailing duty, and escape clause actions.
The boundaries of their field are expanding to encompass labor
and environmental issues. But national security? What is the
relationship between national security and international trade
law?
At first blush, no apparent relationship exists between the
two. On the one hand, the term "national security" conjures up
images of the military, intelligence operations, and a shadowy
world of cloak-and-dagger espionage. On the other hand, the
term "international trade law" triggers thoughts of a highly technical and arcane set of rules that involves an ever-increasing
number of economic sectors and is derived from an international bureaucracy in Geneva - the World Trade Organization
("WT0"). 4 Our senior policy makers embody these stereotypes.
Few, if any, presidential national security advisors have had
much experience with, knowledge of, or even interest in the
world trading system. We do not imagine America's great national security advisors like Henry Kissinger or Zbigniew
Brzezinski to be operating in the same arena as our great international trade negotiators like Carla Hills or Mickey Kantor.
Stereotypes aside, national security and international trade law
are closely linked, and the link has existed ever since the birth
of modern international trade law in 1947. The link is contained
in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"}. 5
Article XXI of GATT establishes a broad framework for imposing international trade measures for national security purposes.
Since 1947, countries have occasionally implemented trade sanctions, sometimes invoking GATT article XXI as a justification.6

(West Supp. 1997) (Iran and Libya Sanctions)). The State Department has published
guidelines on the implementation of this Act at 61 Fed. Reg. 66,067 (1996).
4
See grnerally RAj BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: CAsES AND MATERIALS (1996)
(providing comprehensive treatment of international trade law).
• General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.IAS. 1700,
55 U.N.T.S. 194, reprinted in RAj BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW- DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT 59 (1996) [hereinafter GATT].
6
See Richard Sutherland Whitt, The Politics of Procedure: An Examination of the GATT
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During the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton Administrations, the
United States has exploited this framework to support the unilateral enactment of highly controversial sanctions legislation. The
rationale behind this legislation is national security, but virtually
all U.S. trading partners balk at this rationale.
This Article critically analyzes GATT article XXI and the three
key recent national security sanctions statutes: the 1986 Narcotics
Act, the Helms-Burton Act, and the 1996 Sanctions Act. Part I of
this Article considers the following question: what constraints, if
any, does article XXI place on a WfO Member regarding national security sanctions legislation? Parts II, Ill, and IV review
the three sanctions statutes, respectively, and ask the following
questions: How do these statutes operate in practice? Are these
statutes justified or are the criticisms leveled by our trading
partners correct? Part V considers the effectiveness of national
security sanctions. Finally, this Article concludes that America
should modify or abandon its use of international trade measures to achieve national security aims.
Three additional conclusions ·emerge from this Article. First,
article XXI's provision regarding the enactment of national
security sanctions is a weak restraint on the behavior of wro
Members. Second, while some of the criticisms of the 1986 Narcotics Act, Helms-Burton Act, and 1996 Sanctions Act are legitimate, each act also contains meritorious and overlooked qualities. Accordingly, neither critics nor supporters of these laws are
entirely on target. Third, the weight of empirical evidence suggests that national security sanctions, whatever their merits, are
ineffectual at best and counterproductive at worst. In the end, a
pragmatic rather than ideological approach to linking national
security and international trade law may be prudent, and trade
policy experts should take a hard look at repealing or revamping these policies.

Dispute Settlement Panel and the Arlic/e XXI Defmse in the Context of the U.S. Embargo of Nicaragua, 19 LAw & POL 'V INT'L Bus. 603, 614-20 (1987) (chronicling use of article XXI as justi-

fication to implement trade sanctions).
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I. THE LINK BUILT INTO GATT: ARTICLE XXI

Article XXI sets forth an exception allowing WfO Members
to sidestep their GATT obligations for national security reasons. 7
This exception, while rarely invoked explicitly, is highly significant. The United States maintains an arsenal of national security
statutes that authorize unilateral trade action.8 In recent years,
the United States has added dramatic new statutes to this arsenal.9 Without article XXI, inevitable clashes would occur between unilateral measures adopted under these statutes and
GATT obligations such as most-favored-nation treatment
("MFN") (article I), tariff bindings (article II), national treatment (article Ill), and quantitative restrictions (article XI).
Other GATT articles are unable to manage clashes between
U.S. statutes and GATT obligations. Article XXXV(1)(b), which
allows for the imposition of economic measures such as bans or
boycotts, is ineffective. 10 Article XXXV ( 1) (b) must be invoked
by a WfO non-Member against a WfO Member at the time the
non-Member joins the WTO, or by a Member against a nonMember at the time the non-Member joins the WT0. 11 Nor
could GATT article XXV(5), which explains how to obtain a
waiver of GATT obligations in "exceptional circumstances not
elsewhere provided for in" GATT, manage these clashes. 12 To
obtain a waiver, article XXXV(5) requires a two-thirds majority
vote involving more than half of the WTO Members. 15 No exception to this waiver requirement exists for unilaterally imposed
national security measures. In sum, article XXI provides the
indispensable textual basis in GATT for such economic measures.
7

See GAlT art. XXI.
See generally Harold Hongju Koh &: John Choon Yoo, DoUar Diplomacy/Dollar Defense:
The Fabric of Ec01U1T11ics and Natitmal Security Law, 26 INT'L LAW. 715 (1992) (illustrating statutes and unilateral trade actions justified by national security).
9
See generally Anne Q. Connaughton, Exporting to special Destinalioru: Terrorist Supporting
and Embargoed Countries, 748 PRAC. L. INsr. 353 (1996) (chronicling recently enacted stat8

utes that allow unilateral trade sanctions).
10
See GAlT art. XXXV.
See id.
See id. art. XXV(5).
" See id. art. XXXV.

II

12
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Article XXI states:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be consuued
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to its
essential security interests; or
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action
which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests
(i) relating to fissionabk materials or the materials
(ii)

from which they are derived;
relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and
impkments of war and to such traffic in other
goods and materials as is carried on directly or
indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military
establishment,

(c)

(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in
international relations; or
to prevent any contracting party from taking any action
in pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international
peace and security. 14

This language, coupled with a review of the limited body of
GATT jurisprudence on article XXI, reveals four key points.
First, it is an all-embracing exception to GATT obligations. Second, article XXI (b), which allows countries to take any action
necessary to perfect their essential security interests, is the most
important and controversial portion of this exception. Third, in
contrast, some provisions of article XXI such as sections (a), (c),
and possibly (b)(i) are not, or at least ought not to be, controversial. Fourth, while a non-sanctioning and, in particular, target
Member can challenge the invocation of article XXI by a sanctioning Member, this right has no practical importance.

A. An AU-Embracing Exception
The first feature of article XXI is that it is an all-embracing
exception to GATT obligations. This point is evident from the
first word of the article: "nothing." Once a WTO Member relies
on article XXI to implement a measure against another

14
/d. an. XXI (emphasis added). For a discussion of U.N. Charter article 86 relating to
maintenance of international peace and security, see 1 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
GUIDE TO GAlT LAW AND PRACTICE 609-10 (1995).

University of California, Davis
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Member, the sanctioning Member need not adhere to any
GAIT obligations toward the target Member. This point is
further reinforced by a 1949 decision of the CONTRACTING
PARTIES 15 in a case Czechoslovakia brought against the United
States under article XXIII of GAIT. 16
In its case before the CONTRACTING PARTIES, Czechoslovakia
argued that the United States breached its obligations under
articles I and XIII by administrating export licensing and shortsupply controls. 17 Instituted in 1948, these controls discriminated among destination countries. 18 The United States justified
the controls under article XXI(b) (ii), arguing they were necessary for security purposes and applied only to a narrow group of
export goods that could be used for military purposes. 19 The
CONTRACTING PARTIES rejected the Czech claim by a vote of
seventeen to one, with three abstentions. 20 In so doing, "the
Chairman indicated that Article XXI 'embodied exceptions to
the general rule contained in Article I. '" 21 While most of the
other fundamental GAIT obligations were not at issue in this
case, it is reasonable to infer from this statement that if the
article I MFN rule is excepted, these other obligations would
also be excepted.
B. License to be a Cowboy?:
The Importance and Controversial Nature of Article XXI(b)

By far the most important and controversial portion of GAIT
article XXI is section (b). In the article's text, the word "it"
refers to the WTO Member invoking sanction measures; the
Member has sole discretion to determine whether an action
15

See id. art. XXXII.
See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,

supra note 14, at 602, 606 (discussing
Czechoslovakia's request for decision under article XXIII concerning United States's
administration of export licensing controls).
17
See David Buchan, Less Jljgid Approach to Central Planning. FIN. TIMEs, OcL 23, 1985,
16

1.
18

See Michael Gaugh, GAIT Article XXI and U.S. Expqrt Controls: The Invalidity of Nonessential, Non-proliferation Controls, 8 N.Y. INT'L L REv. 51, 51 (1995) (arguing that export

controls are discriminatory and, thus, contrary to GAIT article 1).
19
See id. (stating that national security exception is implicit rationale for U.S. export
control system).
·
20
See id. at 65.
21
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 14, at 606.
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conforms to the requirements of article XXI (b). The plain
meaning of this word indicates that no other Member or group
of Members and no WI'O panel or other adjudicatory body can
determine for a sanctioning Member whether a measure satisfies
the requirements. 22
Because each WI'O Member decides for itself what its "essen- .
tial security interests" are under article XXI(b), four corollary
principles may be developed. These corollaries surely put article
XXI(b) among the GATT provisions that come closest to allowing a Member to be a "cowboy"- an independent actor that is
able to fend for its own security on the international frontier.
First, a sanctioning Member need not give any prior notice of
impending or imposed national security sanctions. 25 Second,
the sanctioning Member need not justify the sanctions to the
WI'O or its Members. Third, the sanctioning Member need not
obtain the prior approval or subsequent ratification of the wro
or its Members.
These three implications are manifest in a GATT Council
discussion about Argentinean import trade restrictions imposed
by European Economic Community ("EEC") members, 24 Canada, and Australia between April and June 1982 during the
Falkland Islands War. 25 The EEC representative stated that the
exercise of article XXI rights "required neither notification,
justification nor approval, a procedure confirmed by thirty-five
22

See id. at 600 (noting that every country has final decision o·n issues regarding its
own security), This interpretation is evident, for example, in the confident statement of the
representative from Ghana concerning Ghana's boycott of Portuguese goods when Portugal
acceded to GAlT in 1961: "each contracting party was the sole judge of what was necessary
in its essential security interest [and] [t]here could therefore be no objection to Ghana
regarding the boycott of goods as justified by security interests." /d.
., See id. at 605. It was, for example, Cuba, not the United States, _who informed the
Contracting Parties of the trade embargo imposed on Cuba in February 1962 by the
Kennedy Administration, and thereafter the Administration invoked article XXI as its
justification. See id. In contrast, the Reagan Administration informed the Contracting
Parties of its May 1985 prohibition on imports of all Nicaraguan goods and services, and its
ban on exports to Nicaragua of all U.S. goods and services other than those destined for
the organized democratic resistance. See id. at 603.
24
See GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CAsES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN CoMMUNfiY
LAw 2-14 (1993) (presenting history of European Community development and addition of
members).
.. See Gaugh, supra note 18, at 68-69.
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years of implementation of the General Agreement." 26 Mter
some discussion, the U.S. representative stated in even bolder
terms: "The General Agreement left to each contracting party the
judgment as to what it considered to be necessary to protect its
security interests. The CONTRACTING PARTIES had no power to
question that judgment. " 27
The fourth corollary principle distinguishes between threatened and actual dangers. A sanctioning Member may determine
that its essential security interests are "threatened by a potential
as well as an actual danger." 28 Nothing in article XXI(b) requires that a sanctioning Member face a manifest and concrete
danger, such as a physical invasion or armed attack, before imposing a national security measure. Do these four corollaries, in
fact, mean that article XXI (b) is a license for a sanctioning
Member to behave like a cowboy?
Two checks may restrain cowboy behavior. First, in most cases
it is politically prudent for a sanctioning Member to give prior
notice to other WTO Members and attempt to garner a critical
mass of multilateral acquiescence, if not de facto support, before
invoking article XXI. 29 Thus, on November 30, 1982, after discussing the Falkland Islands crisis, the CONTRACTING PARTIES
adopted the Decision Concerning Anicle XXI of the General Agreement
("Decision"). !!0 Subject to the article XXI:a exception concerning
the right to withhold sensitive information, "contracting parties
should be informed to the fullest extent possible of trade measures
taken under Article XXI. "51 When action is taken under article
XXI, all contracting parties affected by such action retain their
full rights under the General Agreement. "52 To be sure, this
first paragraph of the Decision is nothing more than a
procedural recommendation. It is not an obligation to notify the
WTO or its Members because the sanctioning Member decides
supra note 14, at 600.
/d.
28
See id. (emphasis added) (presenting viewpoint of Ghana in debate of Ghana's
boycott of Portuguese goods).
29
See id. at 60!Hl6 (discussing procedures concerning notification of measures under
article XXI).
"" See id.
31
/d. at 606 (emphasis added).
"' See id. (discussing U.S. boycott of Nicaraguan goods and services).
26

'r7

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
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whether contracting parties "should be informed" and whether
notice is "possible." Moreover, there is no preference expressed
as between propter or post hoc notice. However, the first
paragraph reflects a consensus that prior notice is not just a
matter of courtesy and respect for trading partners but also a
means to reduce friction. Presenting the international
community with national security sanctions as a fait accompli
inevitably leads to quarrels among political allies. Countries
opposing the sanctions will typically argue that they share the
same end as the sanctioning countiy, but disagree with sanctions
as a means to achieve that end. These quarrels have exploded
into major trade rows because the United States has resorted to
implementing secondary boycotts of a target country. 88 This
tactic not only penalizes the target country, but also alienates
entities in third (potentially allied) countries that trade with or
invest in the target nation. 84 For present purposes, the key
" See EJ. Prior, House Passes Iran/Libyan Oil Sanctions Act: Bill Widens Split Between U.S.
and Allies OutT Use of Secondary Boycott Policy, EXPORT PRAc., July 15, 1996, at 13 (reporting
Japanese and European allegations that United States's use of secondary boycott is hypocritical).
"' See WORlD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 14, at 602.{14. To be sure, the United
States is not the first WTO Member to resort to a secondary boycotL Countries in the Arab
League have maintained a secondary boycott against firms that have relations with Israel.
See id. at 602. The signatories to the Pact of the League of Arab States, which was entered
into on March 22, 1945 at Cairo, are: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq,
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine Liberation
Organization, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates,
Yemen Arab Republic, and People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. See 2 FRANK W.
SWACKER ET AL., WORlD TRADE WITHOUT BARRIERS§ 16-2(a), at 586-87 (1996). Regarding
the last two signatories, on May 22, 1990, Yemen became a single sovereign state known as
the MRepublic of Yemen," and a member of the Arab' League. The Arab League has
maintained the boycott for many years, though some League members do not adhere to iL
This boycott is discussed in the 1970 GATT Working Party Report on the Accession of the
United Arab Republic. In defense of the secondary boycott of Israel, the representative
from the United Arab Republic stated it was political, not commercial, in nature, and
resulted from the Mextraordinary circumstances to which the Middle East area had been
exposed," including M[t]he state of war which had long prevailed in that area." See WORlD
TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 14, at 602. Accordingly, the representative concluded, Mit
would not be reasonable to ask that the United Arab Republic should do business with a
firm that transferred all or part of its profits from sales to the United Arab Republic to an
enemy country." ld. at 602. Interestingly, and perhaps somewhat hypocritically in view of
the recent use of secondary boycotts by the United States, the United States enacted
blocking legislation making it illegal for American companies to comply with the Arab
League boycotL See Stuart Anderson, Unthinking Critics . .. or Undue Sanctions7 Blow to
Trading Partners, WASH. TIMES, July 19, 1996, at A21.
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point is that while notice is not mandated by article XXI or the
Decision, it could assume an increasingly important de facto role
in reducing trade friction if the United States persists in using
increasingly aggressive, innovative, and extraterritorial types of
unilateral sanctions.
The second restraint on cowboy behavior is contained in the
introductory chapeau to article XXI(b). A sanctioning Member
is supposed to determine that its measure is necessary for the
protection of its own essential security interests. 35 For the most
part, GATT contracting parties have exercised restraint in interpreting these terms, and most WfO Members have been equally
cautious. Overall, the number of express or implicit invocations
of article XXI remains relatively small. Nevertheless, the potential for abuse exists, and the considerable criticism of recent
U.S. sanctions laws would lead some observers to doubt the
continuing power of these terms to restrain cowboy behavior.
Mter all, these terms are broad enough to encompass a variety
of circumstances, and their factual application is subjective. At
the same time, these terms are a gauge by which the world
trading community can opine on a sanctioning Member's use of
article XXI(b). Put differently, they can help shape world opinion as to whether a sanctioning Member is "crying wolf."
Consider Sweden's global import quota system for certain
footwear in effect between November 1975 and July 1977. Sweden argued that the
decrease in domestic production has become a critical threat
to the emergency planning of .Sweden's economic defense as
an integral part of the country's security policy. This policy
necessitates the maintenance of a minimum domestic production capacity in vital industries. Such a capacity is indispensable in order to secure the provision of essential products
necessary to meet basic needs in case of war or other emergency in international relations.ss

It is true that, as one contracting party said during the discussion of the 1949 Czech action, article XXI covers "goods which
were of a nature that could contribute to war potentiaL"~' For instance, it would be reasonable to include a software program or

"

See GATI art. XXI.

,.; WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 14, at 603.
" See id. at 602 (emphasis added).

1997]

Fighting Bad Guys with International Trade Law

13

hardware device within an export control measure that is not
itself used for a military purpose, but which could be converted
to that purpose.
However, upon further reflection, the gauge suggested above
illustrates why Sweden's argument is outrageous: it is a slippery
slope. Would buttons for military uniforms be necessary for the
protection of Sweden's essential security interests on the
grounds that troops are disadvantaged if they lack appropriate
attire? More generally, is article :XXI(b) really designed for potential non-military economic threats? If so, then
America's "Big Three" automakers- General Motors, Ford, and
Chrysler - could argue that Japanese auto imports should be
banned or severely restricted because of the threat they pose to
their market share in the vital passenger car industry. Likewise,
India could and has argued that it must enact extraordinary
measures against imported food to ensure self-sufficiency, especially in light of India's long-standing border conflicts.ss These
arguments, however, would stretch article :XXI(b) beyond recognition, transforming it into a commercial as well as national
security exception. The central thrust behind article :XXI(b) is
to define the requisite link between the American passenger car
industry and a threat to our national security interests or between India's food needs and its historical nemeses, Pakistan
and China. But these arguments presuppose such a link and,
thus, become self-fulfilling. To be sure, in some cases the commercial and national security interests are so intertwined that a
bright line between the two interests cannot be drawn. 59 Nonetheless, regular trade remedies condoned under other articles of
GATT, most notably the escape clause in article XIX, exist to
deal with non-military threats posed by fair foreign competition.
As another example, consider Nicaragua's argument in its
action against the United States concerning a trade embargo
38
See Uli Schmetzer, 50 Yean of F1mJom, India Thirsts fur Progms: A Nuclear Puwer ~
Many People Remain Illiterate, Modem India Is a Diverse Natiml Brimming with Contradictions,
CHI. TRIB., Aug. 10, 1997, at 1 (describing long--'ltanding border conflict between India and
China); Pakistan, India &cha"f!! Fm in Escalating Burder Conflict, VANCOUVER SUN, jan. 29,
1996, at AS (reporting on border conflict between India and Pakistan).
09
See james R. Wllch, Comment, GATT and the HalfLift of Umnium Industry Protection,
10 Nw.J. INT'L L & Bus. 150, 193 (1989) (describing relationship between uranium indus-try and national security).
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that the Reagan Administration imposed in May 1985.40 Nicaragua urged that the key terms in the article XXI (b) chapeau
constitute a self-defense requirement: a Member can invoke
article XXI(b) only after it has been subjected to aggression. In
the unadopted 1986 report, the GATT Panel decided that its
strict terms of reference prevented it from ruling on this argument.41 However, Nicaragua's argument cannot be correct. If
the drafters of GATT intended to include only self-defense cases,
then the language of article XXI would have said so expressly
and perhaps even referenced the article 51 language in the U.N.
Charter. 42 Instead, the drafters used terms that balanced competing interests to demonstrate the meaning of "essential security interests." 43 Moreover, clauses (i), (ii), and (iii) follow the
chapeau to article XXI (b), a further indication that actual aggression is not a prerequisite.
These clauses envision the invocation of article XXI (b) to
manage nuclear weapons material, arms trafficking, or an international relations emergency. If a sanctioning Member had to
wait until a hostile power acquired nuclear weapons, a
See WORlD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 14, at 601 (contending United States
must not enact restrictive trade measures of non-economic agreement).
41
See id. (holding that examination of United States's invocation of article XXI was
precluded by its mandate).
•• See U.N. CHARTER art. 51, para. 1 (providing that U.N. Charter does not prevent
Member from inherent right of self-defense against armed attack until Security Council has
acted jointly to maintain international peace and security).
43
See WORlD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 14, at 600 (discussing meaning of "essential security interests"). One of the drafters of the Havana Charter stated the following:
40

We gave a good deal of thought to the question of the security exception
which we thought should be included in the Charter. We recognized that there
was a great danger of having too wide an exception and we could not put it
into the Charter, simply by saying: "by any Member of measures relating to a
Member's security interests," because that would permit anything under the
sun. Therefore we thought it well to draft provisions which would take care of
real security interests and, at the same time, so far as we could, to limit the
exception so as to prevent the adoption of protection for maintaining industries under every conceivable circumstance .... [T]here must be some latitude
here for security measures. It is really a question of balance. We have got to
have some exceptions. We cannot make it too tight, because we cannot pr~
hibit measures which are needed purely for security reasons. On the other
hand, we cannot make it so broad that, under the guise of security, countries
will put on measures which really have a commercial purpose.
/d.
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destabilizing number or type of non-nuclear arms, or a physical
invasion, then it would be too late for trade sanctions to protect
any Member. In addition, the threat may be orchestrated by a
"military establishment," a term broad enough to include not
only sovereign governments but also major terrorist organizations or drug cartels.
At the same time, however, implicit in clauses (i), (ii}, and
(iii}, and in the words "necessary," "protection," and "essential
security interests," is the concept of a credible threat. Simply
crying wolf will not do because article XXI could not have been
designed to protect a hypersensitive government any more than
tort law protects a hypersensitive plaintiff. Rather, the test
should be objective - whether a reasonable government faced
.with the same circumstances would invoke article XXI. In sum,
Nicaragua's unduly restrictive self-defense argument should not
be used to limit article XXI. Rather, the implicit concept of a
credible threat judged from the objective standpoint of a reasonable and similarly-situated government, coupled with the articulation of specific types of dangers that track one or more of the
three clauses, must restrain cowboy behavior.
Strengthening the Restraints Against
Abusive Invocations of Article XXI(b)

C.

The two restraints discussed in the previous section - giving
prior notice to garner support, or at least minimize opposition,
to national security sanctions and using the critical terms in the
introductory chapeau to article XXI(b) as a gauge of the reasonableness of such sanctions - are not fail-safe devices against
cowboy behavior. The world· community has yet to produce such
devices. Until it does so, the risk of a corrosive effect on the
multilateral trading system from abusive invocations of article
XXI (b) is real.
One observer suggests this risk cannot be hedged, asserting
that "there may be little that can be done about" the "dangerous loophole to the obligations of GATT." 44 This statement is
unduly pessimistic. Greater coordination between the WfO and
44

jOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GAIT§ 28.4, at 748 (1969). But

see id. at 752 (suggesting that GAIT Working Party will review measures using this
loophole).
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the U.N. Security Council might ensure the proper use of article
XXI(b). 45 For example, a joint WfO-Security Council Committee on National Security Sanctions could be established to render a non-binding and non-precedential opinion in each case.
Each case could address two questions. First, does the use of
such sanctions comport with the terms of article XXI(b)? Second, are the sanctions reasonable in relation to the threat or
actual danger posed?
A more ambitious step would be to encourage the use of
national security sanctions only after an appropriate Security
Council resolution has been adopted. 46 In addition, if the answer to either of the above two questions is negative, then the
joint Committee could render an advisory opinion on counterretaliatory measures by the sanctioned and adversely affected
third-party countries. In sum, it is possible, and indeed may be
necessary, to develop checks that preserve the sovereign national
security prerogative of individual WfO Members, yet simultaneously highlight threats to the multilateral trading system posed
by abusive assertions of this prerogative.
D. Non-Controversial Provisions of Article XXI
GAIT article XXI contains three parts that are not, or at least
ought not to be, particularly controversial: sections (a), (b)(i),
and (c). Article XXI(a) assures a sanctioning Member that it has
no obligation to fumish information to the WfO or other Members that "it considers contrary to its essential national security
interests. "47 No sovereign country would be willing, or should
be expected, to surrender its ability to keep sensitive information confidential, particularly when its disclosure might compr~
mise intelligence sources. This prerogative does, and must, remain in the discretion of each country. 48 In the 1949 Czech
4

See WORlD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 14, at 609-10 (discussing article 86
'
which deals with relationship between International Trade Organization and United
Nations). Indeed, article 86 of the Havana Charter, which was not part of GATT, attempted
to sort out jurisdiction between the International Trade Organization and the United
Nations by granting the latter jurisdiction not only over political matters, but also over
economic measures adopted for political reasons. See id.
46
See id. at 603 (mentioning Security Council Resolution 502). This situation in fact
occurred during the Falkland Islands crisis. See id.
47
GATT art. XXI(a).
48
The word "itft makes clear that deciding which information is inappropriate for
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case, for instance, the U.S. representative to GAlT invoked
article XXI(a), stating that "[t]he United States does consider it
contrary to its security interest - and to the security interest of
other friendly countries - to reveal the names of the commodities that it considers to be most strategic." 49 At the same time,
invoking article XXI without disclosing any credible evidence of
a national security threat may be politically unacceptable. 50
That is, as a political matter, to preclude criticism that a sanctioning Member is crying wolf, article XXI seems to place a de
facto requirement on each sanctioning Member to present at
least a prima facie case that a real threat exists.
Article XXI(b)(i) concerns national security sanctions necessary to protect against threats from "fissionable materials" or
their parent materials. Notwithstanding the introductory chapeau
to article XXI(b), which raises interpretive issues discussed
above, 51 the particular exception in clause (i) is quite understandable. No sovereign country should concern itself with
GAlT trade obligations 'when faced with a nuclear weapons
threat. Clause (i) simply states the obvious: protecting oneself
against a nuclear weapons threat and, more generally, deterring
nuclear weapons proliferation is more important than adhering
to the GATI. 52
Likewise, article' XXI(c) states the obvious point, that maintaining international peace and s~curity by performing obligations under the U.N. Charter is more important than adhering
to GAlT rules. It ensures proper prioritization between the
WTO and the United Nations, particularly the Security Council.
Accordingly, it is, and should .be, irrelevant if trade. embargoes
or other Security Council sanctions imposed on rogue countries
violate GAlT obligations to those countries.
Notably, article XXI(c) does not expressly give WTO Members
the right to determine whether its terms are met because, in
contrast to article XXI(a) and (b), article XXI(c) does not
disclosure rests with each Member. See id. art. XXI(a).
49
See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 14, at 601-02.
50
See· infra notes 364-68 and accompanying text (discussing political issues surrounding
1996 Sanctions Act).
•• See supra notes 7-50 and accompanying text (discussing article XXI).
•• See GAIT art. XXI (stating that nothing in GAIT ·prevents any contracting party
from protecting itself against nuclear dangers).
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contain the words "which it considers." However, this omission is
not surprising. In practice, the Security Council agrees to Charter obligations concerning international peace and security, and
the problem of unilateral action is unlikely to arise in this context. For example, in 1966, the Security" Council adopted Resolution 232 requiring a trade embargo against Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe),53 and the resolution was followed by most, if not all,
GATT contracting parties.

E. Challenging the Invocation of Article XXI
The relationship between GATT articles XXI and XXIII54 is
not evident from the language of either of these articles. On the
one hand, because article XXI does not require notice, approval, or ratification, it would seem to follow that the article does
not create a right for a non-sanctioning Member to sue a sanctioning Member. On the other hand, the 1949 Czech complaint
against the United States regarding American export controls
did result in a favorable decision for the United States under
article XXIII(2) as to "whether the Government of the United
States had failed to carry out its obligations under the Agreement through its administration of the issue of export licenses."55 The contracting parties appear to have thought that mere
invocation of article XXI did not immunize a sanctioning Member from an article XXIII action. Similarly, in the discussion of
the restrictions imposed on Argentina during the Falkland Islands crisis, one party expressed the view that Argentina "reserved its rights under article XXIII in respect of any injury
resulting from trade restrictions applied in the context of Article
XXI." 56 More generally, the party stated that "the provisions of
Article XXI were subject to those of Article XXIII(2)." 57 Not
surprisingly, therefore, the above-quoted November 1982 Decision
specifies that "when action is taken under Article XXI, all
" See jACKSON, supra note 44, § 28.4, at 751 (discussing Resolution 232 as only known
example of measure falling under GATT article XXI(c)).
54
See GATT art. XXIII (concerning complaints about nullification and impairment of
benefits and resolution of disputes arising from such complaints).
55
See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 14, at 606.
56
Id.
57
ld.
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contracting parties affected by such action retain their full rights
under the General Agreement." 58
Thus, a non-sanctioning Member has a right to bring an article XXIII action and invoke the Urug;uay Rnund Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputef>9 against a
sanctioning Member's national security sanction. The basis for
the action lies in whether the sanction nullifies or impairs benefits under GATT that otherwise should accrue to the non-sanctioning Member. The resulting action, moreover, may involve
nullification or impairment either because the disputed sanction
is an outright violation of a GATT obligation60 or because of
the way in which the sanction is applied. 61 Indeed, in virtually
every case, a non-violation nullification or impairment claim is
likely to have merit because trade damage should not be in
doubt if the disputed sanction is at all effective.
However, does the right to bring an article XXIII action
mean anything in practice - is a WfO panel or Appellate Body
report likely to adjudicate the merits of a non-sanctioning
Member's attack on the invocation of article XXI? The answer is
almost assuredly negative. As the above textual analysis of article
XXI(b) indicates,62 invocation of the natimial security exception
is a matter left to the discretion of a sanctioning Member. Moreover, realpolitik6! demands that Members retain this sovereign
prerogative even if additional multilateral checks against abuse
are adopted in the future. Any attempt by the wro to encroach
on this prerogative of sovereignty would damage it in the eyes
of national legislatures.
As a practical matter, a WfO panel, like the GATT panel in
the United States-Nicaragua case, would likely interpret its terms
of reference narrowly to exclude a ruling on the substantive
article XXI arguments. Inevitably, this interpretation would
.. ld. at 607.
"" General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade- Multilateral Negotiation (the Uruguay
Round): Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
reprinted in RAJ BHAIA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE lAW- DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT 397 (1996).
60
See GATT arL XXIII(1) (a).
61
62

See id. arL XXII1(1)(b).
See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text (analyzing article XXI(b)).

"' Realpolitik is based upon the realities of national interest and power, as
distinguished from theoretical, ethical, or moralistic objectives. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1890 (3d ed. 1986).
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displease the complaining non-sanctioning Member, as it did in
the Nicaragua case. Nicaragua blocked adoption of the October
1986 report in part because of its failure to make recommendations.64 To an American litigator, this interpretation ought not
to be a surprise. U.S. courts, including the Supreme Court,
routinely seek to base a decision on less controversial procedural
grounds and thereby avoid more complex and controversial
substantive issues. Put bluntly, the 1949 decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES may prove to be the first and last major substantive ruling on the invocation of article XXI rendered under
GATT-WfO adjudication procedures.
II. FIGHTING DRUG KINGPINS: THE 1986 NARCOTICS Acr
A.

The Carrot and Stick Approach

Congress and the President have used intemational trade law
not only to deal with the threat to Americans from terrorists,
but also to combat the scourge of drugs in .American society. As
former Secretary of State James Baker suggested, both are national security threats: "there is no foreign policy issue short of
war or peace which has a more direct bearing on the well-being
of the American people" than the intemational trade of illicit
drugs. 65 Secretary Baker's statement is not hyperbole. The United Nations estimates that the intemational trade in illicit drugs
is worth $400 billion - approximately 8% of world trade more than the trading in iron, steel, or motor vehicles. 66 There
are very few commodities that the United States is more heavily
dependent upon foreign countries than drugs. Approximately
95% of the illegal narcotics consumed in the United States is
imported. 67 Moreover, about 61% of America's federal prison
population is comprised of drug law violators, and each year
about 20,000 Americans die from drug-related causes. 68
64

See WoRLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 14, at 608 (stating that Nicaraguan
delegation would not support adoption until counsel made recommendation).
65
See International NaTCOtics Contro~ 2 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 503, 516 (1991).
66
See Stephen Fidler & Jimmy Bums, IUicit Drugs TTIJde Is Put at $400 Billion, FIN.
TIMES, June 26, 1997, at 11.
67
See International NaTCOtics Contro~ supra note 65, at 516 (describing domestic impact of
international narcotics).
68
See Martin Wolf, The Profit of Prohibition, FIN. TIMES, July 22, 1997, at 12. Ironically,
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Worldwide, about 22% of people infected with the HIV virus are
intravenous drug users. 69
Among the particularly severe drug threats to the United
States are cocaine and heroin. 70 Both cocaine and heroin are
highly addictive. 71 Extracted from the coca leaf, cocaine and its
derivative "crack" are stimulants that destroy their addicts within
a few months or years while heroin, derived from opium, is a
depressant that can be used over decades. 72 Both cocaine and
heroin are highly profitable: by one . estimate, the wholesale
price of a kilogram of cocaine may range from $15,000 to
$30,000, and the wholesale price of heroin may range from
$180,000 to $200,000. 7s Another estimate tracks the stunning
markups at each stage of distribution:
The price of opium to a Pakistani fanner is $90 a
kilogramme. The wholesale price of heroin in Pakistan is

$2,870. Wholesale in the United States, heroin is $80,000.
The final retail price, at 40 percent purity, is $290,000. Similarly, South American peasants receive $610 a kilogramme for
their coca leaves. Cocaine base is $860, while cocaine hydrochloride is $1,500. Wholesale in the United States, at 83 per
cent purity, it is worth $25,250. As crack cocaine it is $50,000
to the consumer and as cocaine powder $110,000. 74
Both drugs originate almost entirely from overseas: Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru account for essentially all of the world's coca
cultivation, 75 and the "Golden Triangle" countries of Myanmar
the fatality figure is less than the annual number of deaths attributed to alcohol or tobacco
·
- 100,000 and 400,000, respectively. See id.
.. See id.
70
See Intematitmal Narcotics Control Efforts in the Western Hemisphere, 6 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH
30!1, !1!17 (1995) (providing statement of Roben Gelbard, Assistant Secretary for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, before Subcommittee on Western
Hemisphere of House International Relations Committee, Mar. 29, 1995); Intematimlal
Narcotics Control - 1990, 2 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 40!1, 417 (1991) (describing threat of
cocaine, "crack," and heroin to American society).
71
See Mohammad Ghanea, A Retrospective Study ofPoisoning in Tehran, !15 J. TOXICOLOGY
!187 (1997).
.
72
See Summary of Af!rill993 International Narcotics Control Report. 4 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH
225, 2!18 (199!1) (illustrating switch of drug producers to heroin as drug of 1990s).
73
See id. (highlighting wholesale prices of heroin and cocaine).
74
Wolf, supra note 68, at 14.
75
See International Narcotics Control Strategy ReJxrrt Released, 6 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 183,
19~97 (1995) (providing statements of Timothy E. Winh, Undersecretary for Global Mfairs, and Roben S. Gelbard, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law En-
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(Burma), Laos, and Thailand account for 75% of the world's
opium production. 76 Most of the balance of the world's opium
production occurs in the "Golden Crescent" countries of Iran,
Mghanistan, and Pakistan. 77 During the early 1990s, the share
of the illicit drug industry in the gross domestic product was 6%
in Peru, more than 7% in Colombia, and more than 9% in
Bolivia. 78 The most important Burmese and Mghan exports are
also drugs.
In an effort to combat the scourge of drugs, Congress amended the Trade Act of 1974 with title IX of the Drug Enforcement, Education, and Control Act in 1986, also known as the
1986 Narcotics Act. 79 The 1986 Narcotics Act is a "carrot and
stick" approach to dealing with the problem of illegal drug
smuggling into the United States and the threat of foreignsourced drug production. The 1986 Narcotics Act empowers the
President to take unilateral trade actions against a country producing or transporting drugs if that country does not cooperate
fully with the U.S. government in keeping drugs out of the
United States. 80 These "stick" actions are to be taken as of
March 1 of each year. 81 The "carrot" is the possibility of obtaining presidential certification that would exempt a country from
trade sanctions. 82
The carrot and stick approach of the 1986 Narcotics Act reflects an important development in U.S. strategy in the war on
drugs. Until Congress passed this Act, the United States concentrated much of its effort on interdiction - intercepting drug
shipments during transit from the source countries of the drugs
forcement Affairs, Mar. 1, 1995). The article also notes that Peru and Bolivia together produce more than 80% of the world's coca, and that Burma is the world's largest producer of
heroin. See id.; su also Summary of Aprill993 International Narcotics Control Repent. supra note
72, at 237 (stating that Peru accounts for more than 60% of world coca cultivation, with
Columbia and Bolivia comprising majority of remainder).
76
See Summary of April1993 International Narcotics Control Repent. supra note 72, at 238
(discussing opium production in Burma, l.aos, Thailand, and Afghanistan).
77
See Grant Peck, Drug Traffic Moving Along New Asian Routes, Hous. CHRON., July 7,
1996, at 26.
78
See Wolf, supra note 68, at 12-14 (stating U.N. estimates of percentage of gross domestic product that illegal drug trade comprises in Peru, Bolivia, and Columbia).
79
See Narcotics Control Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2491-2495 (1994).
80
See id. § 2492(a).
81
82

See id.
See id. § 2492(b)(1)(E).
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to the U.S. border. Interdiction is a game of cat and mouse that
raises the cost of doing business for drug producers and traffickers each time a seizure occurs. However, interdiction cannot
stem the wave of drug smuggling. As the State Department declared in 1995, "We are not satisfied with simply raising the cost
of doing business for the traffickers." 85 The 1986 Narcotics Act
reflects what might be called a "source country" strategy. The
major source countries of drugs are identified; the weak link in
the chain from drug production overseas to drug sales in the
United States is attacked, namely the drug crops lying dormant
in the field. 84 This strategy is attractive because the bulk of
world production of cocaine and heroin is concentrated in a
relatively small number of countries.
The 1986 Narcotics Act identifies two target classes of possible
unilateral trade sanctions: "major drug producing countries,"
and "major drug-transit countries." 85 A major drug producing
country is defined by the annual output of opium, cocaine base,
or marijuana produced in that country. Specifically, it is a country that illegally produces at least five metric tons of opium or
opium derivative, 500 metric tons of coca, or 500 metric tons of
marijuana during one fiscal year. 86 A major drug-transit country
is a conduit for narcotics or a money laundering center. It is a
country "that is a significant direct source of illicit narcotic or
psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances significantly
affecting" the United States.87 In addition, the country's govem"' International Narrotic.s Control Effurts in the Western Hemisphere, supra note 70, at 338
(furnishing statement of Robert Gelbard, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs, before Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere of House
International Relations Committee, March 29, 1995).
84
See Yielding to U.S., Thais Target opium F~elds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct 4, 1981, at 21. For a
discussion of the source country strategy from the Clinton Administration's perspective, see
Drug Control in the Western Hemisphere, 7 DEP'T OF ST. DISP. 293, 310-12 (providing statement
of RobertS. Gelbard, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs before Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere of House International Relations
Committee,June 6, 1996) .
.. ~ 19 u.s.c. § 2492(b)(1)(C).
86
See id. § 2495 (2).
87
/d. § 2495(3) (A). The Secretary of State, after consulting with Congress, established
numerical standards and other guidelines for determining which countries are significant
direct sources of drugs. See id. § 2492(e) (establishing duty of Secretary of State to determine major drug-transit countries). The term •narcotic or psychotropic drugs" is defined
either by an applicable international narcotics control agreement, or by the domestic law
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ment must either know or be in complicity with drug transporting and money-laundering of significant sums of drug-related
profits.88 To establish a suspect country as a major drug producing country, it is unnecessary to demonstrate that a country's
government is involved in producing or trafficking drugs.
1. The Stick: Trade Sanctions
The 1986 Narcotics Act establishes the stick- five sanctions
the President must impose on a major drug producing or drugtransit country. 89 Although the sanctions are mandatory in most
cases, the President has some discretion whether to impose any
or all of the sanctions.90 First, the President may revoke any
preferential treatment afforded to the country's products under
the Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP"), Caribbean Basin
Initiative ("CBI"), or other ~referential scheme.91 Second, the
President may impose an additional duty of up to 50% ad valorem on any or all of the country's products, and he may impose
a duty of up to 50% on duty-free products.92 Third, the President may suspend air carrier transportation between the United
States and the country, and may terminate any air service agreement with the country.9s Fourth, the President may withdraw
U.S. personnel and resources that are participating in a service
arrangement for customs pre-clearance.94 Finally, a country
whose government is involved in illegal drug trade or that fails
to cooperate with U.S. narcotics enforcement activities cannot
receive a quota allocation for sugar imports into the United
States.95 In the abstract, these sanctions may not appear
of the country concerned. See id. § 2495(4).
88
See id. § 2495(3)(B)-(C).
89
See id. § 2492 (presenting sanctions available). Some of these sanctions were added
to the Act by section 806 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FISCal Years 1988 and
1989 and section 4408 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. See id. §§ 2492, 2495(3) (C).
90
See id. § 2492(a)(6).
91
See id. § 2492(a) (1) (allowing President to deny tariff treatment to any or all of
country's products).
92
See id. § 2492(a) (2)-(3). The first and second sanctions apply to imports that are
placed into, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, during the period the action
is in effecL See id. § 2492(c).
•• See id. § 2492(a)(4), (d).
94
See id. § 2492(a)(5).
.. See id. § 2493.
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particularly severe. In some cases, however, the first and second
sanctions may inflict harm on another country and thereby
cause it to alter its behavior with respect to drug production or
transit.
2. The Carrot: Certification
The 1986 Narcotics Act contains an important exception to
these sanctions. The United States will not impose sanctions on
a major drug producing or drug-transit country if the President
determines and certifies to Congress that, during the previous
year, the country "has cooperated fully" with the United States,
or "has taken adequate steps on its own," to change its behavior.96 The four certification criteria97 are the carrot in the
1986 Narcotics Act because they attempt to compel a major
drug producing or drug-transit country to alter its behavior and
thereby avoid the stick of trade sanctions. 98 Because there is no
definition of "cooperation fully" or "adequate steps," the President has considerable discretion in using the carrot.
First, a m,Yor drug producing or drug-transit country must
reach a bilateral or multilateral narcotics agreement with the
United States and cooperate fully with the U.S. government in
satisfying the agreement's goals. 99 The statute contemplates an
agreement with specific objectives: to reduce drug production,
consumption, and trafficking within the country, and address
illicit crop eradication and crop substitution. 100 Under the
agreement's ·terms, a nation must also increase drug interdiction
See id. § 2492(b)(1)(A)(i).
See id. (providing that unfavorable tariff treaunent shall not apply to countries that
adhere to certain drug control practices). These criteria are similar to the criteria set forth
in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. Whereas the stick in the 1986 Narcotics
Act is trade sanctions, the stick in the 1961 Act is the withholding of U.S. foreign aid from
major drug producing and drug-transit countries, and the opposition to loans to such
countries from multilateral development banks. Compa7ll22 U.S.C. § 2291j(b) (1994) (providing President with two considerations for certification) with 19 U.S.C. § 2492(b) (1) (providing President with four considerations for certification). (The original version of the
1961 Act is Pub. L. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (1961)). The certification is due on March I of
each year. See 19 U.S.C. § 2492(b)(1)(A); 22 U.S.C. § 2291h(a).
98
See 19 U.S.C. § 2492(a) (requiring imposition of sanctions upon major drug producing or drug-transit countries).
99
See id. § 2492(b)(1)(A)(i)(I).
100
See id. § 2492(b)(1)(B)(i).
96

97
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and enforcement, drug education and treatment programs, cooperate with U.S. drug enforcement officials, and participate in
extradition, mutual legal assistance, sharing of evidence, and
other treaties aimed at drug enforcement. 101 The country must
also identify and eliminate illicit drug laboratories, as well as the
trafficking of essential precursor chemicals used to produce
illegal drugs. 102 If a country has already been designated as a
major drug producing or drug-transit country during the previous year/ 05 the President similarly cannot certify a country as
cooperating fully with the United States unless that country
enacts a bilateral or multilateral narcotics agreement. 104 This
requirement induces countries to enter into such an agreement.
Second, a country must cooperate fully with the United States
to prevent illegal drug sales and transports to U.S. government
personnel and their dependents. 105 Unfortunately, the statute
does not specify how a country is to prevent drugs from being
sold to U.S. government personnel, particularly where a U.S.
government official is determined to buy drugs. Certainly, a
country cannot be expected to police the behavior of U.S. officials within a U.S. embassy, which is U.S. property, and where
U.S. officials may enjoy diplomatic immunity.
Third, before the President certifies a major drug producing
or drug-transit country, that country must also cooperate fully
with the United States to prevent and punish the laundering of
drug-related profits in that country. This requirement may prove
especially difficult for smaller countries with limited law enforcement resources and little experience in prosecuting sophisticated
white-collar crimes. Money laundering cases typically involve
extensive and painstaking investigation. For example, it may be
necessary to trace wire transfers of funds among banks around
the world, which may require obtaining exemptions from applicable bank secrecy laws. 106 These tasks are likely to require the
See id. § 2492(b)(1)(A)(i)(l), (B)(ii)-(iii), (vi)-(vii).
See id. § 2492(b)(1)(A)(i)(l), (B)(iv)-(v).
10
'
See id. § 2492(b)(1)(C).
104 See id.
105
See id. § 2492(b)(1)(A)(i)(II).
106
For a discussion of wire transfer transactions and law, see ERNEST PATRIKIS ET AL.,
WIRE TRANSFERS 3-14 (1993). See also Cleaning Up DiTty Money, ECONOMIST, july 26, 1997, at
14 (arguing that bank secrecy laws must be change if more "laundrymen" are to be held
101

102
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assistance of bank regulators in relevant countries. Further, money laundering is a criminal offense requiring proof that the
funds in question were generated by drug sales and that they
were laundered. 107
The final requirement for certification takes aim at official
corruption that often is connected with drug production and
trade. A major drug producing or transit country must cooperate fully with the United States to prevent and punish bribery
and other public corruption that facilitates the production, prc:r
cessing, and shipment of illegal drugs, or that discourages the
investigation and prosecution of these acts. 108 This requirement
may prove difficult in a country whose government is riddled
with corruption. "Clean" government officials may lack the political clout to punish bribery and 'other corrupt acts by "dirty"
officials. Indeed, they may fear for their own lives. Even in a less
extreme situation, rooting out corruption may be difficult.
The statute imposes one further requirement to obtain presidential certification, pertaining· to a major drug producing or
drug-transit country that produces licit opium. 109 The opium
producing country must take steps to prevent significant diversion of its licit cultivation and production into the illicit market,
maintain production and stockpiles at levels no higher than
those consistent with licit market demand, and prevent illicit
cultivation and production.uo This requirement acknowledges
the legitimate reasons for producing opium and induces countries to act against the illicit market.
Consider the 1997 certification of Mexico granted by President Clinton under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 ("1961
Assistance Act"), as amended.m The President certified Mexico
accountable); That Infernal Washing Machine, ECONOMIST, July 26, 1997, at 19 (stating that
Switzerland and Cayman Islands made it easier for bankers to report suspect transactions
without breaking bank-secrecy laws). For overviews of U.S. and international efforts to combat money laundering, see generally Raj Bhala et al., Legal Aspects of Money Laundering, 3
MAlAYAN LJ. xxxiii (1991).
107
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957 (1994) (identifying specified unlawful activities under 1986 Money Laundering Control Act).
108
See 19 U.S.C. § 2492(b)(1)(A)(i)(IV).
109
See id. § 2492(b)(1)(E).
110 See id.
"' See 22 U.S.C §§ 2151-2430 (1994). 22 U.S.C. §§ 2291-2291j concern international
narcotics control. These sections require the President to prepare a list of major drug pro-
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as a full partner in the U.S. war on drugs despite the arrest of
Mexico's top anti-narcotics law enforcement official on charges
of collaboration with drug traffickers. 112 The House of Representatives voted 251 to 175 against the President's certification, m and the Senate voted ninety-four to five in favor of a
non-binding resolution criticizing the certification. 114 This
ducing and drug-transit countries and withhold half of most U.S. government assistance
until the President certifies that they have cooperated fully with the United States in the
war on drugs. See id. § 2291j(a)(1). A country that receives full certification receives the
balance of U.S. aid that had been withheld when that country was designated a major drug
producing or drug-transit country. All aid (except humanitarian and counter-narcotics
assistance) is cut off immediately to a major drug producing or drug-transit country that is
denied certification. See id. § 2291j(e). Also, the United States must vote against loans from
a multilateral development bank for the decertified country, and the country is ineligible
for U.S. Export-Import Bank financing and all benefits from the Overseas Private Investment Corporation ("OPIC") other than insurance. See id. § 2291j(a)(2). Afghanistan,
Myanmar (Burma), Colombia, Iran, Nigeria, and Syria are prominent examples of decertified countries. See Rossella Brevetti, Senaton Introduce Resolution to Revme Administrntion' s
Drug Certification of Mexico, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 410, 41(}.11 (Mar. 5, 1997) (discussing Senators Corerdell, Helms, and Feinstein's introduction of joint resolution to reverse
Mexico's certification as reliable partner on war on drugs); Sen. lY Amato Introduces Resolution to Deny Me:cican Drug Certification, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 426, 426 (Mar. 13, 1996)
(reporting Senate Banking Committee Chairman's introduction of joint resolution denying
Mexico certification under Foreign Assistance Act's anti-drug trafficking provision)..
A
major drug producing or drug-transit country that fails to meet the requirements for full
certification may receive a "vital national interests" certification, meaning that it would not
be in the vital U.S. interests to cut off assistance to that country. Lebanon and Pakistan are
examples of countries that have received vital national interests certifications. See 22 U.S.C.
§ 2291j(b)(3); Brevetti, suflm, at 41(}.11 (examining requirements for certification and proposed joint resolution to reverse Mexico's certification). Congress can overturn a presidential certification by passing a joint resolution of disapproval within 30 days following the
certification. See22 U.S.C. § 2291j(d).
For brief overviews of how the 1961 Act operates, see Intemational Narrotics Control
Efforts in the Western Hemisphere, supra note 70, at 337-42 (providing statement of Robert S.
Gelbard, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, before Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere of House International Relations Committee);
see also International Narcotics Control Strategy Repqrt Released, supra note 75, at 195-97 (providing statements of Timothy E. Wirth, Undersecretary for Global Affairs and Robert S.
Gelbard, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs).
112
See Brevetti, supra note 111, at 410 (discussing Mexico's failure to substantially reduce drug trade and organized crime).
"' See House Appruues Decertification Delay Measu~ fur Me:cico with Conditions Attached, 14
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 525, 525 (Mar. 19, 1997) (describing Senate vote to reject Clinton
administration's certification of Mexico as reliable anti-drug ally while staying certification
for 90 days to allow Mexico to respond).
11
'
See Rossella Brevetti, Senate Approves Compromise Measu~ on U.S.-Me:cico Drug Cooperation, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 556, 556 (Mar. 26, 1997) (discussing Senate vote criticism
of Mexico's anti-drug efforts).
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congressional action was not surprising in the wake of the arrest.
While the arrest signified that Mexico was making some progress, many members of Congress questioned the integrity of
Mexico's entire law enforcement apparatus. Moreover, by 1996,
more than half of all cocaine entering the United States came
through Mexico. 115 Mexico had become a major money laundering center even though it had introduced legislation to
criminalize money laundering and fight organized crime. 116
However, the President's certification was foreseeable. The
Clinton administration had invested considerable time and money in forging closer ties with Mexico and helping it develop
economically through two controversial events: Mexico's inclusion in the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA")
and the multi-billion dollar rescue package 117 arranged for
Mexico after its peso crisis. Politically, President Clinton was not
in a position to reverse course and impose trade sanctions on
Mexico. At the same time, the Republican Congress assuredly
did not fail to point out Mexico's shortcomings in the war on
drugs. 118 The end result reflected this political stand-off.
The 1961 Assistance Act and 1986 Narcotics Act work in tandem, in a manner analogous to a cross-default clause in an
international loan agreement. For example, suppose a country
fails to obtain certification and does not qualify for the "vital
national interests waiver," discussed below, under the 1961 Assistance Act. Because the certification and waiver criteria are similar to the criteria in the 1986 Narcotics Act, the country should
not be certified under the 1986 Narcotics Act. The result would
be a loss of foreign assistance and the imposition of trade sanctions under the 1961 Assistance Act.
"' See Gustavo Gonzalez, Chile-Drugs: Mexican Drug Cmtel Bid to Tap Asian Marl!et Thwarted, INTER PREss SERV., August 15, 1997, at 2.
116
See Fact Sheet: CooperatiJm with Mexico - in OuT Nationallntemst, 7 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH

249, 257-59 (1996) (describing steps taken by Mexico to expand enforcement and reform
criminal justice system to more effectively combat drug trafficking and organized crime).
117
See Nora Lusting, Mexico in Crisis, the U.S. to the Rescue: The Financial Assistance Packages of 1982 and 1995, 2 UCLAJ. INr'L L. 25, 25 (1997). The Department of Treasury administered the funds through the Exchange Stabilization Fund. See id.
118
See Brevetti, supa note 111, at 410-11 (discussing Senator.~' introduction of joint
resolution to rever.~e Mexico's certification as reliable partner in war on drugs).
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The 1986 Narcotics Act provides guidance to the President in
administering the above four certification criteria to determine
whether the government of a major drug producing or transit
country is cooperating fully with the United States, or making
adequate efforts on its own in the war on drugs. The 1986 Narcotics Act lists eleven issues the President must consider when
evaluating a government for potential certification. 119 First, has
the government of that country acted to effect "the maximum
reductions in illicit drug production" that the U.S. government
has determined to be achievable? 120 Second, has the foreign
government adopted judicial and law enforcement measures to
eliminate illicit drug production and trafficking, as evidenced by
seizures of drugs and illicit laboratories and prosecutions of
violators? 121 Third, has the foreign government adopted judicial
and law enforcement measures to eliminate money laundering,
as evidenced by the enactment of anti-money laundering laws
and cooperation with U.S. anti-money laundering efforts? 122
Fourth, has the foreign government adopted judicial and law
enforcement measures to eliminate bribery and other forms of
public corruption that facilitate drug production and trafficking
and discourage investigation and prosecution? 123 Fifth, has the
foreign government, as a matter of policy, encouraged or facilitated the production or distribution of illegal drugs? 124 Sixth,
does any senior official of the foreign government engage in,
encourage, or facilitate the production or distribution of illegal
drugs? 125 Seventh, has the foreign government aggressively investigated cases in which a U.S. drug enforcement official has
119
See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2491·2495 (1994). These 11 issues are similar to the issues raised in
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. Compare 22 U.S.C. § 2291j(b) (1994) with
19 U.S.C. § 2492(b) (2) (highlighting similarities in criteria President considers when deter·
mining certification).
120
See 19 U.S.C. § 2492(b)(2)(A) (describing factor President considers regarding cer·
tification). Pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, the U.S. govern·
ment sets specific numerical reduction targets for each major drug producing country to
which the United States proposes to give foreign aid. See generally 22 U.S.C. § 2291j(b) (2)
(discussing considerations regarding cooperation, including reductions in illicit produc·
tion).
121
See 19 U.S.C. § 2492(b)(2)(B).
122
See id. § 2492(b)(2)(C).
123
See id. § 2492(b) (2) (D).
12
See id. § 2492(b) (2) (E).
'
125
See id. § 2492(b) (2) (F).
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been the victim of acts or threats of violence, inflicted by or in
complicity with a law enforcement officer, and has the government "energetically sought to bring the perpetrators . . . to justice?"126 Eighth, has the foreign government failed to provide
reasonable cooperation to U.S. drug enforcement officials, including the refusal to allow these officials to pursue aerial smugglers a reasonable distance into the airspace of the foreign
country? 127 Ninth, has the foreign government revised its conspiracy and asset seizure laws to combat drug traffickers more
effectively? 128 Tenth, has the foreign government expeditiously
processed U.S. extradition requests relating to drug traffickers?129 Finally, has the foreign government protected or granted safe haven to known drug traffickers? 1so
While the President must consider these eleven questions in
applying the certification criteria, the precise statutory language
. used to frame several of these questions leaves considerable
room for the President to maneuver. For example, the second,
third, and fourth questions contain the phrase "to the maximum
extent possible." m Thus, using the fourth question as an example, the President must decide whether a foreign government
has taken measures against money laundering to the maximum
extent possible. Similar flexible wording is contained in other
questions. For instance, the sixth question uses the term "senior
official" but does not define this term; the seventh question asks
the President to determine whether a foreign government has
investigated cases aggressively and brought perpetrators to justice
energetically; the eighth question inquires about reasonable
cooperation and a reasonable invasion of airspace; and the
ninth question addresses expeditious processing of extradition
requests. 1s2 In sum, while the statute provides the President
with a checklist of issues to consider in applying the certification
criteria, this subjective checklist invites the President to exercise
discretion.
126

See
See
128
See
129
See
"" See
1
"
See
132
See
127

id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.

§
§
§
§
§
§
§

2492(b)(2)(G).
2492(b)(2)(H).
2492(b)(2)(1).
2492(b) (2) (J).
2492 (b )(2)(K) ..
2492(b)(2)(A)-(D).
2492(b)(2)(J).
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B. The Vital National Interests Waiver
Even if a country is a major drug producing or transit country
and even if it fails to meet the four certification criteria, the
country may still avoid the stick of sanctions under the 1986
Narcotics Act. This possibility depends upon whether, from the
U.S. perspective, sanctions would be counterproductive. The
President may determine and certify to Congress that the "vital
national interests" of the United States require that it not apply
sanctions. m
The President must define why imposing sanctions on a particular country that does not meet the certification criteria is
counterproductive. In doing so, the President should consider
whether imposition of sanctions would, on balance, promote
U.S. anti-drug efforts. However, the statutory language allows the
President to define the interest at stake to include matters indirectly related to these efforts. 154
Countries are likely to obtain a vital national interests waiver
in five scenarios. For example, in 1987 and 1988, President
Reagan found that Laos had failed to cooperate fully with the
United States on narcotics control and to take adequate steps
on its own. Nonetheless, he gave Laos a vital national interests
certification in both years to promote continuing investigations
of Americans missing in action and prisoners of the Vietnam
War. 155 Plainly, the United States has a unique issue to address
with Laos that qualifies as a vital national interest. Second, suppose the non-certified country is a principal U.S. supplier of a
precious commodity, and there is no other readily available
substitute source. Examples include oil from Saudi Arabia, or
certain minerals like uranium from countries such as Russia.
The non-certified country's supplier status may effectively
"" See id. § 2492(b)(1)(A)(ii) (stating inapplicability of subsection (a) to country in
which United States has vital national interest).
'" See id. (discussing inapplicability of sanctions to countries in which United States has
vital national interest).
135
See Global Narcotics Cooperation and Presidential Certification, DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct. 1989,
at 49, 50. (providing statement of Ann B. Wrobleski, Assistant Secretary for International
Narcotics Matters, before Senate Foreign Relations Committee); PresiJJential Certification of
Narcotics Source Countries, DEP'T ST. BULL., June 1988, at 47, 48-50, (providing statement of
Ann B. Wrobleski, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics Matters, before Senate
Foreign Relations Committee).
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immunize it from sanctions. Third, suppose the non-certified
country could inflict significant economic damage to U.S.
businesses through a denial of market access or government
procurement contracts. China would be an obvious example of a
country that may be too big to penalize. A fourth category of
non-certified country is one that might be too dangerous to
penalize. Such a country may be able to inflict significant
damage to American military and civilian personnel working
abroad. Egypt and Turkey might be examples. Finally, consider a
country in which the United States has too much invested to
sanction. Surely Mexico, a partner in NAFTA, is a case in point.
Certainly, these five illustrations or .categories of countries
likely to obtain a vital national interests waiver are not mutually
exclusive. A country may be fortunate to obtain a waiver of
sanctions because more than one of these broader national
interests, not directly connected with. the drug trade, are at
stake. Whatever the reasons for a vital national interests waiver,
the President must, in certifying that such interests are at stake,
explain these reasons. The President's statement must include a
full and co~plete description of relevant vital national interests
if the United States imposes trade sanctions against a major
drug producing or drug-transit country. 1116 Further, the President must weigh all·of the risks at stake.
Plainly, a vital national interests waiver is an important safety
valve or escape clause that is also contained in the amended
1961 Assistance Act. In that statutory context, President Clinton
has not hesitated to employ the waiver to avoid cutting off most
foreign assistance to foreign governments and voting against
their requests for loans from multilateral development banks.
For example, in 1994, the President did not certify ten of twenty-six countries reviewed; however several of these countries
received vital national interests waivers to avoid U.S. sanctions. m Lebanon and Afghanistan were among these countries.1!11

,,. See 19 U.S.C. § 2492(b)(l)(D) (providing when President may grant vital national
waiver interest to country).
'" See Combating International Narrotics TraJficking, 5 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 421, 440-44
(1994) (providing statement of Robert S. Gelbard, Assistant Secretary for International
Narcotics Matters, before House Foreign Affairs Committee, June 22, 1994).
18
"
See id. Other counuies that received a vital national interests waiver were Bolivia,
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The United States based Lebanon's waiver on the need to
continue promoting economic and political stability and to avoid
a devolution of Lebanon into a chaos similar to that in the
1980s when terrorists held many Americans hostage in and
around Beirut. IS!l Mghanistan 's 1994 vital national interests
waiver also was based on the need to promote political order
after years of war. 140 In both cases, President Clinton determined that encouraging political stability would be more helpful
in promoting counter-narcotics efforts than imposing sanctions.141 In contrast, the President declined to certify and also
could not justify a waiver for Burma, Iran, and Syria, three
countries notorious for their involvement or acquiescence regarding drugs and terrorism.
Congress has the last word regarding presidential determinations and certifications regarding both exceptions. It may disapprove a certification and require the imposition of sanctions
through a joint resolution. 142 Congress must enact this resolution within forty-five legislative days of the President's certification.145 Accordingly, any sanctions imposed remain in effect
until the President makes a certification excepting a country
from sanctions, forty-five legislative days have elapsed, and Congress has not enacted a joint resolution of disapproval during
that forty-five day period.

C. An Imperialistic Statute?
Our trading partners may consider the 1986 Narcotics Act to
be an imperialistic statute. In defending the certification process
under the amended 1961 Assistance Act, the Department of
State claims that "[n]arcotics certification is an honest process,"
"[w]e do not seek to embarrass governments," and "[w]e do not
Laos, Panama, and Peru. See id.
139
See Michael Isikoff, World Output of Narcotics Soan, Congress Told; Annual State
Department Repurt Notes Undermining of Law Enfurumenl Effurts, WASH. Posr, Mar. 2, 1990, at
A24 (reporting grant of waiver to Lebanon to restore stability).
140
See Elaine Sciolino, U.S. Pinpoints Nicaragua on Worldwide Heroin Traffic, N.Y. TIMEs,
Apr. 5, 1994, at A3 (describing grant of waiver to Mghanistan).
141
See id. (illustrating Clinton's willingness to sacrifice narcotics enforcement for
stability in Lebanon and Mghanistan).
142
See 19 u.s.c. § 2492(b)(3) (1994).
143
See id.
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want to force them to adopt our standards." 144 Because the
certification process under the 1986 Narcotics Act is very similar
to that under the 1961 Assistance Act, it may be reasonable to
assume that the State Department would defend the 1986 Narcotics Act process in a like manner. However, such a defense is
dubious for three reasons.
First, the certification process - how a country can avoid the
imposition of trade sanctions - can be highly political. A country may fall victim to trade sanctions, or avoid such sanctions,
due to considerations far afield from the war on drugs. The case
of Mexico, discussed above, illustrates the point.
·
Second, the 1986 Narcotics Act focuses and visits blame entirely on drug-supplying countries. It pays no attention to the
tremendous demand for drugs by Americans. Consider the statement of former Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew:
Let me give you an example that encapsulates the whole
difference between America and Singapore. America has a vicious drug problem. How does it solve it? It goes around the
world helping other anti-narcotic agencies to try and stop the
suppliers. It pays for helicopters, defoliating agents and so
on. And when provoked, it captures the President of Panama
and brings ·him to trial in Florida. Singapore does not have
that option. We can't go to Bunna and capture the warlords
there. What we can do is pass a law which says that any customs officer or policeman who sees anybody in Singapore
behaving suspiciously, leading him to suspect the person is
under the influence of drugs, can require the man to have
his urine tested. If the sample is found to contain drugs, the
man immediately goes for treatment. [And, of course, if the
drug supplier is caught, then he is hanged.] In America if
you did that it would be an invasion of the individual's rights
and you would be sued. 145

The profoundly embarrassing fact is that while Americans constitute no more than 5% of the world's population, we are responsible for about 70% of the world's cocaine consumption and
roughly 10% of the world's heroin consumption. 146 Nonethe144

Combating International Narcotics Trafficking, supra note 137, at 442.

'" TOMMY T.B. KOH, THE UNITED STATES AND EAsT AsiA: CONFLICT AND COOPERATION

10()..()1 (1995).
146
See Assruing the Current Trends in opium Production and Heroin Trafficking, 3 DEP'T ST.
DISPATCH 461, 469 (1992) (furnishing statement of Melvyn Levitsky, Assistant Secretary for
International Narcotics Matters before House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and
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less, a foreign country may be penalized for supplying a substance that a large number of Americans demand. 147 Curtailing
demand, in addition to spotlighting supply, might yield improved results in the war on drugs and not antagonize our allies.
Third, even the State Department admits that some governments of drug-supplying countries lack the ability, assuming they
have the will, to reduce or eliminate drug production in their
territory. Consider the context in which the governments of
Laos, Mghanistan, and Burma, all major heroin-producing countries, 148 must lead an anti-heroin campaign. Laos has "a difficult geography, an impecunious central government that has
delegated fiscal responsibility to regional entities and thus lost
some measure of control, and a dependency on international
institutions for external financing." 149 In Mghanistan, years of
warfare diverted government attention from the problem of
poppy cultivation; without a vigorous central government, Mghanistan fell under the thumb of regional commanders who
are akin to feudal warlords. 150 Moreover, Mghanistan is
plagued by a "devastated economy and a large refugee population." 151 In Burma, the ruling State Law and Order Restoration
Commission is hardly a sympathetic government. 152 Insurgent
armies in Burma control the poppy fields in areas largely out of
the central government's reach. 155 The Rangoon government
Control, June 9, 1992).
"' See Joseph B. Treaster, The 1992 Campaign: Candidates' Recurd.s; Four Yean of Bush's
Drug War. New Funds but an 0/Jl Strategy, N.Y. TIMEs, July 28, 1992, at A1 (reporting on penalties for supplying drugs).
148
See Andrew B. Campbell, Note, The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine: A Jurisdictional Weapon in the
War on Dru,g:s, 23 VAND.j. TRANSNAT'L L 385, 393 (1990).
1
.. A.s.wsing the Currmt Trends in opium Production and Heroin Trafficking, supra note 146,
at 469.
150 See id.
151 /d.
152
See Lori Fisler Darnrosch, Politics Acrass Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforr:ible Influence
Over Domestic Affairs, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 50 n.138 (1989) (describing United States's curtailed .economic relations with Burma pending political change); Patricia Stirling, The Use of
Trade Sanctions as an Enforcement Mechanism for Basic Human Rjghts: A Proposal for Addition to
the World Trade Organization, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL 'v 1, 31 (1996) (describing United
States's failed attempts to correct Burma's human rights violations); Thomas K. Ragland,
Note, Burma's Rohinjyas in Crisis: Protection of •Humanitarian • Refugees Under International
Law, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ. 301, 302 (1994) (describing human rights violations of
State Law and Order Restoration Commission).
153
See K.l. Douglas, War and the Global opium Supply, 21 FLETCHER F. WORlD AFF. 121,
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allows poppy cultivation in return for peaceful coexistence with
these armies. 154
Imagine the· reaction in the United States if our trading partners enacted a converse. piece of legislation. This hypothetical
bill would mandate the identificatio~ and publication of major
drug-consuming countries; the United States surely would be
blacklisted. Such legislation would require the United· States to
cooperate fully with its trading partners to reduce drug demand
or take steps on its own according to criteria set by our trading
partners. These criteria would include creating drug rehabilitation programs, prosecution initiatives, and the commitment of
specific budgetary allocations to support these efforts. The criteria also would include enactment of the death penalty for drug
traffickers and its prominent advertisement on the U.S. Customs
form filled out by all persons entering the United States. 1!;!;
Failure to satisfy these criteria could lead to denial of access to
our trading partners' markets in key sectors like agriculture,
services, and aviation. This hypothetical legislation, if enacted by
a trading partner, would undoubtedly provoke outrage in the
United States; however, the 1986 Narcotics Act is precisely this
. sort of legislation visited l;lPOn our partners.
Ill. FIGHTING FIDEL: THE 1996 HELMs-BURTON Acr
A. Two Themes: The "Overthrow Castro" Act and
Its Defensible Features
Aside from section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended/56 few U.S. international trade statutes have generated as
much controversy as the Helms-Burton Act. 1!;7 The language

128 (1997) (describing Burmese hilltribes' control of poppy fields) .
... See id.
'" Mter all, this penalty exists in key trading partners like Malaysia, Indonesia, and
Singapore, and (as any traveler to these destinations knows) it is prominently displayed on
immigration and customs entry forms to these countries. See, e.g., Sidney L. Harring, Death,

Drugs and Deuelopment: Malaysia's Mandatory Death Penalty fur TraJJickers and the International
War on Drugs, 29 COLUM.J. 'TRANSNAT'L L. 365 (1991) (describing mandatory death penalty
for drug trafficking in Malaysia).
156
See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2419 (1994) (amending rights and regulations of Trade Act).
For a discussion of section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, see BHALA, supra note 4, at 1059.
157
See 22 U.S.CA §§ 6021-6091 (West Supp. 1997). The Act is named after its principal
co-sponsors, Republican Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina and Republican
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and legislative history of the Helms-Burton Act indicate that its
fundamental objective is to overthrow Fidel Castro's communist
dictatorship in Cuba. 158 In this regard, the Act is more aggressive - more offensive and less defensive in nature - than any
other U.S. national security sanctions legislation. No doubt many
share this objective to overthrow Castro, including congressional
cnt:J.cs of the Ace 59 and, more importantly, persons in
Cuba. 160 Whether international trade law is an appropriate or
effective means of achieving this objective, however, is a divisive
issue that pits the United States against many of its most important trading partners and divides the ranks of American trade
policy makers and observers. The American public is almost
evenly split in its opinion about the Helms-Burton Act, with 45%
in favor and 48% opposed. 161
Indeed, the United States has come under intense pressure to
modify or repeal the act from its key trading partners, including
Representative Dan Burton of Indiana. For a section-by-section account of the similarities
and differences between the House bill and Senate amendment and the resulting language
adopted by a joint Congressional committee, see JOINT ExPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE
COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, H. CONF. REP. NO. 104-468 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 558.
Coverage of the Helms-Burton Act in the business media has been extensive, and
space does not permit citation herein of all of the articles. Some of the excellent pieces
include: Biter Bitten: japanese Firms Acquisitions, ECONOMIST, Apr. 25, 1992, at 85 (discussing
state of Japan's industry); Stephen Fidler, Comment and Analysis: The Long Ann of American
Law, FIN. TIMES, July 8, 1996 (stating that Helms-Burton Act has angered Cuba as well as
other trading partners of United States); Deroy Murdock, Cuba - This Island of Lost
Potential, WORlD TRADE, Aug. 1997, at 28 (proposing that Helms-Burton Act allows
Americans to sue foreign companies that deal with property of American firms nationalized
by Castro); Therese Raphael, U.S. and Europe Clash wer Cuba, WAIL ST.]., Mar. 31, 1997, at
A14 (discussing U.S. trading partners' anger over Helms-Bunon Act); Carla Anne Robbins,
Sherritt Officials to & Barred from U.S., WAIL ST.J.,July 11, 1996, at All (illustrating pressure
that United States is putting on Cuban and American allies that trade with Cuba); Anneke
van Dok-van Weele, U.S. Should Quit &ssing Its Friends, INT'L HERALD TRm. (France),July 1,
1997, at 10 (criticizing Helms-Burton Act).
158
See H.R REP. No. 104-202 (1995), at 22, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 527, 527
(stating that Helms-Bunon Act would take proactive steps to encourage early end to Castro
regime and would direct President to suppon transition to democratic government in
Cuba).
159
See id. at 57, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 556 (stating dissenting views that agree
that Castro "must go" and Cuba must make difficult transition to democracy and free
markets, but rightly questioning how to advance U.S. national interest).
160
See id. (arguing that Cuba's real problem is Castro's authoritarian system).
161
See Americans Against Helms-Burton ITy Small Ma?gin, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 699,
699 (Apr. 16, 1997).
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the European Union ("EU"), Canada, Mexico, China, and Japan.
For example, three months after the Act took effect, the U.N.
General Assembly approved a non-binding resolution calling for
an end to all U.S. economic measures against Cuba. One hundred thirty-seven countries voted in favor of the resolution, twenty-five abstained, and just three - the United States, Israel, and
Uzbekistan - voted against the resolution. 162 In the fall of
1996, the EU brought a WTO action against the United States
concerning the Act. 163 This action prompted the United States
to suggest that the wro had no jurisdiction to determine
whether the Act was in America's national security interests under article XXI of GATT. 164 For the time being, the EU has
agreed to suspend the action if President Clinton (1) reassures
the EU that he will continue to suspend the application of civil
liability for trafficking in confiscated property until his term
expires in January 2001, and (2) obtains congressional authority
to waive the provision excluding aliens, their spouses, and their
minor children from the United States who traffic in such property.165 The EU has accused the United States of not following
162

See U.N. General Assembly Votes fur End to Cuba Embargo, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
1755, 1755 (Nov. 13, 1996).
165
See Audit of U.S. Trade Policies Is GeneraUy Favorable, Helms-Burton Questioned, 13 Int'1
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1733, 1733 (Nov. 13, 1996) (discussing WTO members' response to
Helms-Burton Act); EU Takes Action Against U.S. Helms-Burton, IY Amato Acts, 8 EURECOM 1
(1996) (indicating that EU agreed on October 1, 1996 to challenge Helms-Burton Act in
WTO); Guy dejonquie'res, EU to Ro.ise Stakes in Trade Law Row with U.S., FIN. DMES, Feb. 3,
1997, at 1 (stating that EU will ask WTO director-general to name members of panel).
164
See Rossella Brevetti et al., U.S. Says "7'0 Panel Not Competent to Judge Cuba Dispute,
Hopes to Settle, 14 lnt'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 351 (Feb. 26, 1997); Cuban Feud, FIN. DMES, Feb.
4, 1997, at 21 (stating that EU claims United States's objection to WTO action on HelmsBurton Act could threaten WTO); Guy de Jonquie'res, U.S. Dodges Bnwels Onslaught. FIN.
TIMES, Feb. 21, 1997, at 6; Guy de Jonquie'res & Nancy Dunne, U.S. Leaves Dour Ajar in Row
with EU Over Cuba TratU, FIN. DMES, Feb. 21, 1997, at 18 (stating that United States would
formally object to formation ofWTO panel on Helms-Burton dispute).
,., See Lionel Barber & Guy de Jonquie'res, Brussels and U.S. in Deal to.End Cuba Trade
Rift, FIN. DMES, Apr. 12, 1997, at 1 (stating that jesse Helms did not believe that Congress
would grant President Clinton's request to amend Helms-Burton Act); Guy de Jonquie'res,
EU Delays Clash on U.S. Anti-Cuba Law, FIN. DMES, Feb. 13, 1997, at 5 (stating that EU asked
WTO to postpone establishment of dispute panel); EU Suspends Effort to Challenge in WTO
Helms-Burton Legislation, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 742, 742 (Apr. 23, 1997) (stating that
WTO action over Helms-Burton Act is waived unless United States takes action under Act
against EU companies); Gary G. Yerkey, EU Said Not Planning to Revive Challenge to HelmsBurton Challenge. 14 lnt'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1040, 1040 Uune 11, 1997) (explaining that
EU agreed to suspend its request for WTO panel immediately); Gary G. Yerkey, U.S., EU
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through on the second commitment; indeed, in June 1997, the
House of Representatives approved legislation to tighten the
alien exclusion provision by requiring that the State Department
report on companies whose officials might be sanctioned under
the provision. 166
To its supporters, the Helms-Burton Act provides a vital safeguard against physical threats to U.S. national security posed by
Castro's regime, a reinforcement of the importance private property ownership plays in economic development, and a noble
effort to support human rights and civil liberties in Cuba. 167
President Clinton calls the Act "a justified response to the Cuban govemment's unjustified, unlawful attack on two unarmed
U.S. civilian aircraft that left three U.S. citizens and one U.S.
resident dead," and a reaffirmation of "our common goal of
promoting a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba by tightening the existing embargo while reaching out to the Cuban
people." 168 To its detractors, the Act is an outrageous and
Approve Plan to Resolve Dispute Ouer Helms-BuTton, OJJicials Say, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
686, 686 (Apr. 16, 1997) (stating that EU would waive its case in WTO in exchange for
United States's amending Helms-Burton Act).
166
See EU Warns It Wall Reinstate Complaint on Helms-BuTton if Congress Tightens Law, 14
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1089, 1089 Oune 18, 1997); GOP Howe Member3 Pms Administration
on Helms-BuTton Title IV Implemmtation, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1148, 1148 Ouly 2, 1997).
In July 1997, Stet, an Italian telecommunications group and one of Europe's largest
investors in Cuba, immunized itself from suit under the Helms-Burton AcL Stet agreed to
pay compensation to America's ITT for its confiscated Cuban assets. See Guy de Jonquie'res
& Emma Tucker, Keeping the Lid on Helms-BuTton, FIN. 'nMES, July 31, 1997, at 4. Stet
benefits from these assets by providing telecommunications services to Cuba, but ITT
promised not to sue Stet because of the compensation arrangemenL The State Department
agreed to exempt Stet from the visa denial provisions of the Helms-Burton AcL See id.
167
See H.R REP. No. 104-202, at 22-30 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. 527, 527535.
168
Statement by President of the United States, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 479, 479
(Mar. 18, 1996).
The U.S. trade embargo was imposed under the 1917 Trading With the Enemy Act
("TWEA"), Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and Cuban Democracy Act of 1992. The
relevant provision of TWEA under which a trade embargo against Cuba was imposed is 50
U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1994). The relevant provision of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
pursuant to which sanctions were imposed on Cuba is 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a) (1994). The
relevant sections of the Cuban Democracy Act is 22 U.S.C. § 6001 (1994). See also 22
U.S.CA § 6040 (West Supp. 1997) (describing provision of Helms-Burton Act in which
Congress acknowledges existing import restrictions on Cuban products); H.R REP. No.
104-202, at 34, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. at 539-40 (discussing legislative history of
section 6040); JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMfiTEE OF CONFERENCE, H.R
CONF. REP. No. 104-468, at 46 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. 558, 561 (expressing
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possibly illegal extraterritorial assertion of U.S. jurisdiction, 169
another example of America's annoying tendency to act unilaterally in the world trading system, and a reflection of American
naivete about the efficacy of trade sanctions to achieve political
aims. 170 Indeed, the Act's critics in Congress argue that it
"marks a radical shift in U.S. foreign policy" 171 that plays into
Castro's hands. 172 As the treatment below suggests, the truth
about the Act lies somewhere in the middle between these two
extreme views.
Proponents of the Helms-Burton Act often understate or fail
to articulate arguments in favor of the Act because they are
mesmerized by their own anti-Castro rhetoric. While some of the
critics' arguments are overstated or rebuttable, some of the critiprofound conviction of Joint Committee of Conference that executive branch agencies
must be more vigorous in enforcement of certain provisions of U.S. embargo on Cuba).
For overviews of the trade embargo, see generally Annie Swank, The U.S. Trade
Embargo Against Cuba: The Time Has Come to End this Cold-War Relic, 4 CURRENTS 14 (1995)
(discussing history of U.S. embargo against Cuba).
169
See, e.g., Neil Buckley, U.S. Extra-territorial Trade Laws A~ EU, FIN. TIMEs, July 30,
1997, at 4 (discussing Stet-ITT-State Department agreement to shield Stet from HelmsBurton Act).
170
See Archie Dunham, Alternatives to Unilateral Trade Sanctions, WASH. TIMES, May 25,
1997, at B4 (chronicling past failures of trade sanctions to achieve foreign policy goals).
171
H.R. REP. No. 104-202, at 53, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 551 (dissenting views).
172
See id. at 57, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 556 (dissenting views). Helms-Burton is
not without its critics:
H.R. 927 [i.e., the Helms-Burton Act] is not a status quo bill, it is an
extreme bill. It toughens the embargo against Cuba and tightens the noose on
the Cuban people. It adopts measures against Cuba harsher than those against
the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
A policy of contact, dialogue, and exchange with Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union helped foster a democratic revolution ....
Those who favor increased isolation of Cuba have a responsibility to explain why the engagement that helped kill communism in Eastern Europe and
the Soviet Union should not be the hallmark of our policy toward Cuba.
Throughout the past 36 years, Castro has used two mechanisms to relieve
pressure on his regime - letting his people take to the seas and appealing to
Cuban nationalism. This bill hands Castro a fresh deck of nationalist cards....
This bill, he says, proves that exiled Cubans want to tum the clock back to
1958. .
The message should be clear to all: this bill gives Castro new scapegoats to
distract the Cuban people from their real problem: Castro's authoritarian system.

Id.
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cisms are more powerful than the critics themselves seem to
realize. Not surprisingly, neither proponents nor critics are entirely correct, and a more balanced view of the Act is needed.
The starting point is to recognize that all international trade
lawyers and their clients must live with, or ignore at their peril,
the Act's sanctions for as long as Castro remains in power. If
the longevity and resilience of China's Mao, the Soviet Union's
Stalin, Albania's Hoaxa, and North Korea's Kim II Sung and
Kim Jong II, are any gauge, then certainly Castro is not
planning for retirement in the near future. Indeed, a June 1997
EU report found neither progress in human rights nor
movement toward a pluralistic democracy in Cuba. 175
As a technical legal matter, the Helms-Burton Act is not difficult to understand. The rights and obligations that the Act creates are relatively straightforward, and its provisions are generally
clear. However, as intimated above, at a deeper level the Act is
difficult to grasp because its emotional and sometimes bombastic
language masks a variety of policy goals and associated sanctions.
Whether these goals are appropriate and whether the sanctions
support the goals, are issues that divide the Act's supporters
from its opponents. One approach toward a balanced view of
the Act is ( 1) to identify the underlying policies and the reasons
for those policies; then (2) to understand the specific types of
sanctions set forth in the Act and consider how they support
one or more of the policy goals; and finally (3) to appraise the
arguments for and against the sanctions and goals. This threestep approach is adopted below.
The policies underlying the Helms-Burton Act can be placed
into three related groups: property, freedom, and physical security. First, the Act seeks to redress American claims regarding
property confiscated by Castro's government and more generally
support the right of individuals to hold and enjoy private property in Cuba. 174 Second, the Act aims to promote both human
"' See joe Kilwin, EU &pm1 Cites No Progress on Cuba Human Jljght.s Issues, 14 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 1147, 1147 Guiy 2, 1997) (discussing Cuba's lack of progress in human rights
and democratic reforms).
174
See 22 U.S.C.A. § 6022(6) (West Supp. 1997) (stating that pwpose of Helms-Burton
Act is to protect U.S. nationals against confiscatory takings and wrongful trafficking in
property confiscated by Castro regime); H.R. REP. No. 104-202, at 22, reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 527 (stating that Helms-Burton Act would take proactive steps to provide
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rights, as set forth in the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and civil liberties, as understood from
an American perspective, in Cuba. 175 Third, the Act attempts
to safeguard the United States against physical threats posed by
the Castro regime. 176
These three policies are equally important and, indeed, integrally related; each addresses America's long-term interest in
creating an economically robust and politically stable neighbor
and trading partner who will not jeopardize national security. A
pluralistic political system ensures that an extremist leader - a
madman like Iraq's Saddam Hussein- will not plunge a country into war. 177 With a robust economy, a country has too
much to lose to risk a reallocation of resources and destruction
of property associated with war. 178 The logic, based partly on
historical experience frorri the First and Second World Wars and
the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, is that prosperous democracies tend not to go to war with, or threaten violence against,
one another. 179 In enacting the Helms-Burton Act, Congress
expressed the reasonable view that respect for private property is
a prerequisite for economic progress, 180 while economic stagnation breeds instability that could threaten U.S. national
additional protection for rights of U.S. nationals whose property had been illegally
confiscated by Cuban government).
,. See 22 U.S.CA § 6022(1) (stating that purpose of HeJ.ms..Burton Act is to assist
Cuban people in regaining their freedom and prosperity); H.R. REP. No. 104-202, at 23,
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. at 528 (observing that •Fidel Castro is alone in the Americas"
and reviewing abysmal human rights record of his regime).
176
See 22 U.S.CA § 6022(3) (stating that purpose of HeJ.ms..Burton Act is to provide for
continued national security of United States against continuing threats from Castro
government). These threats encompass terrorism, the theft of property from U.S. nationals,
and political manipulation of many Cubans' desire to escape that results in a mass
migration to the United States. See id.
177
See Hisashi Owada, lnternatUmal Agmda ofjapan for the Nineties, 84 AM. SOc'V INT'L L.
PRoc. 95, 9S.99 (1990) (stating that pluralistic political systems ensure political peace).
178
See id. (noting pluralistic political systems produce economic prosperity).
179
See Maxwell 0. Chibundu, Law in Develbpment: On Tapping, Guunling, and Serving
Palm-Wine, 29 CAsE W. REs.]. INT'L L. 167, 207~8 n.124 (1997) (presenting President
Clinton's speech to United Nations which emphasized that democracy is rooted in compromise, not conquest).
180
See H.R. REP. No. 104-202, at 24, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. 527, 529 (arguing
that economic development is not possible without private property, and property rights do
not exist in Cuba today, hence legislation protects property rights and undermines lawless
exploitation of property that jeopardizes prospects for future trade and investment).
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security. 181 Likewise, respect for human rights and civil liberties
is another prerequisite for economic progress, which, in turn,
leads to prosperity and stability. 182 Since 1959, when Castro
assumed power, his lack of respect for private property, human
rights, and civil liberties has been accompanied by direct and
indirect physical threats to, and confrontations with, Americans.
These threats, which the Helms-Burton Act expressly states
would be acts of aggression, 183 include ( 1) Cuban government
attempts to construct and operate nuclear facilities under substandard conditions that, were an accident to occur, would
threaten parts of the United States as far north as Washington,
D.C. with radioactive poisoning/ 84 (2) the operation of intelligence facilities to gather sensitive information that may be used
against the United States/ 85 and (3) the encouragement of
U.S. border control problems by motivating waves of Cubans to
escape repression and poverty and seek asylum in the United
States. 186 The confrontations include the October 1962 Cuban
missile crisis 187 and the February 24, 1996 incident when
Cuban MiG fighters deliberately shot down two unarmed private
American planes outside of the airspace over Cuba's twelve-mile
181
See Annual Public Review of National Security Thrw.ts to the United States: Hearings Befm1!
the Senate Select Comm. on lntelligmce, 104th Gong. (1997) (statement of George Tenet,
Acting Director, Central Intelligence Agency) (discussing impact of economic stagnation
on situation in North Korea and Iran).
1
. . See 22
U.S.CA § 6031(1) (West Supp. 1997) (defining Castro's regime as
perpetrating human rights violations and threatening international peace).
183
See id. § 6031.
184
See id. § 6031(3)-(4) (discussing threat to U.S. national security posed by operation
of any nuclear facilities in Cuba).
185
See id. § 6031(3) (discussing threat to U.S. national security presented by Cuban
intelligence activities).
186
See id. § 6031(4) (discussing threat to U.S. national security posed by mass migration
from Cuba).
187
See ROBERT F. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN DAYS: A MEMOIR OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 2~
128 (1969) (discussing Cuban missile crisis). The literature on this crisis is voluminous but
Robert F. Kennedy's account is one of the most riveting. See id.
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territorial sea limit. 188 The four crew members aboard, three
U.S. citizens and one permanent resident, were killed. 189
The policy consequences of this logic are obvious. America's
long-term national security interest boils down to the simple
objective behind the Helms-Burton Act - assisting the Cuban
people to replace Castro's communist dictatorship with a transitional government that will eventually lead to a bona fide
pluralistic democracy. For evidence of this objective, the statement of the Act's purposes is excellent testimony:
The purposes of this Act are (2) to strengthen international sanctions against the Castro
government;
(4)
(5)

To encourage the holding of free and fair democratic
elections in Cuba, conducted under the supervision of
internationally recognized observers; [and]
to provide a policy framework for United States support
to the Cuban people in response to the formation of a
transition government or a democratically elected government in Cuba . . . .190

The Act contains additional supporting testimony. For instance,
the President is authorized to support non-governmental organizations and individuals in their efforts to build democracy in
Cuba. 191 Further, in thinly veiled statutory terms, Congress incites the Cuban people to radically change their political and
economic status quo.
The policy of the United States is ...
(1) To support the self-determination of the Cuban people.
(3)

To encourage the Cuban people to empuwer themselves with a
government which reflects the self-determination of the Cuban

people.

188

See 22 U.S.C.A. § 6046 (condemning Cuban attack on defenseless planes of
"Brothers to the Rescue," Miami-based humanitarian organization that was searching for
and aiding Cuban refugees in Straits of Florida); Statement on Signing the Cuban Liberty
and Democratic Solidarity (UBERTAD) Act of 1996, 32 WEEKLY CoMP. PREs. Doc. 479, 479
(Mar. 12, 1996).
189
See Statement by President of the United States, supra note 168, at 479.
100
22 U.S.C.A. § 6022.
091
See id. § 6039(a) (authorizing President to furnish assistance and other support to
such organizations and individuals).
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To recognize the potential for a difficult transition from
the current regime in Cuba that may result from the initiatives taken by the Cuban people for self-determination
in response to the intransigence of the Castro regime in
not allowing any substantive political or economic reforms, and to be prepared to provide the Cuban people
with humanitarian, developmental, and other economic
assistance. 192

To implement this policy, several provisions in the Helms-Burton
Act direct the President to prepare for a post-Castro Cuba. First,
the President should develop a multinational economic assistance plan from the United States, other countries, and international financial institutions/ 9s and create an administrative apparatus to distribute this aid to a post-Castro Cuba. 194 Second,
after a democratically elected government replaces the Castro
regime, the President should report to Congress about significant barriers to United States-Cuban trade and the possibility of
extending MFN treatment to Cuba, designate Cuba as a beneficiary under the Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP") or
program Caribbean Basin Initiative ("CBI"), and negotiate the
accession of Cuba to the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA"). 195 Third, once the Castro regime is overthrown,
the President should suspend, and eventually end, the U.S. trade
embargo against Cuba. 196
As the above testimony suggests, the Cold War-era technique
of CIA-sponsored assassinations of foreign leaders has probably

192

193

/d. § 6061.
See id. § 6062(a)(1), (e) (directing President to develop plan for providing economic

assistance when traditional or democratically elected government is in power). Interestingly, the Act directs the President to communicate the plan to the Cuban people, but does
not say when the communication should occur. See id. § 6062(f). Presumably, Congress
would like the President to communicate the plan even before Castro is overthrown so that
the Cuban people have some degree of comfort that foreign assistance will be forthcoming.
See generaUy H.R REP. No. 104-202, at 26, 36-38 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. 527,
530, 541-43 (discussing provisions regarding preparation for inevitable democratic transition in Cuba); jOINT ExPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CoNFERENCE, H.R
CoNF. REP. No. 104-468, at 52-53 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. 558, 567-68 (discussing same provisions as H.R Rep. No. 104-202).
194
See 22 U.S.CA § 6063 (describing coordination and implementation of assistance
programs).
195
See id. § 6062(h) (providing for reports on trade and investment relations).
196
See id. § 6064(a), (c) (establishing termination of economic embargo).
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ended. In its place, economic assassinations ~ccur through unilateral trade action.
The course of action prescribed by H.R 927, as amended
[i.e., the Helms-Burton Act], preseiVes U.S. credibility with
the Cuban people as one of the few countries not willing to put
aside what it knows about the Castro regime in exchange for mythical market-share. H.R 927, as amended, seeks to break the status
quo by extending an offer of broad U.S. support for a peaceful transition and providing disincentives to investment in
Cuba by companies whose ventures might otherwise buoy the
regime by exploiting the labor of the Cuban people and the
property of U.S. citizens whose property in Cuba was wrongfully confiscated. 197
In truth, the Helms-Burton Act might as well be called the
"Overthrow Castro" Act. That rubric accurately describes how the
United States has unilaterally defined its national security interest under article XXI of GATT, and thereby justified the sanction measures set forth in the Act.
The policies concerning property, freedom, physical security,
and the bottom-line goal of toppling Castro, also resonate in the
congressional "findings." These are dramatic and stunningly
blunt statements not normally, if ever, found in an international
trade statute. Regarding property, consider section 301 of the
Helms-Burton Act:
(1) Individuals enjoy a fundamental right to own and· enjoy
property which is enshrined in the United States Constitution.
(2) The wrongful confiscation or taking of property belonging to United States nationals by the Cuban Government, and the subsequent exploitation of this property
at the expense of the rightful owner, undermines the
comity of nations, the free flow of commerce, and economic
development.
(3) Since Fidel Castro seized power in Cuba in 1959 (A) he has trampled on the fundamental rights of the
Cuban people; and
(B) through his personal despotism, he has confiscated
the property of (i)
(ii)
197

millions of his own citizens;
thousands of United States nationals; and

H.R REP. No. 104-202, at 24, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. at 529.
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(iii) thousands more Cubans who claimed asylum
in the United States as refugees because of
persecution and later became naturalized
citizens of the United States.

(5)

(6)

The Cuban Government is offering foreign investors the
opportunity to purchase an equity interest in, manage,
or enter into joint ventures using property and assets
some of which were confiscated from United States
nationals.
This "trafficking" in confiscated property provides badly
needed financial benefit[s], including hard currency, oil,
and productive investment and expertise, to the current
Cuban Government and thus undermines the foreign policy
of the United States (A) to bring democratic institutions to Cuba through the
pressure of a general economic embargo at a time
when the Castro regime has proven to be vulnerable to international economic pressure; and
(B) to protect the claims of United States nationals who
had property wrongfully confiscated by the Cuban
Government. 198

Regarding freedom and physical security, section 2 of the Act
contains further "findings" stated in unmistakably combative
terms and is highly suggestive of the fundamental goal of overthrowing the Castro regime:
(I)
(2)

( 3)

( 4)

198

The economy of Cuba has experienced a decline of at
least 60 percent in the last 5 years [i.e., between 199095] ....
At the same time, the welfare and health of the Cuban
people have substantially deteriorated as a result of this
economic decline and the refusal of the Castro regime to
permit free and fair democratic elections in Cuba.
The Castro regime has made it abundantly clear that it wiU
not engage in any substantive political reforms that would lead
to democracy, a market economy, or an economic recooery.
The repression of the Cuban people, including a ban on free
and fair democratic elections, and continuing violations of
fundamental human rights, have isolated the Cuban regime as the only completely nondemocratic government
in the Western Hemisphere.

22 U.S.C.A. § 6081 (emphasis added).
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As long as free elections are not held in Cuba, the economic
condition of the country and the welfare of the Cuban
people will not improve in any significant way.
The totalitarian nature of the Castro regime has deprived the Cuban people of any peaceful means to
improve their· condition and has led thousands of Cuban citizens· to risk· or lose their lives in dangerous attempts to escape from Cuba to freedom.

The United States . . . considers it a moral obligation, to
promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms
as expressed in the Charter of the United Nations and
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

(13) The Cuban government engages in the illegal international narcotics trade and harbors fugitives from justice
in the United States.
( 14) The Castro government threatens international peace and
security by engaging in acts of armed subversion and temnism
such as the training and supplying of groups dedicated to
international violence.
(15) The Castro government has utilized from its inception and
continues to utilize torture in various furms (including by
psychiatry), as weU as execution, exile, confiscation, political
imprisonment, and other furms of terror and repression, as [a]
means of retaining power.
(16) Fidel Castro has defined democratic pluralism as "pluralistic
garbage"' and continues to make clear that he has no intention
of tolerating the democratization of Cuban society.
( 17) The Castro government holds innocent Cubans hostage
in Cuba by no fault of the hostages themselves solely
because relatives have escaped the country.
(18) Although a signatory state to the 1928 Inter-American
Convention on Asylum and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (which protects the right to
leave one's own country), Cuba nevertheless surrounds
embassies in its capital by armed forces to thwart the
right of its citizens to seek asylum and systematically
denies that right ·to the Cuban people, punishing them
by imprisonment for seeking to leave the country and
killing them for attempting to do so (as demonstrated
in the case of the confirmed murder of over 40 men,
women, and ·children who were seeking to leave Cuba
on July 13, 1994).
(20) The United Nations Commission on Human Rights has
repeatedly reported on the unacceptable human rights
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situation in Cuba and has taken the extraordinary step
of appointing a Special Rapporteur.
(21) The Cuban Government has consistently refused access
to the Special Rapporteur and formally expressed its
decision not to "implement so much as one comma" of
the United Nations Resolutions appointing the Rapporteur.
(23) Article 39 of ... the United Nations Charter provides
that the United Nations Security Council "shall determine the existence of any threat to peace . . . ."
(24) The United Nations has determined that massive and systematic violations of human rights may constitute a "threat to
peace" under Article 39 and has imposed sanctions due to

such violations of human rights in the cases of Rhodesia,
South Africa, Iraq, and the former Yugoslavia.
(27) The Cuban people deserve to be assisted in a decisive manner
to end the tyranny that has oppressed them for 36 years, and
the continued failure to do so constitutes ethicaUy improper

conduct by the international community.
(28) For the past 36 years, the Cuban Government has posed and
continues to pose a national security threat to the United

States. 199

In sum, the above-quoted Congressional findings on the record
from the Helms-Burton Act leave no doubt that the Act's primary purpose is to shake up the current Cuban status quo.
The international community already has accepted the use of
multilateral economic sanctions to attempt a fundamental
change in a target country's status quo that may incite a popular overthrow of the government. 200 But is Helms-Burton's use
of unilateral trade action to overthrow a government legitimate?
It seems that if a prima facie case in favor of this objective can
be made under GATT article XXI, then notwithstanding all of
the other obligations in GATT and the Uruguay Round agreements, nothing in the GATT-WfO system forbids such action.
Moreover, nothing in this system confers subject matter jurisdic199
200

/d. § 6021 (emphasis added).
See Steve Mufson & Lawrence Ingrassia, Smah Africa Looks Capable of Suroiving Sane·

tinns fur Years- But at a Stiff Price, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 1985 (reporting on economic sanctions against South Africa); Carla Anne Robbins, Containing Saddam Remains a Challenge,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 1996, at All (describing multilateral economic sanctions against
Iraq).
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tion on a WTO panel, the Appellate Body, or the Dispute Settlement Body to determine whether a case has been made. Indeed,
the prima facie case may be necessary not because of article
XXI, but rather to persuade other countries of the substantive
basis for the action. In this instance, perhaps reasonable minds
can differ as to whether Castro's Cuba poses a national security
threat to the United States. To concede subject matter jurisdiction would involve an extraordinary ceding of sovereignty inconceivable in the present international political economy. Undoubtedly, there are philosophical grounds, and perhaps even good
policy reasons, in favor of a revolutionary shift in subject matter
jurisdiction on national security matters, but such arguments are
beyond the scope of this Article. 201
Although the "Overthrow Castro Act" theme resonates
throughout the Helms-Burton J\ct, a second theme emerges,
suggesting that several of the Act's sanctions are defensible
when critically appraised. That is not to say these sanctions are
wise public policy, or that they are invulnerable to criticism on
doctrinal grounds. Rather, it is to counterpoint the critics of the
Helms-Burton Act, many of whom would have international
trade law observers believe that the Act is rotten to the core. In
truth, several of its provisions are modest and entirely within the
sovereign prerogative of the United States, and even the more
controversial provisions are arguably legitimate.
To flesh out these two themes, it is important to understand
how the Helms-Burton Act implements the property, freedom,
and physical threat policies to hasten Castro's downfall. The
Helms-Burton tactic is to impose three distinct categories of
sanctions that might be termed "foreign assistance" sanctions,
"ostracism"· sanctions, and "trafficking" sanctions. Each category
is discussed in greater detail below. In brief, foreign assistance
sanctions refer to the withdrawal or withholding of U.S. foreign
assistance to countries that aid or abet the Castro regime. Ostracism sanctions are measures that further isolate Cuba from the
mainstream of the world trading system. Trafficking sanctions
201

See Raj Bhala, Hegtlian Reflections on Unilateral Action in the World Trading System, 16
BERKEI.EYJ.lNT'L L. (forthcoming Spring 1998) (proposing philosophical argument regarding shift in subject matter jurisdiction).
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are liabilities for engaging in transactions in American proper205
tf02 conflscated
by the Castro regime. All three categories
202
See 22 U.S.CA § 6023(4), (12) (defining •confiscated" and "property"). The term
"property" is broadly defined to include any kind of property - real property, personal
property, intellectual property, and security interests - and covers present, future, and
contingent rights and interests. See id. Thus, for example, if the Castro regime confiscated
inheritance rights under a will and produced a product in violation of a patent right in a
state-owned enterprise, the beneficiary of the inheritance rights and the patent holder
might be potential claurumts under the Helms-Burton Act.
20
The definition of "confiscated" obviously relies on another important term: "proper'
ty." See id. The term "confiscated" (or, equivalently, "confiscated property") is commonplace
in the Act. See id. § 6067(a) (requiring Secretary of State to prepare report on claims held
by U.S. nationals regarding property that Castro regime had confiscated); id. § 6081 (listing
congressional findings on confiscated property); id. § 6082 (creating liability for trafficking
in confiscated property); id. § 6083 (concerning proof of ownership claims to confiscated
property); id. § 6091 (b) (excluding any alien who has trafficked in confiscated property
from United States). It refers to:

(A) the nationalization, expropriation, or other seizure by the Cuban Govern-

ment of ownership or control of property(i)
without the property having been returned or adequate and effective compensation provided; or
(ii)
without the claim to the property having been settled pursuant to
an international claims settlement agreement or other mutually
accepted settlement procedure; and
(B) the repudiation by the Cuban Government of, the default by the Cuban
Government on, or the failure of the Cuban Government to pay(i)
a debt of any enterprise which has been nationalized, expropriated,
or otherwise taken by the Cuban Government;
(ii)
a debt which is a charge on property nationalized, expropriated, or
otherwise taken by the Cuban Government; or
(iii) a debt which was incurred by the Cuban Government in satisfaction or settlement of a confiscated property claim.
Id. § 6023(4).
Of course, the terms "confiscated" and "property" refer to property owned by a "United States national." Thus, whether the beneficiary and patent holder in the preceding
example actually have a claim under the Act depends on whether they are "United States
nationals." Any U.S. citizen, and any other legal entity organized under federal or state law
with its principal place of business in the United States, is a "United States national." See id.
§ 6023(15). It is extremely significant that a person need not have been a "United States
national" (in particular, a U.S. citizen) at the time the Castro regime confiscated the property. See H.R. REP. No. 104-202, at 31 (1995), -rtprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. 527, 536 (stating that "[p]ersons who were not United States citizens at the time their property in Cuba
was confiscated but who subsequently became United States citizens are included within the
definition of a United States national" (emphasis added)).
Consider a likely example: the factory of a Cuban citizen living in Havana is seized by
the government in 1960, and no compensation is paid. The citizen escapes Cuba in 1961
and resettles legally in Miami, becoming a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1970. This person is
considered a "United States national" under the Helms-Burton Act. Accordingly, a substan-
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of sanctions are designed to tighten the economic noose around
Cuba and thereby hasten the demise of the regime. The unstated logic is that the Cuban people are rational actors who will
weigh the costs and benefits of Castro's communism and eventually conclude that, on balance, this system impedes their economic and political development. Mter all, is this calculation not
unlike the one made by millions of people in the former Soviet
bloc countries? Of course, this logic assumes that, unlike many
Iraqi and Iranian citizens, the Cubans populace will not rally
around their leader in the face of "America the Bully."
B. Definitions of Key Terms

How the sanction measures operate in practice depends in
part on certain key terms. The definitions of three of these
terms are relevant to the fundamental objective of the HelmsBurton Act, the overthrow of the Castro regime, and merit discussion at the outset. 204 That is, all three definitions concern
the ruling government and none would be necessary but for this
fundamental objective.
First, the unqualified term "Cuban Government" refers to "the
government of any political subdivision of Cuba, and any agency
or instrumentality of the Government of Cuba." 205 While this
definition does not expressly refer to the present Castro regime,
that implication is clear from the remaining two definitions, a
"transition government in Cuba" and a "democratically elected
government in Cuba." 206 Both definitions envision a change in
the status quo - the removal of Fidel Castro from power and rely on the President to determine whether the enumerated
criteria are fulfilled.
tial number of Cuban-Americans whose property was taken from them by Castro, and who

then fled Cuba for the United States and subsequendy became U.S. citizens, are eligible to
file suits under the AcL
204
See H.R REP. No. 104-202, at 31, ~nted in 1996 U.S.C.C.AN. at 536 (discussing
legislative history of key terms).
206
22 U.S.C.A § 6023(5).
206
See id. § 6023(14) (defining •transition government in Cuba"); id. § 6023(6)
(defining ·democratically elected government in Cuba"); H.R REP. No. 104-202, ·at 38,
~nted in 1996 U.S.C.C.AN. at 543-44 (discussing definitions of these terms); JOINT
ExPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE CoMMITI'EE OF CoNFERENCE, H.R CoNF. REP. NO. 104468, at 54-56 (1996), ~in 1996 U.S.C.C.AN. 558, 569-71 (explaining drafting history
of these terms).
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To qualify as a transition government in Cuba, at a minimum,
the President must determine that Cuba has met the following
eight criteria: the government has ( 1) legalized all political activity; (2) released all political prisoners and allowed in~ernational
human rights inspectors to examine Cuban prisons; (3) dissolved
the state secret police apparatus; (4) made public commitments
to hold free and fair elections for a new government within
eighteen months after the transition government assumes power,
an election in which all political parties have full and equal
access to the media and international observers supervise; (5)
ceased interference with Television Marti and Radio Marti broadcasts; (6) made public commitments and demonstrable progress
toward establishing an independent judiciary, respecting internationally recognized human rights as set forth in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, and allowed for the establishment
of independent trade unions; (7) severed all ties with Fidel or
Raul Castro; and (8) given adequate assurances that it will allow
the speedy and efficient distribution of aid to the Cuban people.207 In determining whether a government is transitional,
the President must examine four additional criteria: if the government ( 1) is demonstrably in transition from a communist
totalitarian dictatorship to a representative democracy; (2) has
made public commitments and demonstrable progress toward
guaranteeing free speech and freedom of the press, permitting
Cuban-born persons to regain their citizenship and return to
Cuba, assuring the right to private property, and returning property seized by the Castro regime (or equivalent compensation)
to U.S. citizens; (3) has extradited criminals to the United
States; and ( 4) has permitted the deployment of independent
human rights monitors throughout Cuba. 208 These criteria are
designed to ensure that a post-Castro government will not be a
puppet regime within Castro's sphere of influence. In other
words, the criteria aim to ensure a bona fide transition to a new
political, economic, and social status quo. However, as critics of
the Helms-Burton Act point out, the glaring problem is that
while each criterion is valid in isolation, the criteria become
unrealistic as a multi-factor test. It is unlikely that any
207
208

See 22 U.S.CA § 6065(a).
See id. § 6065(b).

1997]

Fighting Bad Guys with International Trade Law

55

government could meet such criteria after thirty-six years of
totalitarian rule and, thus, "ensures that the United States will sit
on the sidelines during the transition." 209
To determine whether a Cuban government is a democratically elected government, the President must evaluate fewer criteria
than to determine whether it is a transition government. This
fact is not surprising, because doubts about a complete overthrow of the Castro regime would more likely surround a transition government than a democratic government. In brief, a
democratically elected government in Cuba is one that the President determines: ( 1) results from free and fair elections supervised by international observers, in which opposition parties had
ample time to organize and campaign and all candidates had
full access to the media; (2) respects both human rights ·and
civil liberties; (3) is moving substantially toward a market economic system based on the right to own and enjoy property; (4)
is committed to enshrining the principles of regular free and
fair elections, human rights, and civil liberties in a constitution;
(5) has made demonstrable progress toward establishing an
independent judiciary; and (6) has made demonstrable progress
toward returning property seized by the Castro regime to U.S.
citizens or providing full compensation for such property. 210
Two remarkable facts about the definitions of a democratically
elected government and transition government in Cuba should
not go unmentioned. First, these definitions are the first effort
in U.S. international trade law to specifically define what kind of
new political system the United States seeks in another country.
To be sure, some international trade statutes contain political
criteria. 211 However, no other statute is so ambitious or majestic in its attempt to define an entirely new form of government
for another country. Accordingly, these definitions embody both
the noble commitment to freedom supporters of the HelmsBurton Act emphasize and the legal imperialism that antagonists
highlight.
H.R CONF. REP. No. 104-468, at 5~54, Tl!flrinted at 1996 U.S.C.CAN. at 552
(dissenting views).
210
See 22 U.S.CA § 6066.
211
See BHAIA, supra note 4, at 531-95, 1281-360 (discussing Generalized System of
Preferences with trade and labor issues).
209

56

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 31:1

Second, all of the criteria in both definitions, several of which
overlap, are based on one value: the rule of law. On the other
hand, Castro's regime is an ugly example of the rule of man.
Free and fair elections in a pluralistic multi-party democracy,
respect for human rights, civil liberties, property rights, and an
independent judiciary all function within the rule of law. Why is
this value worth promoting? A practical answer to this question
comes from Hong Kong. At midnight on June 30, 1997, British
administration of the territory ended, and Chinese sovereignty
resumed. 212 The international business community's principal
fear about the handover continues to be whether China will
presetve the rule of law that has been the scaffolding upon
which Hong Kong has built its phenomenal successes.m It is
this scaffolding that allows wealth to be created and spread.
Most, if not all, of the criteria in the Helms-Burton Act definitions of a democratically elected government and a transition
government are among the criteria the international business
community will use to evaluate whether continued and expanded trade relations in Hong Kong are worthwhile. In sum, notwithstanding all of the possible sophisticated philosophical and
jurisprudential arguments that justify it, the rule of law is worth
promoting in a post-Castro Cuba, as in a post-British Hong
Kong, because it is good for business.

C. Suspension of Sanctions
The Helms-Burton Act contains three provisions that allow for
the suspension of sanctions. First, the President may suspend the
effective date of the Act, which was August 1, 1996,214 for up
to six months, and thereby suspend operation of the entire
Act. 215 The criterion for this suspension is based upon the
report to Congress that it is "necessary to the national interests
of the United States and will expedite a transition to democracy
See Andrew Pollack, Asian Nations' Hr1Je fur Hong Kong Is Bwines.s as Usual; Don't ShaTII
U.S. Fear of Crackduum on Civil Liberties, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 3, 1997, at A22
212

(reporting on Chinese takeover of Hong Kong).
215
See id. (reporting on international businesses' misgivings that Chinese rule of law will
increase difficulty of conducting business in Hong Kong).
••• See 22 U.S.C.A. § 6085(a).
... See§ 6085(b)(l).
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in Cuba." 216 Using the same criterion, the President may
suspend the effective date for additional periods of up to six
months each. 217 In practice, the authority to postpone the ef-.
fective date is irrelevant because the President decided on July
16, 1996 not to invoke it; 218 hence, the Act took effect on August 1, 1996.
Second,· the President is authorized to suspend foreign assistance sanctions, such as the bar on indirect financing of Cuba,
if he determines a transition government has gained control in
Cuba. 219 Whenever the economic embargo against Cuba is terminated, the President will lift the bar on foreign assistance
sanctions. 220 Heretofore, the President has declined to invoke
this suspension authority.
Finally, the President is authorized to suspend the right to
bring an action for trafficking in confiscated property for up to
six months, if this. "suspension is necessary to the national interests of the United States artd will expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba." 221 In July 1996, President Clinton invoked
this suspension authority. 222 In suspending the trafficking sanction, the President must report in writing to Congress that the
criteria regarding U.S. national interests and a transition in
Cuba are satisfied. 223 In January 1997, and again in July 1997,
President Clinton invoked this right-to-sue authority for a further
six months. 224 The President can rescind any suspension if it
216

See id. The President can rescind a suspension if it will expedite a transition to
democracy in Cuba. See. id. § 6085(d).
217
See id. § 6085(b)(2).
218
See Statement by President Clinton on Implementation of Helms-Burton Law Issued July 16,
1996, 131nt'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1155, 1189 Quly 17, 1996) (stating that President declined
to use his authority to postpone effective date); Rossella Brevetti & Peter Menyasz, Clinton
Delays Lawsuits Under Title Ill of Helms-Burton, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1155, 1158 Quly
17, 1996) (reporting that President decided to allow Helms-Burton Act to take effect);
White Howe Fact SMet on Presidenf s Decision, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1155, 1190 Quly 17,
1996) (explaining presidential authority under title III to postpone effective date).
219
See 22 U.S.CA. § 6033(b)(1).
... See id. § 6033(b) (2).
221
See id. § 6085(c)(1)(8).
222
See Brevetti & Menyasz, supra note 218, at 1158 (reporting that President decided to
suspend right to bring private causes of action for six months.).
m See22 U.S.CA. § 6085(c)(1)(8), (2).
.
... See Brevetti & Menyasz, supra note 218, at 1158 (reporting that President suspended
right to sue for six months); Canada Weighs NAFTA Action, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 37,
42 Qan. 8, 1997); Nancy Dunne, Clinton Suspends Helms-Burton Again, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 4,
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will expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba.225 Under the
United States-EU agreement discussed earlier,226 the President
appears committed to invoking this authority until his term
expires in January 2001.
Interestingly, even if President Clinton's suspension has not
defused some of the controversy surrounding the Helms-Burton
Act, it has at least allowed the United States and its trading
partner critics to relax. However, Congress neither intended nor
desired this benefit when it passed the Act. 227 The President
sought a criterion for suspending the operation of the trafficking sanction that focused on whether suspension is important to
U.S. national interests, including expediting the transition to
democracy in Cuba. 228 Congress flatly rejected that proposal,
opting to use the term "necessary" so that expediting the transition to democracy would be the "central element of the
President's decision." 229 Congress inserted in the legislative history that "under current circumstances [in Cuba] the President
could not in good faith determine that suspension of the right
of action [under the trafficking sanction] is either 'necessary to
the national interests of the United States' or 'will expedite a
transition to democracy in Cuba. '" 230 Congress felt that suspension "would remove a significant deterrent to foreign investment
in Cuba, thereby helping prolong Castro's grip on power." 2~ 1
To vigorous supporters of the Act, the President's decisions
regarding suspension have undoubtedly been in bad faith. In
reality, perhaps the President was caught off guard by the vehement and widespread criticism of the Act from U.S. trading
partners, and, thus, invoked the suspension authority to steer a
temporary middle course between proponents and critics.
1997, at 1.
225
See 22 U.S.CA. § 6085(d).
226
See supra note 165 and accompanying text (highlighting EU agreement to suspend
action so long as President Clinton continues to suspend provision on civil liability).
227

See jOIJIIT ExPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, H.R. CONF.

REP. No. 104-468, at 65 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. 558, 580 (stating that
President has power to suspend right to sue if necessary to seiVe national interest and to
expedite transition in Cuba) .
... See id.
... See id.
... /d.
231

ld. at 66, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. at 581.
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D. Foreign Assistance Sanctions

1. Non-Controversial Sanctions
The Helms-Burton Act uses foreign assistance sanctions to
restrict the amount of American capital entering Cuba and,
hence, hasten the demise of the Castro regime. For example, no
U.S. national, permanent resident alien, or U.S. agency may
lend, extend credit, or provide any· other form of funding to
any person to finance a transaction in confiscated property if a
U.S. national owns a claim on that property. 252 Critics of the
Helms-Burton Act can hardly view this sanction as controversial.
It is simply an act of self-restraint, and the United States is free
to channel indirect public and private financing to regimes it
finds politically acceptable.
Another illustration of a non-controversial foreign assistance
measure concerns general licenses for U.S. families to send
funds to their relatives in Cuba. Before reinstituting general
licenses for these remittances, Congress urges the President to
insist that the Cuban government permit small businesses to
operate without restraint, with the right to hire employees, pay
wages, purchase necessary supplies, and exercise other rights
that will encourage the operation of small businesses in
Cuba. 255 This measure is uncontroversial in two respects. First,
no . sanction is attached. Congress is simply exhorting the President to push the Castro regime to allow some measure of entrepreneurial capitalism to develop; the President is free to ignore
the exhortation. Second, the measure is logical. Presumably, the
point of sending funds to relatives in Cuba is to improve their
standard of living, which is possible if the relatives can invest the
funds in a small business and enjoy the resulting profits. The
measure, therefore, could help ensure that the Castro regime
allows remittances to be put to their intended use.

"" See 22 U.S.C.A. § 6033(a) (West Supp. 1997).
m See id. § 6042(1) (A) (requiring President to submit report on assistance to Cuba).
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Controversial Foreign Assistance Sanctions
Targeting Third-Party Countries

Other foreign assistance sanctions in the Helms-Burton Act
are somewhat more controversial and target official U.S. aid to
third-party countries that support the Castro regime. Essentially,
these sanctions present third-party countries with a choice to
either cease dealing with Fidel or risk losing U.S. aid. 2M Ultimately, however, even these financial assistance sanctions may be
reasonable. Surely the United States is free to establish political
criteria, prudent or not, for U.S. taxpayer-financed foreign aid
eligibility. Critics of the Helms-Burton Act must yield to realpolitik: · this carrot-and-stick approach to modifying the behavior of
donee countries has always been a feature of the foreign aid
programs of every donor country. Unless a donor country is
seized with a fit of unprecedented altruism, the feature is certain to remain.
One illustration of sanctions targeting third-party countries
addresses relations between independent countries of the former
Soviet Union ("FSU"). To understand this scenario, suppose the
Ukraine, or another independent state of the FSU, engages in
transactions with Cuba. Specifically, the FSU state assists Cuba
through financial aid or technical advice, supports the construction or operation of intelligence facilities in Cuba, and trades
goods, including commodities like oil, or seiVices with Cuba. 235
The Helms-Burton Act amends the 1961 Assistance Act to render an independent FSU state ineligible for U.S. government aid
if it provides assistance to Cuba, supports Cuban intelligence
facilities, or engages in non-market based trade with Cuba. 236
Of these three activities, sanctioning the first two should not be
controversial. If the donee country aids an enemy, the United
States has a sovereign prerogative to decline to give aid for this
234
See id. § 6003(b)(1)(A) (allowing President to tenninate aid to countries that provide assistance to Cuba).
""' See id. § 6038(a). The Helms-Burton Act requires the President to submit annual
reports to Congress (due on January 1) on commercial and military dealings between foreign countries and Cuba and the amount of assistance provided by foreign countries to
Cuba. See id. This reporting requirement is not limited to FSU countries. See id.
236
See id. § 6021 (amending § 498A of Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. §
2295a(a)(ll), (d) (1994)).
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or any other reason. Indeed, regarding the second activity, the
legislative history to the Helms-Burton Act points out:
With respect to Russian intelligence facilities located at
Lourdes, Cuba . . . a senior Russian government official announced in November 1994 that his government was providing $200 million in credits to the Castro regime in exchange
for the continued use of that facility. The Lourdes facility is
one of the world's largest and most sophisticated intelligence
stations, which Department of State and Department of Defense documents say is used to intercept and monitor U.S.
commercial satellites, U.S. military and merchant shipping
communications, NASA activities, and telephone conversations
of U.S. citizens. The [joint congressional] committee of conference notes that the Department of State has assured the
Congress that no part of the [Helms-Burton] Act would violate U.S. treaty obligations, nor does any existing arms control treaty prevent the United States from urging Russia to
end its use of Cuba as a base for intelligence operations
against U.S. interests. 237

However, sanctioning non-market based trade with Cuba is more
problematic because the United States clearly is trying to dictate
the terms on which two other sovereign countries trade.
The goal of sanctioning non-market based trade with Cuba is
to hasten its economic collapse by forcing the Castro regime to
consume precious resources, including hard currency, by paying
market prices for imports. However, the breadth of the sanction
should not be misunderstood: trade must be non-market based.
That is, an FSU country is ineligible for U.S. foreign aid only if
it trades with Cuba "on terms more favorable than those generally available in applicable markets for· comparable commodities."238 Examples of non-market terms for exports to Cuba
would be charging a concessional price, providing a subsidy,
delivering goods or services in advance with no accountability
for full payment, not requiring payment for appropriate transportation and insurance costs, or forgiving debt in exchange for
an equity interest in property of the Cuban government. 2!9 An
7

jOINT Exi'I.:ANATORY STATEMENT OF THE CoMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, H.R CoNF.
REP. No. 104-468, at 48 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 558, 563.
.,.. See 22 U.S.C.A. § 6021 (amending § 498A(b) of Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22
U.S.C. § 2295a(b)(5)).
""' See id. (amending § 498A(b) of Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. §§
2295a(b)(5), 2295b(k)(3) ).
""
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example of an off-market term for Cuban imports would be a
preferential tariff rate 240 or a countertrade transaction, such as
a barter exchange of Russian oil for Cuban sugar. Here, the
terms of the transaction are more favorable to Cuba than would
be available to Cuba on the free market, resulting in a subsidy
to Cuba. 241
Conversely, nothing in the Helms-Burton Act sanctions trade
in non-confiscated property conducted on market terms. This
omission is significant because many state-owned enterprises
("SOEs") or newly privatized companies within FSU countries
are certain to have trading relationships within the Castro regime based on previous economic ties between the former Soviet Union and Cuba. Yet because many of these FSU entities are
likely to be struggling economically, they may be unwilling to
trade with Cuba on unprofitable off-market terms. In other
words, notwithstanding the Helms-Burton Act, they cannot afford
to subsidize Castro, and the Act does not preclude them from
earning an arm's length profit from his regime.
In addition to the "non-market based trade" requirement,
three further limitations exist on the scope of the financial
penalty sanction imposed on FSU countries for dealing with
Cuba. First, Congress can elect to continue U.S. foreign aid to
an FSU country that assists or engages in non-market based
trade with Cuba by disapproving a presidential determination
triggering the cessation of aid. 242 Second, the President can
continue U.S. aid to an FSU country that supports Cuba's intelligence facilities if the aid is important to U.S. national security.243 Third, several categories of U.S. aid are immune from
cut-off: humanitarian aid; aid for the development of a democratic political system, the rule of law, private sector organizations, and a free market system; and certain educational exchange programs. 244 Plainly, it would be counterproductive to
240

See id. (stating preferential tariff rales would be "nonmarket based trade").
See H.R CONF. REP. No. 104-468, at 48, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. at 563 (explaining why more favorable trade is considered subsidy).
242
See 22 U.S.CA. § 6021 (amending§ 498A(b) of Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22
U.S.C. § 2295a(b)(5)).
2
See id.
"
244
See id. § 2295a(d)(3) (describing exceptions to assistance reductions).
241
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the U.S. policy goal of facilitating FSU countries in trans1Uon
from communism to market capitalism to shut down these aid
programs.
The second illustration targets any country that helps Cuba
complete construction of a particular semi-finished nuclear power plant. This form of a third-party country foreign assistance
sanction is designed to prevent the completion of a nuclear
power plant in Juragua, Cuba. 245 Congress expressed profound
skepticism in the Helms-Burton Act about the ability and willingness of the Castro regime to operate the Juragua plant in a safe
manner that does not threaten the United States, reminding the
world about Castro's past nuclear brinkmanship and present
threats:
(I)

President Clinton stated in April 1993 that the United
States opposed construction of the Juragua nuclear
power plant because of the concerns of the United States
about Cuba's ability to ensure the safe operation of the facility
and because of Cuba's refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty . . . .

(3)

The State Department, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Department of Energy have expressed
concerns about the construction and operation of
Cuba's nuclear reactors.
In a September 1992 report to the Congress, the General Accounting Office outlined concerns among nuclear
energy experts about deficiencies in the nuclear plant
project in Juragua ... including (A) a lack in Cuba of a nuclear regulatory structure;
(B) the absence in Cuba of an adequate infrastructure to
ensure the plan( s safe operation and requisite maintenance;
(C) the inadequacy of training of plant operators;
(D) reports by a former technician from Cuba who, by
examining with x-rays weld sites believed to be part
of the auxiliary plumbing system for the plan,
found that 10 to 15 percent of those sites were defective;

(4)

Su H.R REP. No. 10~202, at 35 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. 527, 540.
Construction was halted in September 1992. However, Cuba, possibly with the assistance of
third-party countries such as Russia, seeks to finish the project. See id. at 35-36, reprinted in
1996 U.S.C.CAN. at 540-41.
245
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(E)

since September 5, 1992, when construction on the
plant was halted, the prolonged exposure to the elements, including corrosive salt water vapor, of the primary reactor components;
(F) the possibk inadequacy of the upper portion of the
reactors' dome retention capability to withstand only 7
pounds of pressure per square inch, given that normal
atmospheric pressure is 32 pounds per square inch and
United States reactors are designed to accommodate pressures of 50 pounds per square inch;
(5) The United States Geological SuiVey claims that it had
difficulty determining answers to specific questions regarding earthquake activity in the area near Cienfeugos
because the Cuban Government was not forthcoming
with information.
( 6) The Geological Suroey has indicated that the Caribbean plate,
a geological formation near the south coast of Cuba, may pose
seismic risks to Cuba and the site of the power plant, and may
produce large to moderate earthquakes.
(7) On May 25, 1992, the Caribbean plate produced an
earthquake numbering 7. 0 on the IOchter scale.
(8) According to a study by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, summer winds could carry radioactive poUutants from a nuckar accident at the power plant throughout aU
of Florida and parts of the States on the coast of the Gulf of
Mexico as Jar as Texas, and northern winds could carry the
poUutants as Jar northeast as Vnginia and Washington, D. C.
(9) The Cuban Guvemment, under dictator Fidel Castro, in 1962
advocated the Soviets' launching of nuckar missiles to the
United States, which represented a direct and dangerous
provocation of the United States and brought the world
to the brink of a nuclear conflict.
(10) Fidel Castro over the years has consistently issued threats
against the United States Government, most recently
that he would unleash another perilous mass migration
from Cuba upon the enactment of this [Helms-Burton]
Act. 246

Assuming these Congressional findings are true, they establish a
persuasive case of bona fide U.S. security concerns and suggest
Congress and the President would be irresponsible to fail to
block completion of the Juragua plant. In tum, U.S. efforts to
persuade third-party countries to decline to help Cuba to build
the Juragua plant seem entirely reasonable. These efforts are
246

22 U.S.C.A. § 604l(a) (emphasis added).
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certainly less unilateral or forceful than a U.S. Air Force attack
on the plant akin to the Israeli destruction of an Iraqi facility
several years ago. 247
These efforts, embodied in the Helms-Burton Act, involve the
imposition of a financial penalty on any country that supports
completion of the Juragua plant.248 As a penalty, the United
States would withhold foreign assistance in an amount equal to
the aid given by the third-party country to Cuba to help Castro
finish the plant. 249 Once again, however, several categories of
U.S. aid could not be cut off: humanitarian aid; aid for the
development of a democratic political system, the rule of law,
private sector organizations, and a free market system; and certain educational exchange programs. 250
Interestingly, in passing the Helms-Burton Act, Congress
opined that the executive branch had been slack in enforcing
existing economic sanctions - most notably the trade embargo
- against Cuba. 251 Consequently, a suspicious Congress directed the President to: ( 1) encourage third-party countries to restrict trade and financial relations with the Cuban regime, 252
(2) apply extant sanctions against countries that assist Cuba, 25s
(3) direct that the United States deny visas to officials of the
Castro regime or Cuban Communist Party,254 (4) and encourage the Secretary of State to ensure that all U.S. diplomats posted overseas understand and communicate to their foreign counterparts the reasons for the U.S. economic embargo of Cuba,
and encourage them to cooperate with the embargo. 255 While

..

7

See Burrus M. Carnahan, Protecting Nuclear Facilities from Military Attack: Prospects After

the Gulf War, 86 AM. j. INT'L L. 524, 525-26 ( 1992).
248
See22 U.S.CA § 6041(b)(1) .
... See id.
... See id. § 6041(b)(2).
251
See H.R REP. No. 104-202, at 32 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. 527, 537 (declaring profound concern that executive branch agencies are not vigorous in enforcing
certain provisions of U.S. embargo on Cuba or advocating U.S. policy before foreign governments).
252
See 22 U.S.CA § 6032(a)(1); see also H.R REP. No. 104-202, at 24, reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.CAN. at 529 (noting need to encourage countries to stop "undermining" U.S. trade
embargo against Cuba).
"" See 22 U.S.CA § 6032(a)(2), (c).
254
See id. § 6032(e). ·
... See id. § 6032(b).
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the trade embargo may be ineffectual, there is little to cnt1c1ze
in the aforementioned exhortations in the Helms-Burton Act.

E. Ostracism Sanctions
The "ostracism" sanctions in the Helms-Burton Act are designed to further isolate Cuba from the mainstream of the world
trading system. Doing so, according to supporters of the Act,
will further tighten the economic noose around the Castro regime.256 Critics argue that implementing a policy that further
isolates Cuba will only help Castro by allowing conditions in
Cuba to become much worse than they are today. 257 Moreover,
even if isolation eventually topples the Castro regime, it only
increases the prospect of violent change and the chances of
another mass exodus of refugees to the United States. For these
reasons, critics argue, no other govemment agrees with such a
draconian isolationist policy toward Cuba and the policy is destined to fail without the support of foreign govemments. 258
Thus, critics contend that the ostracism sanctions paradoxically
wind up ostracizing the United States and thereby damage our
relations with our trading partners. 259 In this regard, the critics
are correct.
The ostracism sanctions are straightforward. Until the President determines that Cuba is run by a democratically elected
government, the United States will continue to oppose Cuba's
admission into any intemational financial institution, including
the World Bank, International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), and
Inter-American Development Bank. 260 Likewise, the United
States will continue to oppose any attempt to allow Cuba to
once again participate in the Organization of American States
("OAS"). In 1961, the OAS member states voted to suspend
Cuba from the OAS261 until democracy takes root. 262 Proponents of ·the Helms-Burton Act probably are correct in stating
256
257
258
259
200

261
262

See H.R. REP. No. 104-202, at 53, rqninted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. at 551.
See id., rqninted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. at 552.
See id.
See id. at 53-54, rqninted in 1996 U.S.C.C.AN. at 552.
See 22 U.S.C.A § 6034(a)(l), (c).
See H.R.. REP. No. 104-202, at 33, rqninted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. at 538.
See 22 U.S.CA § 6035.
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that "it is inconceivable that any OAS member government
would consider Cuba to be worthy of active participation in the
OAS without first undertaking fundamental democratic reforms."265 After all, the OAS has recognized "representative
democracy as an indispensable condition for stability, peace, and
development. " 264
Whereas exile from the OAS is a diplomatic loss of face for
Cuba, exclusion from the World Bank and IMF squeezes Cuba's
economy, making it difficult, if not impossible, to obtain development funding. Suppose an international financial institution
were to approve a loan or other assistance to Cuba over U.S.
opposition. The United States would have to withhold the
amount of the loan or other assistance from that institution by
not contributing to its capital stock. 265 Here, domestic opponents of the Act have a valid concern: withholding funds from
the World Bank, IMF, or other international financial institution
undermines U.S. leadership of those institutions and consumes
precious goodwill toward the United States in those institutions.266
F.

Trafficking Sanctions

By far the most controversial provisions in the Helms-Burton
Act concern trafficking in confiscated property of U.S. nationals.
The United States has the sovereign prerogative to give or withhold assistance from individual foreign countries on political
grounds, and even from international financial institutions.
These sanctions may be unwise because the breaching of commitments fosters ill will. The United States also has the sovereign prerogative to attempt to ostracize Cuba because of its
government, though this sanction may be unwise; constructive
engagement, which the United States has used in the past
against China, 267 may be more effective. Critics of the Helms-

.., jOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE CoMMITTEE OF CoNFERENCE, H.R. CONF.

REP. No. 104468, at 47 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 558, 562.
... /d.
260
See 22 U.S.C.A. § 6034(b) (stating that Secretary of Treasury shall not pay any
institution that approves loans or other assistance to Cuba over opposition).
,.. See H.R. REP. No. 104-202, at 5~54, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 552 (dissenting
views).
267

See Diane F. Orentlicher & Timothy A. Gelatt, Public Law, Private Actors: The Impact of
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Burton Act consider the imposition of severe civil money damages for trafficking in confiscated property of U.S. nationals to be
illegitimate. 268 Equally obnoxious is a denial of entry to the
United States because of a tenuous connection to trafficking in
confiscated property.
In contrast, to supporters of the Act, the trafficking provisions
are rationally calculated or, in the words of the legislative history, "unique but proportionate" 269 measures "intended primarily
to create a 'chilling effect.'" 270 "This 'chilling effect' should
deny the current Cuban regime venture capital, discourage
third-party country nationals from profiting from illegally confiscated property, and help preserve such property until such time
as the rightful owners can successfully assert their claim." 271
Further, liability for trafficking exists only after the end of a
three-month grace period beginning on the date on which the
trafficking provision takes effect. m Originally, that date was August 1, 1996,275 but because President Clinton suspended the
application of the trafficking provision,274 presumably this grace
period will not begin to run until the United States lifts the
suspension. Accordingly, supporters could contend this liability
will hardly come as a surprise to defendants if the threat of
liability becomes a reality.

Human Rjghts on Business Investtm in China, 14 Nw. j. INr'L L & Bus. 66, 73-82 (199!1)
(discussing U.S. policy of constructive engagement towards China).
268
8« Peter Morici, The United States, World Trade, and the Helms-Burton Act, CuRRENT
HIST., Feb. 1997, at 87 (stating that Helms-Burton would be difficult to defend under
international law).
269
H.R REP. No. 104-202, at !19, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 544; !« also H.R
CONF. REP. No. 104-468, at 58, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 57!1 (describing right of
action as unique but proportionate remedy for U.S. nationals who were targeted by Castro
regime when their property was wrongfully confiscated).
270
•
H.R REP. No. 104-202, at 25, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5!10; su also H.R
CONF. REP. No. 104-468, at 58, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 57!1 (explaining that one
purpose of civil remedy is to discourage persons and companies from engaging in commercial transactions in confiscated property). A civil remedy also deters the exploitation of
property confiscated from U.S. nationals. See id.
271
H.R. REP. No. 104-202, at 25, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. at 530.
272
8« 22 U.S.C.A. § 6082(a)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1997).
m 8« id. § 6085(a).
274
8« Pascal Fletcher, Israelis Press Ahead with Cuba VentuTf, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1997, at
6.
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1. Civil Liability for Trafficking

a.

The Scope and Amount of Liability

The statement of civil liability in the Helms-Burton Act is
straightforward, sweeping, and applies both retroactively and
prospectively: 27" "any person that . . . traffics in property . . . confiscated by the Cuban Government on or after January 1, 1959,
shall be liable to any United States national who owns the claim
to such property." 276 Moreover, the alleged trafficker cannot
use what may in some cases be an obvious defense: the act of
state doctrine. 277 It is critical to understand that this statement
in the Act creates a private right of action for U.S. nationals
against traffickers. Such a right is rare in U.S. unilateral international trade action statutes.
Any one of four adjustments to this sweeping statement of
liability - modifications to the meaning of "any," "property,"
"United States national," or the amount of liability - might
have rendered the trafficking sanction far less fearsome and,
"'' See id. § 6082(a)(4)(A) (clarifying that actions can be brought regarding property
confiscated before, on, or after enactment date of Helms-Burton Act). Various requirements concerning procedures for filing of claims and the election of remedies are set forth
in 22 U.S.C.A. § 6082(c), (f) (1) and discussed in H.R. REP. No. 104202, at 41, reprinted in
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 546.
.
276
22 U.S.C.A. § 6082(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added); see aLso H.R. REP. No. 104202, at 40,
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 545 (summarizing liability for trafficking). As required by
the Act, the Attorney General has published a summary of this liability provision. See 22
U.S.C.A. § 6082(a)(8); Summary of the Provisions of Title III of the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (UBERTAD) Act of 1996, 61 Fed. Reg. 24,955 (1996).
The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission issues certificates of a claim of ownership
of an interest. In any action brought under the Helms-Burton Act, a court must accept the
certificate as conclusive proof of ownership of an interest of property. See 22 U.S.C.A. §
6083(a)(1). This Commission was established under the International Claims Settlement
Act of 1949, 22 U.S.C. § 1643 (1994). If a Helms-~urton case involves an uncertified claim,
the court may appoint a special master (including the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission) to determine the ownership and amount of the claim. See id. § 6083(a)(2). In addition, a court will accept as conclusive evidence of ownership or amount a determination as
to the validity of a claim or its amount by an international arbitrator where the United
States or the claimant submitted the matter for binding arbitration. See id. § 6083(a)(3).
However, determinations of foreign courts or decrees of foreign administrative agencies are
not conclusive evidence of the ownership or amount of a claim. See id. The provisions regarding proof of ownership claims to confiscated property are discussed in JOINT ExPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE CoMMITTEE OF CoNFERENCE, H.R. CoNF. REP. NO. 104-468, at 6364 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 578-79.
277 See 22 U.S.C.A. § 6082(a)(6).
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hence, far less controversial than it is. However, in each case
Congress declined to narrow the sanction and thereby defuse
some of the controversy it has generated.
First, for example, if only Americans were held liable, then
the traffic sanction would hardly raise an eyebrow. Further,
critics of the Helms-Burton Act might not have minded if, along
with Americans, only officials of the . Castro government and
Communist Party members were held liable. However, the word
"any" in the liability provision, without limitation in the statute
or legislative history, obviously puts all foreigners at risk.
Second, if liability likewise pertained to only a narrow class of
property interests, then perhaps the sanction would not be so
controversial, as it would have little practical effect. However,
the broad definition of "property", which includes all real and
personal property, securities, intellectual property, and all present and future interests,278 eliminates this possibility.
Third, if the term "United States national" expressly excluded
Cuban-Americans whose property was confiscated before they
became U.S. citizens, this limitation would reduce the practical
effect of the traffic sanction. But because the definition includes
any U.S. citizen, and any entity whose principal place of business
is in the United States, this limitation also is excluded. Congress
estimates that thousands of U.S. nationals can substantiate a
valid claim to Cuban property in a U.S. court. 279 Approximately
6000 U.S. citizens and businesses with outstanding claims against
confiscated property in Cuba have filed their claims with the
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission; an additional 15,000
U.S. nationals have not filed claims with the Commission but
also have had commercial property confiscated in Cuba.280
Whatever the exact figure, it is clear that the potential number
of private rights of action is staggering.
The fourth and final modification that Congress could have
made, but did not, concerns the amount of liability. Suppose
the civil money damages imposed for violating the trafficking
278

See id. § 6023(12).
""' See H.R REP. No. 104-202, at 39, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. at 544.
280
See id. at 43-45, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. at 549-51 (letter from James L. Blum,
Director, Congressional Budget Office, to Hon. Benjamin A Gilman, Chairman, House
Committee on International Relations, July 24, 1995) (discussing benefits of strengthening
sanctions against Cuba).
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sanction were so insignificant that potential defendants regarded
them as merely a cost of doing business. Here too, perhaps no
one would care about the sanction because it would amount to
a right without a remedy. But, once again, the Helms-Burton
Act's language eliminates this possibility. The amount of the
liability is the largest of three possible values, plus court costs
and reasonable attorneys' fees: 281 (1) the amount, if any, certified to the claimant by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, plus interest; 282 (2) for an uncertified claim, the amount
determined by a court-appointed special master, plus interest;28s and (3) the fair market value of the property, determined by the greater of the current value, or the value when
calculated, plus interest. 284 An amount in controversy less than
$50,000, exclusive of interest, costs, attorneys' fees, and treble
damages, is deemed de minimis and, therefore, not actionable.285 Property used for accredited diplomatic purposes is immune from attachment and execution of a judgment under the
trafficking sanction. 286 Similarly, a judgment cannot be enforced against the property of a transition or democratically
elected government in Cuba. 287
Treble damages are available to a claimant in two instances,
making the specter of liability particularly fearsome. First, if the
value used to determine liability is the amount certified to the
claimant by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, then
the claimant may recover treble damages. 288 In light of the re281

See 22 U.S.CA § 6082(a)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).
See id. § 6082(a)(1)(A)(i)(I). Interest is computed at a statutory rate set forth in 28
U.S.C. § 1961 (1994) from the date of confiSCation until the date on which the action is
brought. See id. § 6082(a)(1)(B).
283
See id. §§ 6082(a)(1)(A)(i)(II), 6083(a)(2); see also supra note 282 (defining computation of interest). .
284
See id. § 6082(a) ( 1) (A) (i) (III); see also supra note 282 (defining computation of interest) .
... See id. § 6082(b).
286
See 28 U.S.CA § 16ll(c) (West Supp. 1997).
287
See 22 U.S.CA § 6082(d); JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE CoMMITTEE OF
CoNFERENCE, H.R CoNF. REP. No. 104-468 (1996), at 61, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN.
558,576.
288
See 22 U.S.CA § 6082(a)(3)(A), (C)(ii). In the event the United States were to
enter into an agreement with Cuba settling claims to confiscated property, certified claimants who had recovered an amount equal to or greater than the amount of their certified
claim would not be entitled to any further recovery under the agreement. Claimants who,
282

72

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 31:1

buttable presumption that the certified amount should be used
to calculate liability, a trafficker is potentially exposed to significant liability. 289 Second, suppose a U.S. national with an uncertified claim learns that a person is about to traffic in that
claimant's confiscated property. The claimant should give written
notice of his or her intention to commence an action, and
demand that the unlawful trafficking cease. 290 Nonetheless, the
person traffics in the property. In this instance, the claimant is
eligible to recover treble damages for what amounts to a brazen
and willful violation of the trafficking sanction. 291
The distinction between the two classes of potential defendants subject to treble damages is significant. As suggested
above, a non-certified claimant cannot institute an action seeking treble damages against the defendant until thirty days after
written notice has been provided; this thirty-day period runs
from the date on which the claimant posts the notice or delivers
it personally to the defendant. 292 During this thirty-day grace
period, a cautious defendant will immediately cease trafficking in
confiscated property, use the thirty days to research the validity
of the plaintiff's claim, and decide upon a course of action. H
the defendant ceases trafficking by the conclusion of the thirtyday period, then the defendant can avoid treble damage liability.295 However, the defendant remains liable, under the normal
liability amount rule, for trafficking that occurred between the
end of the three-month grace period following the Act's effective date and the time the trafficking ceased. 294 In contrast, a
plaintiff with a certified claim is not obligated to give any
in a Helms-Burton action, recovered less than the amount of their certified claim could
recover the balance under the agreement See id. § 6082(0 (2) (A) (i)-(iii).
289
See id. § 6082(a)(2). It is also noteWorthy that if actions brought under the HelmsBurton Act are consolidated to satisfY claims, including in the context of a bankruptcy
proceeding, U.S. nationals holding claims whose amounts have been certified by the For-

eign Claims Settlement Commission are entitled to full payment before any other claimant
See id. § 6082(0 (2) (B).
290
See id. § 6082(a) (3) (D)
""' See id. § 6082(a)(3)(B)-(C).
292
See H.R CoNF. REP. No. 104-468, at 5S.59, -nprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 57~74.
""' See 22 U.S.C.A. § 6082(a)(3)(B); H.R CONF. REP. No. 104-468, at 58, -nprinted in
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 573.
294
See H.R CoNF. REP. No. 104-468, at 58, -nprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 573 (discussing civil remedy for trafficking).
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advance notice to the defendant before commencing an action
seeking treble damages. Consequently, a defendant against a
certified claimant cannot benefit either from the additional
thirty-day grace period or the consequent opportunity to avoid
treble damage liability.
This distinction creates an obvious priority for certified claimants. While at first glance this distinction may appear unfair, it is
entirely defensible. The legislative history indicates that since the
Cuban claims program ended on July 6, 1972, claimants have
effectively put Cuban investors on notice of 5911 certified U.S.
claims and "[i]nformation regarding whether the claim to a
particular property in Cuba . . . held by a certified U.S. claimant
is readily available." 295 Conversely, it is only fair that non-certified claimants bear an affirmative duty to provide notice to
potential defendants before seeking treble damages; these defendants are unlikely to have a formal and reliable informational
mechanism available to them to check whether the property in
question was confiscated.
To be sure, five relevant safeguards ensure that opportunists
do not abuse the liability for trafficking. First, a U.S. national
cannot bring a claim regarding property confiscated before the
enactment date of the Helms-Burton Act- March 12, 1996unless the national acquired the claim before this date. 296 Otherwise, a secondary market in ownership claims to pre-enactment
confiscated property might arise. Second, a U.S. national cannot
bring a claim regarding property confiscated on or after March
12, 1996, if the national acquired the claim after the confiscation.297 Again, a secondary market in ownership claims might
arise. Third, neither a U.S. national who could have, but failed
.,. See id. at 59, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.AN. at 574.
296
See 22 U.S.C.A § 6082(a)(4)(B); H.R. REP. No. 104-202, at 40 (1995), rqninted in
1996 U.S.C.C.AN. 527, 545.
297
See 22 U.S.C.A § 6082(a)(4)(C). Note that the legislative history to 22 U.S.C.A §
6082(a)(4)(C) incorrectly states that the relevant date by which a U.S. national must have
acquired a claim is the date of enactmenL See H.R. REP. No. 104-202, at 40, rqmnted in
1996 U.S.C.C.AN. at 545-46. 22 U.S.C.A § 6082(a)(4)(C) logically requires the national to
acquire ownership of the claim to the property before the date of confiscation. See H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 104-468, at 59, rqmnted in 1996 U.S.C.C.AN. at 574 (stating that "with
respect to property confiscated on or after the date of enactment . . . an action for damages is precluded only if the claim to the property was acquired by assignment for value after
the property was conjiscatetl' (emphasis added)).
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to, file a claim with the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission,298 nor a national who did file such a claim but whose
claim was rejected by the Commission, may recover under the
Helms-Burton Act. 299 Fourth, there is a two-year statute of limitations calculated from the date trafficking has ceased.500 The
fifth safeguard, clarified by the legislative history, concerns "persons or entities that would relocate to the United States for the
purpose of using" the trafficking remedy. 301 These opportunists
could seek to become "United States nationals" after the date of
enactment of the Helms-Burton Act, by incorporating in the
United States. However, they are not eligible to make a claim
on property confiscated before the date of enactment. 302
Notwithstanding the above safeguards, the scope and amount
of liability for trafficking in confiscated property is broad and,
therefore, more controversial because of the terms "any," "property," and "United States national," and because of the potential
to recover treble damages. Accordingly, in the sweeping statement of liability quoted at the outset, only the definition of the
term "traffic" provides hope to critics of the Helms-Burton Act
that the traffic sanction might be narrow and less controversial.
The hope is dashed immediately, however, by the broad definition of the term "traffic." A person, entity, or foreign government305 traffics in confiscated property:
298

See 22 U.S.CA § 6082(a)(l)(A); H.R REP. No. 104-202, at 41, reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.CAN. at 546.
299
See 22 U.S.CA § 6082(a) (5) (A)-(8).
""" See id. § 6084; see also id. § 6082(a)(5)(C) (prohibiting U.S. national with uncertified
claim from bringing action before two years from date of enactment of Helms-Burton Act,
i.e., March 12, 1998); id. § 6082(h) (concerning suspension and termination of rights upon
overthrow of Castro). Regarding 22 U.S.CA § 6082(a)(5)(C), an interesting question aJis.
es as to whether President Clinton's suspensions of the operation of the trafficking sanction also suspends the prohibition. On the one hand, the President's suspensions affect the
entire trafficking sanction, thus suggesting the prohibition is pushed out into the future by
the amount of time of the suspensions. On the other hand, Congress was aware of the
possibility of one or more suspensions when it wrote this prohibition, and it nonetheless
fixed the date as two years from the date of enactment. The latter argument gives full effect to both the suspension and prohibition sections and, thus, seems more appealing than
the first argument. Note that the date of enactment is different from the effective date of
the Act, which was August I, 1996. See id. § 6085(a).
"'' See H.R CoNF. REP. No. 104-468, at 59, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. at 574 (discussing intended applicability of title and amendments with regard to proper parties).
,.. See id.
"" See 22 U.S.CA § 6023(11) (defining person as individual, business entity, and gov-
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if that person knowingly and intentionally (i) sells, transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers,
manages, or otherwise disposes of confiscated
property, or purchases, leases, receives, possesses, obtains control of, manages, uses, or
otherwise acquires or holds an interest in
confiscated property,
(ii) engages in a commercial activity using or
otherwise benefitting from confiscated property, or
(iii) causes, directs, participates in, or profits
from, trafficking (as described in clause (i) or
(ii)) by another person, or otherwise engages
in trafficking (as described in clause (i) or
(ii)) through another person, without the
authorization of any United States national
who holds a claim to the property. !104
Aside from the mens rea requirement,!!05 that a person must
both know she is trafficking and intend to do so, there are
precious few exceptions to this definition.
Delivering telecommunications signals to Cuba, however, is.
one exception to trafficking. !106 This exception ensures that persons can communicate with family, friends, and business contacts
in Cuba and allows for the transmission of American television
and radio programs to Cuba. 507 This exception includes, of
course, Radio and Television Marti as discussed in other provisions of the Helms-Burton Act. !!08

emment).
""' /d.§ 6023(13)(A).
,.,. The term "knowingly" is defined as "knowledge or having reason to know." /d. §
6023(9). The Act does not define "intentionally."
... See id. § 6023(13)(B)(i)-(ii) (stating that term "traffics" does not include delivery of
international telecommunications signals to Cuba or trading or holding of securities).
""' See id. § 6023(13) (B) (i) (stating that term "traffic" does not include delivery of telecommunication signals to Cuba); see also id. § 6037(a) (directing United States Information
Agency to convert television broadcasting to Cuba under Television Marti Service) .
..,. See id. § 6021(7) (observing that Radio and Television Marti have been "effective
vehicles for providing the people of Cuba with news and information and have helped
bolster the morale of the people of Cuba living under tyranny"); id. § 6037 (converting
Television Marti to ultra high frequency ("UHF') broadcasting so it is accessible to larger
number of Cubans); id. § 6044 (authorizing President to establish exchange of news bureaus between United States and Cuba if, inter alia, Cuban Government agrees not to interfere with movement in Cuba of journalists working for Radio or Television Marti); id. §
6065(a) (5) (listing cessation of interference with Radio or Television Marti broadcasts as
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Holding or trading publicly-traded securities also does not
constitute trafficking. 309 The securities exception is important
for investors who purchase shares in companies that may traffic
in confiscated property or who purchase shares in mutual funds
that, in tum, hold the stocks of such companies. The trafficking
sanctions are designed to hit the company that traffics in the
confiscated property, but not the individual investor or mutual
fund that buys stock in that company. 510
Transactions and uses of property incident to lawful travel to
Cuba are also excluded from the definition of trafficking.m
This exception makes it logistically possible to travel to Cuba.
One can hardly expect to stay in Cuba for more than a day
without taking sufficient funds and a suitcase of appropriate
personal belongings. It is not clear, however, how far this exception extends. Would it, for instance, cover a businessperson's
marketing literature or commercial samples? The exception to
trafficking also protects innocent Cubans. The Act does not
deem a Cuban citizen and resident who is not an official in the
Castro government or Communist Party, but who transacts in or
uses confiscated property, to be trafficking in such property. 512
Notwithstanding these exceptions, the breadth of this definition means that the reach of the Helms-Burton Act extends far
beyond U.S. shores. Here lies the heart of the criticism of the
Helms-Burton Act: it is an illegitimate extraterritorial extension
of American enforcement jurisdiction. For example, a transaction in confiscated property between a Singaporean and French
company negotiated, consummated, and performed outside the
United States, involving no U.S. parties, and completed in a
currency other than U.S. dollars, is snared by the definition of

one crirerion for Presidential derermination that government is "transition government in
Cuba"); see alsojOINf EXPlANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 104-468, at 49 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. 558, 564 (discussing
conversion of Television Marti to UHF).
""' See 22 U.S.CA § 6023(13)(B)(i)-(ii) (stating that Jerm "traffics" does not include
delivery of international Jelecommunications signals to Cuba or trading or holding of securities).
.
"" See id. § 6023(13)(B)(i) (declaring that lerm "traffic" does not include trading or
holding securities publicly traded or held, unless Secretary of Treasury delermines person
trading is specially designaled national).
511
See id. § 6023(13)(B)(iii).
2
"
See id. § 6023(13)(B)(iv).
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"traffic" and is, therefore, subject to sanction. Clause (i) of the
Act's definition of the term "traffic" makes clear that the transaction could take virtually any form, regardless of the label the
Singaporean and French companies attach to the contract documents.515 Clause (iii) of the definition denies these companies
certain defenses: namely, they dealt in confiscated property only
indirectly, they dealt through another party, or they happened
to profit from such dealing but did not themselves handle the.
property. 514
Indeed, various third parties may be ensnared by clause (iii).
Suppose the Singaporean company pays the French company
100 million pounds sterling in the confiscated property transaction by means of a wire transfer through Barclays Bank in London. Barclays Bank earns a fee for processing the wire transfer.
· Subsequently, the Singaporean company deposits profits it earns
from the confiscated property in National Westminster Bank in
London. National Westminster earns fees and generates new
business as a result of handling the Singaporean company's
account. Are Barclays and National Westminster liable under the
phrase in clause (iii) that they have participated in, or profited
from, trafficking by another person? Certainly, if they did so
"knowingly and intentionally," then an aggressive plaintiff might
seek to hold them liable.
Certain terms in the definition of trafficking render its potential breadth uncertain, thus causing both fear and resentment
among foreign businesses and governments. The term "commercial activity" in clause (ii) of the definition of trafficking relies
on a definition of this term set forth in title 28 of the United
States Code.515 Nevertheless, there may be some ambiguities.
Would commercial activity include generic advertising or promotion of a business enterprise without express reference to confiscated property? Would it include marketing free services, or
"' See id. § 6023(13)(A)(i).
'" See id. § 6023(13)(A)(iii).
515
See id. § 6023(3) (referring to 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (d), which defines "commercial activ·
ity" as regular course of business conduct or specific ttansaction or commercial act). The
definition examines the nature of the conduct, not the purpose of the conduct. See 28
u.s.c. § 1603(d) (1994).

78

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 31:1

seeking volunteers to provide services? In other words, how specific must the link be between the action and the confiscated
property to be considered a commercial activity?
b.

The Problem of Extraterritoriality

The above hypothetical suggests a loose analogy between the
anti-trafficking provisions and general time-honored criminal law
principles. These provisions may be thought of as a global scale
civil statute against both the receipt of stolen property and laundering the resulting proceeds. The underlying unlawful activity is
knowing or intentional receipt of suspected stolen property stolen by Castro, of course. The derivative unlawful act is any
knowing or intentional involvement in transactions involving the
stolen property, which includes laundering profits garnered from
business dealings using this property. Mter all, the analogous
criminal law principles are familiar, so the anti-trafficking provisions are consistent with accepted legal concepts.516
The problem with the broad reach of these Helms-Burton Act
concepts is the resulting global ramifications. In anticipation of
the hue and cry from foreign governments, the United States
defends the extraterritorial reach of the anti-trafficking provisions in the Act itself. The Act provides a private judicial remedy
to U.S. nationals whose property is wrongfully confiscated by
foreign nations or their citizens. 517 This defense is adapted al6

See Malcolm Wilkey, Helms-BuTton: Its Fundamental Basis, Validity, and Practical Effect,
26 AB.A. INT'L L. NEWS 1, 1 (1997).
"' See 22 U.S.C.A. § 6081. Congress made the following findings:
"

(8) The international judicial system, as currently structured, lacks fully effective remedies for the wrongful confiscation of property and for unjust
enrichment from the use of wrongfully confiscated property by governments and private entities at the expense of the rightful owners of the
property.
( 9) International law recognizes that a nation has the ability to provide fur rules of laW
with respect to conduct outside its territory that has ur is intended to have substantial effect within its territory.
(10) The United States Government has an obligation to its citizens to provide
protection against wrongful confiscations by foreign nations and their
citizens, including the provision of private remedies.
(11) To deter trafficking in wrongfully confiscated property, United States nationals who were the victims of these confiscations should be endowed
with a judicial remedy in the courts of the United States that would deny
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most verbatim from the public international law doctrine of
extraterritoriality set forth in section 402(1)(c) of the American
Law Institute's Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of
the United. States. 518 Section 402 (I) (c) provides that a legitimate
basis of jurisdiction is the effects principle, which holds that "a
state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to . . . conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory." 519 Yet, this statement is an American principle, and not universally accepted. 520 Other countries
resist and resent an aggressive American use of this principle,
and it raises howls of legal imperialism, perhaps rightfully so.
2.

The Wisdom of Imposing Liability for Trafficking

Even if the United States can legitimately assert extraterritorial
jurisdiction, the wisdom of imposing civil liability for trafficking
in confiscated property must be questioned on three grounds.
First, if the ultimate goal of the Helms-Burton Act is to overthrow Castro, this liability might not facilitate this goal. The
specter of liability means that potential investors in Cuba could
never be sure whether a U.S. citizen or an entity incorporated
in the United States could claim a piece of property. 521 Therefore, the very investors needed to promote the development in
Cuba of a free market economy and pluralistic democracy "will
be skittish about making financial commitments." 522
Second, if other countries were to impose a rule against trafficking in confiscated property, then it might be more difficult

traffickers any profits from economically exploiting Castro's wrongful
seizures.
/d. (emphasis added).
318
See 1 REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 402(1)(c) (1987) .
... /d.
..., See id. § 402 cmt d (admitting that "[c]ontroversy has arisen as a result of economic
regulation by the United States," and that Restatement is taking position in controversy); see
also IAN BROWNUE, PRINCIPLES OF PuBUC INTERNATIONAL LAW 308-09 (4th ed. 1990) (discussing strong reaction from large number of foreign governments to American policies
concerning extraterritorial enforcement measures).
·
"'' See H.R REP. No. 104-202, at 55-56 (1995), reprinJuJ in 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. 527, 554
(dissenting views) (discussing uncertainty bill creates regarding foreign property and Amer·
ican investors).
... See id.
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for Americans to protect their overseas investments in countries
other than Cuba. Suppose a former communist bloc country,
such as Bulgaria, enacted a liability rule similar to that in the
Helms-Burton Act. Bulgarians could then sue American investors
in Bulgarian courts over any investment in a disputed property
- a property in which a Bulgarian held an ownership claim. As
a result, "no bilateral property agreement would be safe from
subsequent litigation." 525 In contrast to imposing liability for
trafficking, international commercial arbitration under an accepted set of rules and procedures would effectively resolve disputed
property claims in overseas investments and, thus, avoid an upward spir.il of litigation in individual countries.
Finally, imposition of liability for trafficking in property confiscated in Cuba exalts the claims of former Cuban property owners over the claims of all others who have experienced confiscation in third-party countries. There is absolutely no reason to
believe "those who lost property in Cuba are more deserving
than those who lost property in Germany, Eastern Europe, Vietnam, or Russia." 524 In brief, the Helms-Burton Act liability pr<r
vision is unequal justice.
While the third criticism is theoretically appealing, it is at
least partly rebutted by two practical facts. First, the United
States is not trying to overthrow governments in Germany, Eastern Europe, Vietnam, or Russia. The previous regimes that were
anathema to U.S. national security interests have long since
been replaced by governments that, to one degree or another,
attract political sympathy and economic assistance. 525 In addition, those persons who lost property in Cuba represent a
uniquely solid and vocal block of voters, particularly in Florida,
a state rich with electoral college votes. 526 Certainly a candidate
... /d.
524
/d. at 55, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. at 553.
,.. See id. at 54-55, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. at 553 (commenting on painful ttansition to democracy in Russia and Eastern Europe).
26
'
See Richard D. Porotsky, Economic Coercion and the General Assembly: A Post-Cold War
Asswment of the Legality and Utility of the Thiny-Fwe Year Old Embargo Agninst Cuba, 28 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 901, 914-15 (1995) (noting that both candidates in 1992 presidential election proclaimed support for Cuban Democracy Act in response to block of influential voters in Florida that appeared to dictate U.S. policy toward Cuba).
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as politically shrewd as President Clinton was aware of this fact
when he sought re-election in 1996.

G. Exclusion from Entry into the United States
An essential feature of sovereignty is that a nation is able to
control its borders. 827 Logically, the United States has the right
to exclude any person or class of persons it chooses from entry
into the ·United States.· In the Helms-Burton Act, the United
States has chosen to exclude
any alien who the Secretal}' of State determines is a person
who, after March 12, 1996(1) has confiscated, or has directed or overseen
the confiscation of, property a claim to which
is owned by a United States national, or converts or has converted for personal gain confiscated property, a claim to which is owned
by a United States national;
(2) traffics in confiscated property, a claim to
which is owned by a United States national;
(3) is a corporate officer, principal, or shareholder with a controlling interest of an entity
which has been involved in the confiscation
of property or trafficking in confiscated property, a claim to which is owned by a United
States national; or
( 4) is a spouse, minor child, or agent of a personal excludable under paragraph (I), (2), or
(3).328

The exclusion rule is mandatory: subject to three exceptions, the
U.S. Secretary of State829 must deny an entry visa to anyone in
the above four categories, and the Attorney General must exclude anyone in these categories from the United States. 8so
27
'
See James A Casey, Sauerrignty l1y Suffnuna: The /Uwion of Indian Tribal Sauemgnty, 79
CORNELL L REv. 404, 419 (1994) (supporting fundamental notion that sovereignty controls
borders) .
... 22 U.S.CA § 6091(a) (West Supp. 1997). For purposes of excluding aliens, the
tenns "confiscated• and "traffics• are defined in 22 U.S.CA § 6091(b)(1)-(2), respectively.
These definitions are very similar to the definitions of these tenns quoted and discussed
earlier. Comptm id. § 6023(4), (13) with id. § 6091(b)(l), (2) (highlighting identical language for definitions of tenns "confJSCated• and "traffics•).
329
See H.R. REP. No. 104-202, at 57, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. at 555 (dissenting
views) (stating consular official's actual job is to prevent undesirable persons from obtaining visas) .
..., See 22 U.S.CA § 6091 (a) (using phrases •shall deny a visa" and "shall exclude" (em-
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Moreover, Congress asserts in the legislative history that this
exclusion rule is not an idle threat. It "expects the Departments
of State and Justice to enforce these restrictions vigorously and,
at the very least, to immediately incorporate [sic] the names of
all persons known to U.S. embassies and other agencies" who
come within the categories of excludable persons into "computerized records that are regularly consulted by consular officials
when issuing visas." 551
The far-reaching scope and, to critics, the obnoxious nature,
of the Helms-Burton Act is evident from the third and fourth
categories of excludable aliens. Consider this hypothetical: a
woman is an assistant vice president (one of a hundred assistant
vice presidents) in a Malaysian plantation company involved in a
joint venture with an Australian agribusiness to cultivate pineapples in Cuba. Her husband is a law professor at the University
of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur, and they have a two-year-old daughter. In 1960, the Castro regime confiscated the land on which
the pineapples are now cultivated. The regime seized the land
from a Cuban who has since escaped to Miami and become a
U.S. citizen. The acts of trafficking (for example, the export of
pineapples from the property) occurred after the date of enactment of the Helms-Burton Act. The assistant vice president did
not choose the property in Cuba where the pineapples grow.
Rather, other corporate officers in her company were responsible for site selection as well as for the associated contract negotiations between the Malaysian and Australian companies and the
Cuban government. Suppose further that the assistant vice president and her law professor husband have a twenty-two-year-old
nephew graduating from the College of William & Mary in
Williamsburg, Virginia. Accordingly, she and her husband apply
for a visa to enter the United States and attend the William &
Mary graduation ceremony. Under clause (3) of the exclusion
rule, the Malaysian assistant vice president must be denied entry
into the United States. Under clause (4), her law professor hUsband and baby girl must be denied entry into the United States.
This result is, plainly, obnoxious. The exclusion rule "is so
phasis added)).
'" H.R REP. No. 104-202, at 42, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 548.
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broadly written that it would capture entirely innocent people." 552
Indeed, because of earlier actions taken by others, the rule may
punish people who follow all applicable local laws when purchasing property. sss
To be sure, this criticism is overstated because it implies that
the exclusion rule create"s strict liability. Regarding the second
category of excludable aliens, a mens rea requirement exists.
While the plain language of the exclusion rule does not require
a person to have engaged in the proscribed conduct in a knowing or intentional manner, the definition of the term "traffics"
contains an intent requirement that is applicable to the exclusion provisions. 554 Because the third category of excludable
aliens uses the term "trafficking," it also contains the same mens
rea requirement. Likewise, because the fourth category incorporates the second and third categories by reference, the fourth
category contains this requirement insofar as the excluded person is a spouse, minor child, or agent of a person listed in the
second or third categories. Only the first category eschews use of
the term "traffics," focusing instead on the initial confiscation of
property. Consequently, as a technical matter, there is no mens
rea requirement for a person in the first category, or for the
spouse, minor child, or agent of a person in the first category.
In practice, however, it is hard to imagine confiscation of property that is not knowing or intentional.
If the hypothetical is altered slightly to involve a Canadian or
Mexican businessperson, the objectionable result in the above
hypothetical of the Malaysian businesswoman and her family may
well violate the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA"). The Mexican and Canadian governments could
argue that the. exclusion rule violates NAFTA which limits the
restrictions countries can place on business travel.m Here too,
332

333

/d. at 57, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. at 555 (dissenting views) (emphasis added).
See id.
.

"' See 22 U.S.CA § 6091 (b)(2)(A); H.R. REP. No. 104-202, at 42, reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.CAN. at 547 (explaining that alien must "knowingly and intentionally traffic" in
confiscated property for alien to be excluded).
335
See H.R. REP. No. 104-202, at 57, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. at 555 (dissenting
views). The opponents of the Act argue that the exclusion rule violates NAITA and the
Uruguay Round Trade Agreement, which allow countries to restrict business travel only for
public health and national security reasons.
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the criticism is somewhat overstated. It assumes that U.S. national security concerns are entirely without merit.
Critics of the Helms-Burton Act would have fewer provisions
to attack if Congress had been more judicious in choosing the
categories of aliens it sought to exclude from the United States.
Yet the statute sets forth only three grounds for excepting an
alien from the exclusion rule: when trafficking is ongoing, but
not new or different from the original trafficking acts that occurred before March 12, 1996, the date of enactment;536 a
finding by the Secretary of State that the person needs medical
treatment in the United States;"' or a finding by the Secretary
of State that the person needs to appear in federal district court
to answer an accusation of trafficking in confiscated property of
a U.S. national.sss
When he signed the Helms-Burton Act, President Clinton
carved out a fourth exception to the exclusion rule: the Act
cannot restrict diplomats traveling to the United States or the
United Nations.!IS9 Curiously, the legislative history to the
Helms-Burton Act indicates that an alien will not be excluded if
the Secretary of State finds that admission "is in the national
interests of the United States." 540 However, nothing in the
statute's plain language, or even a liberal interpretation of this
language, supports a national interests exception from the exclusion rule.
As a practical matter, perhaps the most potent criticism of the
exclusion rule concerns its enforceability. Critics of the HelmsBurton Act rightly point out that the exclusion rule complicates

This is not a theoretical concern.... [A]n executive for a Canadian company
could be barred from entering the United States because his or her company
had some involvement with confiscated property in the 1960s- perhaps before the executive was born. The Canadian and Mexican Governments consider
this provision to be a violation of NAITA, and have said they will initiate dispute-settlement proceedings against the United States if it is enacted.
I d.

..,; See 22 U.S.CA § 6091(d)(2);jOINf ExPLANATORY STATEMENT OF TifE COMMITTEE OF
CONFERENCE, H.R CONF. REP. NO. 104-468, at 66 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN.
558, 581.
"'' See 22 U.S.CA § 6091(c).
"" See id.
,.,. See Statement by President of the United States, supra note 168, at 479.
540
H.R. REP. No. 104-202, at 42, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. at 547-48.
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the issuance of visas because consular officials will have to make
visa decisions without the benefit of complete information on
those confiscated property transactions. 541 The Immigration
and Naturalization Service ("INS") would have an unbelievably
complex task to organize a thorough, up-to-date, and secure
computer database accessible to all U.S. consular officials worldwide. No doubt Congress had this type of database in mind
when it enacted the exclusion rule. Even if the database existed,
the exclusion rule would require U.S. consular officers to ask
every visa applicant everywhere in the world new questions:
[The exclusion rule] is not limited to Cuban property issues
- it applies to property issues worldwide. A consular officer
will have to ask all visa applicants:
Have you ever bought property?
Can you prove that the person you bought it from did not

confiscate it from someone else?
Can you prove that the person they bought it from did
not confiscate it from someone else?
Are you a principal shareholder in a company that owns
property? If so where is it, who owned it before, and can
you prove it wasn't confiscated?
The questions go on and on. No matter what the answers,
the consular officer will have no basis for evaluating the information provided - and no ability to enforce the law. 542
The criticism that the exclusion rule is unenforceable 545 is especially poignant in light of other, arguably more important; demands on consular and INS officials. Both are overwhelmed by
the task of stemming the flow of illegal aliens, drug traffickers,
convicted felons, and terrorists into the United States. 544 Attempting· to enforce the Helms-Burton exclusion rule seems an
imprudent allocation of consular and immigration resources.

,., See id. at 55, ~nted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. at 553 (dissenting views) .
... /d. at 56-57, ~nted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN at 555 (dissenting views) .
... See id.
... See id.
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IV. FIGHTING THE MULIAHS545 AND QADDAFI:
THE 1996 SANCfiONS Acr
A.

The Purpose of New Sanctions Against Iran and Libya

National security is the obvious stated purpose behind the
1996 Sanctions Act.MS As President Clinton summed up when
signing the legislation, Iran and Libya are "two of the most
dangerous sponsors of terrorism in the world." 547 Moreover,
each country is widely reputed to be seeking the acquisition of
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The aggressive language of the congressional findings in sections 2 and 3 of the
Act reveals the perceived national security threats with respect to
Iran and Libya:
Sec. 2. Findings.
(1) The efforts of the Government of Iran to acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them
and its support of acts of international terrorism endanger the national security and foreign policy interests of the
United States . . . .
( 4)

345

The failure of the Government of Libya to comply with
Resolutions 731, 748, and 883 of the Security Council of
the United Nations, its support of international terrorism, and its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction constitute a threat to international peace and security that endangers the national security and foreign policy
interests of the United States . . . .

A mullah is an Islamic teacher and religious leader. See WEBSTER'S NEW
INTERNATIONAL UNABRIDGED DICfiONARY 1484 (3d ed. 1993).
,... Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541 (codified at 50 U.S.CA § 1701 note (West Supp.
1997)). The Department of State has published guidelines on the implementation of the
Act at 61 Fed. Reg. 66,067 (1996).
The Act is sometimes referred to as the "D'Amato Act," after Senator Alphonse
D'Amato of New York, who introduced the original bill. Because the entire Act is codified
as a note to 50 U.S.CA § 1701, references below to provisions in the Act are to the
sections in the Act as set forth in the note. The legislative history to this Act is contained in
two House Reports. See H.R. REP. No. 104-523(1) (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN.
1296 (accompanying original version of H.R. 3107); H.R. REP. No. 104-523(11) (1996),
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. 1311 (accompanying bill as enacted). In general, these
House Reports offer few insights beyond what is already obvious from the language of the
Act.
"' Gary G. Yerkey, President Clinton Signs into Law Legislation to Punish Fomgn Fmns
Investing in Iran, Libya, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1273 (Aug. 7, 1996).
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Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy.
(a) ... The Congress declares that it is the policy of
the United States to deny Iran the ability to support
acts of international terrorism and to fund the development and acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them by limiting
the deveLopment of Iran's ability to explore for, extract,
refine, or transport by pipeline petroleum resources of
Iran.
(b) ; . . The Congress further declares that it is the
policy of the United States to seek full compliance
by Libya with its obligations under Resolutions 731,
748, and 883 of the Security Council of the United
Nations, including ending all support for acts of international terrorism and efforts to develop or acquire
weapons of mass destruction. 548

The highlighted language bespeaks the theory behind the Act. A
direct connection exists between ( 1) profits earned by the Iranian and Libyan governments made possible by foreign investment
in the development of the petroleum resources549 in these
countries, and (2) the threat to U.S. national security arising
from Iranian- and Libyan-sponsored terrorism and their efforts
to obtain certain weapons. As Undersecretary of State Peter
Tarnoff testified with respect to the 1996 Sanctions Act, "a
straight line links Iran's oil income and its ability to sponsor
terrorism, build weapons of mass destruction, and acquire sophisticated armaments." 550 In brief, these rogue governments
use some of their petroleum industry profits to fund terrorist
activities and buy materials for nuclear, chemical, and biological
"" 50 U.S.CA § 1701 note (West Supp. 1997) (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 3. Declaration of policy) (emphasis added) .
..,. "Petroleum resources,~ the heart of the target of the sanctions against Iran and
Libya, refer (somewhat circularly) to "petroleum and natural gas resources." See 50 U.S.CA
§ 1701 note (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 14. Definitions).
"" H.R REP. No. 104-523(1), at 9, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. at 1298.
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weapons. 351 The Act aims to constrict their key funding source
and thereby constrain their threatening activities. 352
To apply and enforce these sanctions in support of U.S. national security interests, the Act carefully defines the terms "act
of international terrorism," "develop" and "investment." An act
of international terrorism is an act that (1) is "violent or dangerous to human life," (2) violates federal or state criminal laws or
would violate these laws if committed within federal or state
jurisdiction, and (3) "appears to be intended" to "intimidate or
coerce a civilian population," "influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion," or "affect the conduct of a
government by assassination or kidnaping." 355 The terms "develop" and "development" are used only in the context of petroleum resources and refer to the exploring, extracting, refining,
or transporting of these resources. 554 Investment focuses on
three specific activities within the petroleum industry undertaken
after August 5, 1996 (the date of enactment), under an agreement with the governments in Iran or Libya. These three investment activities are: developing Iranian or Libyan petroleum
resources, or guaranteeing another person's agreement to develop these resources; acquiring an equity interest (i.e., buying
shares) in the development of Iranian or Libyan petroleum
resources; and receiving royalties, earnings, or profits from the
development of Iranian or Libyan petroleum resources. 555 The
definition of "investment" is further qualified because it does
not include any agreement to buy or sell goods, services, or
technology. 556 However, this qualification is confusing because
it may conflict with one of the aforementioned three investment
301

See genero.Uy Zbigniew Brzezinski et al., Differentiated Containment, 76 FOREIGN AFF.,
May-June 1997, at 20, 27. It is worth underscoring the breadth of Mnational security" concerns encompassed by the Act. Two prominent former national security advisors, Zbigniew
Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft, argue the Act should focus more narrowly on the quest for
nuclear weapons capability, which is M[t]he single most worrisome aspect of Iran's behavior." ld.; see also Edward Mortimer, The Satanic Dialogue, FIN. TIMEs, May 21, 1997, at 28
(stating that Iran is attempting to develop weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear
bombs and long-range missiles).
302
See H.R REP. No. 104-523(1), at 13-14, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. at 1302-03.
,., See 50 U.S.CA. § 1701 note (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 14. Definitions) .
... See id.
... See id.
... See id.
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activities. For example, suppose a company develops the Iranian
petroleum industry by selling drilling equipment to the government of Iran. The qualification suggests the sale is not an investment.
As with the other two Acts discussed in this Article, the stated
purpose of the 1996 Sanctions Act is to safeguard national security. However, it is less obvious why Congress and President
Clinton enacted new sanctions against Iran and Libya. Pursuant
to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977
("IEEPA"), the United States already has a trade embargo
against Iran and Libya. ss? Why enact another statute? Given
existing embargoes, what types of novel sanctions could possibly
exist, and what purposes could any further sanctions possibly
serve?
One answer to these questions is that the 1996 Sanctions Act
is a secondary boycott, whereas IEEPA trade embargo is a primary boycott. IEEPA trade embargo imposed against Iran and Libya is a primary boycott because the United States forbids U.S.
citizens from importing goods or services from, or exporting
goods or services to, the target countries. The essential nature of
a primary boycott is that it is an act of self-restraint by the boycotting country and concerns only the boycotting country and
the target country. 558
A secondary boycott involves not only the boycotting and
target countries, but also third-party countries. A secondary boycott attempts to limit the extent of economic dealings of thirdparty countries with the target country.ss9 The 1996 Sanctions
Act not only reinforces America's primary boycott but, more
importantly, imposes a secondary boycott against Iran and Libya.
It levies penalties against U.S. and non-U.S. citizens and businesses alike that invest in the Iranian and Libyan petroleum
industries. Like the Helms-Burton Act, the 1996 Sanctions Act
also contains a secondary boycott measure that bars U.S. and
See Pub. L No. 9~223, 91 Stat. 1626 (1977) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706
(1994)). For a discussion of IEEPA and the Iranian and Libyan embargoes, see HOUSE
COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 105TH CONG., OVERVIEW AND COMPIU\TION OF U.S. TRADE STATUTES 167-70 (Comm. Print 1997).
"" See Barbara]. Anderson, Sectmdary Boycotts and the First Amendment, 51 U. CHI. L REv.
811, 811-15 (1984) (elaborating on use and effectiveness of secondary boycotts) .
... See id.
'
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non-U.S. persons from trafficking in confiscated property and
denies entry into the United States to non-U.S. persons engaged
in trafficking.
This economic distinction between primary and secondary
boycotts is evident from a petroleum development transaction
involving Conoco, Inc., an American oil company, Total S.A., a
French oil giant, and Iran. In early 1995, Conoco reportedly
initialed a $1 billion contract with Iran to develop oil fields
around Iran's Sirri Island. In response, President Clinton invoked IEEPA to prohibit U.S. persons from financing, managing,
or supervising the development of Iran's petroleum resources.360 This response was a primary boycott and it successfully
forced Conoco to withdraw from the contract. 561 However, to
the dismay of Congress and Clinton Administration officials,
Total SA picked up Conoco's abandoned contract, agreeing to
develop the Sirri Island oil fields in a $600 million contract. 562
In enacting a secondary boycott against Iran and Libya, Congress sought to discourage such opportunistic behavior in disregard of U.S. national security concerns.
In addition to implementing a secondary boycott, the second
reason Congress passed the 1996 Sanctions Act was to respond
to two incidents involving terrorists allegedly supported by Iran
and Libya. The first incident was the July 1996 explosion of a
Trans World Airlines Boeing 747 jetliner flying from New York
to Paris which killed all 230 passengers and crew. Despite considerable speculation that a terrorist bomb caused the explosion,56s to date there is no evidence to suggest terrorist involvement.
... See Exec. Order No. 12,957, 60 Fed. Reg. 14,615 (1995).
,., See Bushan Bahree, Total of Frana Takes Iran Deal, Ignoring U.S., WALL ST. J. EUR.,
July 14, 1995, at 3 .
... See H.R. REP. No. 104523(1), at 9-11 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CA.N. 1296,
1298-1300; Gary G. Yerkey, EU Files Frmnal Protest with U.S. Over lAw Penaliz.ing Foreign Firms
with Tia to Iran, Libya, 13 lnt'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1315, 1316 (Aug. 14, 1996) .
.., See Nancy Dunne & Robert Corzine, Politics Sets Tone for Trade BanieTs, FIN. TIMES,
July 25, 1996, at 4 (noting widespread suspicion in United States that terrorist bomb, possibly oflranian or Middle Eastern origin, involved in 1WAjetliner explosion); Laurie Lande,
Congress Seeks End to Libya, Iran Ties by Foreign Fmns, WALL ST. J., July 24, 1996, at A16 (observing that congressional fears about terrorism increased following 1WA explosion, and
authorities investigated whether terrorists may have caused crash).
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In retrospect, Congress may have overreacted to the incident.
Indeed, a Financial Times editorial obsetved that "U.S. assertions
about Iran's role in· terrorism remain unproven."S64 The &onomist intoned that while Iran is the prime suspect when international terrorism is directed· against American interests, evidence
has yet to be produced.!!& The United States' suspicions regarding Iran's part in terrorism remain unproven.S66 In brief,
the Iranian government may be nasty, but our trading partners
do not believe that it is the godfather of international terrorism.
To be sure, article XXI(a) of GATT does not require a WTO
Member to divulge information that would compromise its
essential national security interests. 367 As the Financial Times
suggests, however, the United States must prove at least a prima
facie c~e if it expects its European allies to sign on to the secondary boycott.!l68
A second incident that apparently provoked congressional
reaction was the June 1996 bombing of a Saudi Arabian apartment building that housed U.S. military personnel. 369 The
bombing killed nineteen American service personnel, and it was
widely thought that Iranian terrorists orchestrated the incident. 370 Once again, no credible evidence of Iranian involvement exists. To the contrary, the perpetrators may well have
been Saudi dissidents. 371

!64 Handling Iran, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1996, at 17.
,.. See Handling Iran: The West Has to Find Something Mure than LectuTtJ but Less than &(}nomic Sanctions, ECONOMIST, Mar. 16, 1996, at 17 (stating that Iran is prime suspect behind

terrorism).
566
See Handling Iran, supra note 364, at 17 (asserting that while Iran has participated in
terrorism in past, United States cannot prove that Iran is engaged in terrorism at present).
""' See GAIT arL XXI(a).
068
See Handling Iran, supra note 364, at 17 (stating that United States's assertions of
Iran's terrorism remain unproven).
,.. See Bruce Clark, U.S. split on Huw to Handle Iran, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1997, at 8 (reporting details about bombings).
.
70
'
See id. (reporting that Iranian terrorists were suspected behind bombing).
. "' · See M.E. Ahrari & Brigid Starkey, Polarity and Stability in the Post-Cold War Persian Gulf,
21 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 133, 144 (1997) (discussing Saudi government crackdown on
Shi'i opposition to majority rule following November 1995 and June 1996 bombing incidents in Saudi Arabia).
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B. Questioning the Wisdom of New Sanctions Against Iran and Libya
Similar to the Helms-Burton Act, many of America's closest
military allies and most significant trading partners condemn the
1996 Sanctions Act precisely because it is a unilateral effort at a
secondary boycott 572 In their eyes, a secondary boycott gives
the sanctions an unwarranted, perhaps illegal, extraterritorial effect.575 Put bluntly, critics of the Act see it as a U.S. attempt to
bully others into complying with a unilaterally-imposed sanctions
regime. 574 Worse yet, the American secondary boycott is quite
rightly viewed as hypocritical. The United States balked at the
Arab countries' attempt to enforce a secondary boycott of Israel;
indeed, the United States enacted blocking legislation making it
illegal to comply with the boycott 575 Now, however, the United
States expects compliance with its secondary boycott of Iran and
Libya. Finally, critics note that the secondary boycott is an antiAmerican flag around which Iranian mullahs and Colonel
Muammar Qaddafi can rally their people, 576 as Castro has attempted to do vis-a-vis the Helms-Burton Act. 577 Thus, ironically, the boycott may reinforce the very behavior of the Iranian
and Libyan govemments that the United States seeks to alter.
These criticisms raise the practical problem of the efficacy of
the Act: can it achieve its stated purpose of safeguarding national security, given intense opposition from America's friends? Two
572

See Canada Criticizes U.S. /ran-Libya Law as Unsuppurtable E:ctraterritority, 13 lnt'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1316, 1316-17 (Aug. 14, 1996) (reporting EU condemnation of 1996
Sanctions Act); Yerkey, supra note 362, at 131&.16 (reporting Canadian displeasure with
Act).
m See Canada Criticizes U.S. /ran-Libya Law as Unsuppurtable E:ctraterritority, supra note
372, at 1316-17 (reporting on Canadian and EU challenge to extraterritorial imposition of
trade policy) .
574
See id. (relaying European Trade Commissioner's comment that Iran and Libya
Sanctions Act of 1996 allows one country to dictate foreign policy of other countries).
575
See supra note 34 and accompanying text (highlighting U.S. legislation in response to
Arab League secondary boycott of Israel).
576
See, e.g., Roula Khalaf, U.S. Sanctions Afll GadafF s Gf!latest Fear. Thf!lats to Oil Shales
Worry the Libyan Leader and Help Him Manipulate opinilm at HOflll!, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1996,
at 4 (noting that sanctions are convenient tool for Qaddafi and have perverse effect of
bolstering Libyan leader and reinforcing deep resentment of United States).
577
See U.S. Bids to Help Fund Democracy in Cuba, CARiuBF.AN UPDATE, Mar. 1, 1997
(reporting Castro referring to HelrrurBurton Act as attempt to enslave Cubans).
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Congressmen, who voted in favor of the 1996 Sanctions Act,
neatly summarize the argument that a unilaterally-imposed secondary boycott cannot work:
[W]e are concerned that the bill [H.R 3107, ·the initial version of the Act] could be counterproductive to the goal of
increasing multilateral economic and political pressure on
Iran.
The sanctions in the bill will penalize foreign firms for
commercial activity which, though objectionable to us, is legal
in their home countries. We understand that other governments are likely to charge that the bill's import and government procurement sanctions, at a minimum, violate trade and
other international agreements to which the United States is
a party.
[O]ther governments have already notified us that they
object to these measures on sovereignty grounds. Past experience suggests they will take blocking measures. Retaliatory
measures against U.S. trade, perhaps authorized by international adjudicatory bodies, are also possible.
Our concern here is not that we may offend our allies, for
we object to their unwillingness to adopt tougher measures to
isolate Iran [and Libya] economically and politically. Our
concern is more practical: The United States cannot adequately pressure Iran's. [or Libya's] economy alone. A strong
adverse reaction by other governments to a U.S. effort to
penalize their firms will put us at odds with some of our
closest friends. That could ultimately reduce, rather than
increase, multilateral cooperation on Iran [and Libya].
We believe recent history is instructive. Western efforts to
confront another dangerous country - the former Soviet
Union -were set back in 1982 when the United States tried
to sanction firms participating in the development of a Soviet
gas pipeline.
The target of U.S. pressure in 1982 was subsidiaries of U.S.
firms, yet the reaction in Europe was intense. And U.S. sanctions did not achieve their goal: the sanctions were not sustainable, and the United States ultimately had to lift them.
The bill before us today would hit foreign firms. We can
expect at least as strong a response. 578

318
Additional Vzews of the Hmwrable Lee H. Hamillon and the Hmwrable james P. Moran, in
H.R REP. No. 104-523(1), at 20 (1996), Ttflrinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. 1296, 1309; see also
Toby Roth, New Iranian-Libyan Sanctions WzU Only Hurt U.S., WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 1996, at
A14 (arguing that Act will isolate United States from other governments whose help United
States needs to contain threats from Iran and Libya).
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Of course, the force motivating some of the critics, particularly
those in Europe, is economic self-interest. As a European Commission spokesperson admitted, "Europe is energy dependent on
these nations [Iran and Libya]" and "can't afford to seriously
hurt our economies because of a [sanctions] strategy that hasn't
proved to be effective."s79 Iran and Libya supply more than
20% of the European Union's oil and gas.!ISO Iran is particularly vital as the world's third largest exporter of oil.ss 1 Business
ties between Iran and Germany are close. Iran's leading trading
partner is Germany, with roughly 170 German companies, including Siemens AG and Mannesmann AG, doing business in
Iran, and Iranian govemmental and private entities owing roughly $8.8 billion to German businesses. ss2
Despite these economic facts about Iran, as a tactical matter,
the 1996 Sanctions Act might have been less controversial in
Europe if it had omitted Libya. Ties between Europe and Libya,
especially in the petroleum resource industry, are closer than
between Europe and Iran. sss The only European oil company
to have significant direct investments in Iran's petroleum resource industry is Total.!l84
Moreover, as of this writing, only Total has challenged the
Act. In September 1997, Total and its two consortium partners
- Malaysia's Petronas and Russia's Gazprom - signed a contract with the National Iranian Oil Company. The contract calls
for the consortium to invest $2 billion to develop part of the
South Pars natural gas field, located near Iran's maritime border
with Qatar.ss5 Production is scheduled to start in 200l.S86 The
'"' Laurie Lande, Congress Seeks End to Libya, Iran Ties fly Foreign Firms, WALL ST. J., July
24, 1996, at A16.
""' See Gary G. Yerkey, President Clinton Signs into Law Legislation to Punish Fureign Firms
Investing in Iran, Libya, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1273, 1274 (Aug. 7, 1996).
381
See Bruce Clark, U.S. Applauds European Stand on Iran, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1997, at 3.
'"' See Trading with Terrorists, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 1996, at A12; Greg Steinmetz, EU
Unlikely to Impose Embargo on Iran, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 1997, at A2 (elaborating upon Iranian debt to German companies).
'"' See Libya's Trans-National Oil System Keeps Expanding, APS REv. DOWNSTREAM TRENDS,
Aug. 18, 1997, at 4 (reporting on Europe's extensive involvement and investment in Libya).
'"' See Clark, supra note 381, at 3.
""' See David Owen & Guy de Jonquie'res, Total to Defj U.S. with $2bn Deal to Develop Iran
Gas, FIN. nMES, Sept. 29, 1997, at 1.
... See id.
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Clinton Administration has threatened to impose sanctions on
Total under the Act, but France has warned of serious consequences, and the EU has said it will resurrect its complaint in
the WfO against the Helms-Burton Act if sanctions are imposed.587 Quite possibly, the United States will waive sanctions
if France takes a tougher stance against Iran with respect to
terrorism and chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. The
Total contract should not surprise the Clinton Administration.
Iran has 15% of the world's proven natural gas reseiVes, second
only to Russia's reseiVes; thus, foreign companies are anxious to
develop Iran's reseiVes. 588 Further, as the Financial Times pointed out, "Total is fast developing a reputation for targeting output from 'outlaw' countries such as Iraq, Libya and Burma although [Total] chairman Thierry Desmarest has claimed it is
just that 'the Lord put the reseiVes in places that are a bit hot
on political grounds."' 589
In contrast to the more modest dealings in Iran, several European companies in addition to Total, such as Agip of Italy,
Repsol of Spain, OMV of Austria, Petrofina of Belgium, . and
Lasmo of the U.K., either have dealings in Libya's industry or
have explored Libya's potential reseiVes. 890 For Italy in particular, participating in a secondary boycott of Libya's petroleum resource industry would be impossible in the short- or mediumterm because Italy buys 30% of its oil from Libya. 891 Thus, notwithstanding the Total deal, the 1996 Sanctions Act might have
been more favorably received in Europe if the Act had omitted
Libya.
Leaving Libya out of the Act might also have been in the
long-term strategic interest of the United States. At present, the
principal U.S. access to Caspian Sea oil is through Russia. 892
587

See Gerard Baker et al., U.S. Attacks Totals $2bn Iran Deal, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1997,

at 1.
588

See Virginia Marsh, Other Investors Watch and Wait, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1997, at 9.
See Owen & de Jonquie'res, supra note 385, at 1.
..., See Corzine & Dunne, supra note 363, at 4 (revealing oil companies involved in Libya).
"' See Lorraine WoeUert, AUies Complain of "ChiUing Effect, "WASH. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1996,
at AI.
392
See Robert D. Kaplan, Why the U.S. and Iran Will Be Friends Agnin, WALL ST. J., Feb.
10, 1997, at A18.
389
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However, Russia has yet to demonstrate it will be a stable democratic market economy. Iran could provide non-Russian access to
Caspian sea oil. If Islamic extremists overtook Saudi Arabia, the
importance of such an alternate access route would increase.
The Act, however, is not uniformly unilateral in nature. It
"urges" the President to undertake diplomatic efforts both in
international fora such as the United Nations and bilaterally
with U.S. allies "to establish a multilateral sanctions regime
against Iran," limiting the development of its petroleum resources and thereby inhibiting its efforts to sponsor acts of international terrorism. 595 Curiously, there is no comparable provision
in the Act concerning Libya. The President must report periodically to Congress regarding the results of these diplomatic efforts.594 The President must also list the countries that have
and have not agreed to undertake sanctions measures against
Iran. 595
There is a possible link between diplomatic efforts to establish
a multilateral sanctions regime against Iran and the unilateral
sanctions imposed by the United States. The President may
waive the investment trigger sanction against Iran if a country
"has agreed to undertake substantial measures, including economic
sanctions" that will undermine Iran's efforts to support international terrorism. 596 Neither the Act nor the legislative history
explains what constitutes substantial measures. It is a matter left
to presidential discretion. 597 However, substantial measures
would conceivably include participation in a multilateral sanctions regime arranged as a result of the President's diplomatic
""' 50 U.S.CA § 1701 note (West Supp. 1997) (Iran and libya Sanctions, Sec. 4. Multilateral regime) .
... See id.
... See id. The President must report to Congress 90 days after August 5, 1996 on whether and extent to which EU, Korea, Australia, Israel, and japan have imposed sanctions on
Iran and libya, and the disposition of any GAlT or wro panel decision on such sanctions. See id. Additionally, the President must report to Congress on, inter alia, his efforts to
persuade other count:nes to pressure Iran ~ (1) cease its support for international terrorism and its attempts to acquire nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and (2) withdraw diplomats who participated in the 1979 takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran. See
id. (Iran and libya Sanctions, Sec. 10. Reports required).
396
See id. (Iran and libya Sanctions, Sec. 4. Multilateral regime) (emphasis added). The
President must notifY Congress of the waiver at least 30 days before the waiver takes effecL
Seeid.
.., See id.
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efforts. m If so, then the nationals - the individuals and businesses from that country - participating in the regime would
also be eligible for a sanctions waiver. It clearly would be unreasonable for the Act to target nationals in the secondary boycott
of Iran when their country is participating in multilateral sanctions against Iran. Conversely, an enhanced sanction must be
imposed on nationals of a country that does not qualify for a
sanctions waiver. Thus, the failure of a country to participate in
a multilateral sanctions regime against Iran could cause its nationals to bear a double burden: the denial of a sanctions waiver
and the imposition of an enhanced sanction.
In fairness to supporters of new sanctions against Iran and
Libya, the European governments' passive reaction to terrorism
is sometimes maddening. In 1992, four Kurdish opposition leaders were killed in a Berlin restaurant named Mykonos. 599 In
April 1997, a Berlin court convicted four perpetrators of the
Mykonos assassinations. 400 In the verdict, Judge Frithjof Kubsch
declared: "The Iranian political leadership is responsible," 401
and specifically identified Mr. Ali Fallahian, Iran's chief of foreign intelligence, as orchestrating the Mykonos murders. 402 Fol..,. See id. (stating-that Congress urges President to use diplomatic efforts to establish
multilateral sanction regime) .
.,. See EU Igrwm U.S. Request to Take Economic Measum Agninst Iran, 14 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 787, 787 (Apr. 30, 1997) (reporting that German court found Iranian government
officials conspired to kill four Kurdish opposition leaders). For media accounts of the case
and its aftermath, see EU Suspends •critical Dialogue• with Iran; Ending Ties Is Weighed, Dutch
OJJicial Says, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 706, 706 (Apr. 16, 1997) (asserting that EU suspended dialogue with Iran as result of Iranian authorities' link with assassination of
Kurdish leaders); Frederick Studemann & Lionel Barber, EU Adopts Toogher Attitude over
Iran, FIN. TIMEs, Apr. 11, 1997, at 1 (reporting that United States welcomed Berlin court's
conviction of Iranian authorities); Frederick Studemann, Germany Puts Dialogue with Iran on
Hold, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1997, at 5 (declaring that suspension of dialogue with Iran is
dramatic twist in Germany's foreign policy).
400
See Robin Allen, Khatami Set to Take Reins in Iran, FIN. TIMES, Aug: 2, 1997, at 2 (reporting on convictions).
401
Greg Steinmetz, Ruling im Killing spurs EU to Curo Links with Iran, WALL Sr. J., Apr.
11, 1997, at All.
402
See Allen, supra note 400, at 2; Kurdish opposition Radio Welcomes German Arnst Warrant fur Minister (BBC radio broadcast, Mar. 20, 1996) (discussing Fallahian's indictment for
orchestrating bombings of Mykonos cafe in Berlin). Amazingly, Mr. Fallahian visited Bonn
in October 1993 at the official invitation of Mr. Bernd Schmidbauer, the security advisor to
Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and even toured the Munich offices of Germany's intelligence
services. Later, on March 18, 1996, he was indicted by German prosecutors for having masterminded the murders. He has yet to stand trial on the charge. See Philip Golup, Berlin
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lowing this verdict, the EU suspended its policy of "critical dialog" with Iran, and all EU members (except Greece) recalled
their ambassadors from Tehran. 4011 However, not one European
country enacted trade sanctions. 404
C.

Six New Sanctions

Because it attacks terrorist activities by limiting the available
profits that fund such activities, the sanction mechanism in the
1996 Sanctions Act is predictable. The Act seeks to bar new
· investment in the Iranian and Libyan petroleum industries above
. a certain threshold. The Act lays out six specific sanction measures.405 The President is required to impose two or more of
these measures on an individual or "sanctioned person" who
violates the Act. 406
First, the President may direct the U.S. Export-Import Bank to
deny approval of any guarantee, extension of credit, or insurance in connection with the export of goods or services to a
sanctioned person. 407 Second, the President may decline to issue a required license to allow the export of sensitive goods or
technology to a sanctioned person. 408 Third, the President may
prohibit any U.S. financial institution - either a commercial or
investment bank or an insurance company409 - from lending
or providing credits in excess of $10 million in a twelve-month
period to a sanctioned person unless the funding is to support
humanitarian activities. 410
The fourth type of sanction is relevant only if the sanctioned
person is a financial institution. The sanctioned financial institution may not be allowed to serve as a repository of U.S. governCourl Ruling Puts EU s 'Critical I>ialtJgue with Iran at JUsk, AsiA TIMES, Apr. 14, 1997, at 9.
"" See John Lancaster, New Iranian Regime, Arab Neighlxm Shaw Signs of Easing Tense Re/a.
tions, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 1997, at A15; Philip Golup, supra note 402, at 9.
404
For an excellent discussion of the strains Iran places on the relationship between
the United States and Germany, see generally Charles Lane, Germany's New Ostpolitik, 74
FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 77.
..,. See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 note (West Supp. 1997) (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 6
Description of Sanctions).
406
See id. (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 5. Imposition of sanctions).
"" See id. (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 6. Description of sanctions).
408 See id.
409
See id. (defining "financial institution").
410 See id.
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ment funds - it cannot maintain Treasury tax and loan accounts into which tax revenues are deposited and maintained on
behalf of the U.S. govemment. 411 The Federal Reserve may also disqualify the institution as a primary dealer in U.S. government debt instruments; the disqualification means the institution
cannot participate directly in open market transactions in Treasury bills, notes, and bonds, held through the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York. 412
The fifth sanction applies only to persons that are or seek to
be U.S. government contractors. The President may bar the U.S.
government from procuring goods or services from the sanctioned person. 415 If the President chooses to impose this sanction, then the Act requires him to abide by the Uruguay Round
Agreement on Government Procurement. In practice, this means
that the President will eschew imposing sanctions on "eligible
products," defined according to the Agreement in U.S. law. 414
Finally, the President may restrict imports from the sanctioned
person into the United States. In doing so, the President must
act in accordance with the powers set forth in IEEPA. 415
Does the differential impact that particular sanctions might
have suggest a disparity between the aggressive · rhetoric surrounding the Act's purpose and the strength of the Act's measures used to combat terrorism and its supporters? Given the
411
See id.
"' See id. If a financial institution loses its authority to hold Treasury tax and loan
accounts and its primary dealer status, then for purposes of the President's imposing two
or more of the six sanctions the financial institution has received not one but two sanctions. A curious point about this fourth sanction is the relationship between the President
and the Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve is an independent agency of the U.S.
government and, in general, does not take orders from the executive branch. See Bernard
Schwartz, A Decade of Administrntive Law, 32 TulSA LJ. 493, 496 (1997). Yet presumably
Congress intended the possibility that the President might order the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to deny designation
to, or revoke the prior designation of, a financial institution as a primary dealer. Surely
Congress would not have wanted to see the Federal Reserve thwart a sanction the President
thought appropriate in the interests of national security.
"' See id. (stating that United States cannot procure goods or services from sanctioned
person).
"' See 19 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (1994) (listing eligible products pursuant to Agreement);
H.R REP. No. 104-523(11), at 13 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1311, 1316.
"' See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 note (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 6. Description of
sanctions) (stating that President may act under International Emergency Economic Power
Act to restrict imports).

100

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 31:1

strong rhetoric, Congress probably did not foresee a limp-wristed
set of sanctions. To the contrary, it must be inferred that Congress provided the President with discretion to choose two or
more sanctions so that the President could exploit, or not exploit, the vulnerabilities unique to a sanctioned person.
For a large number of companies, the fifth and sixth sanctions are potentially draconian. Designating a company as ineligible to receive U.S. government procurement contracts or barring its exports from the U.S. market could cause irreparable
harm to the company. At the same time, the six sanctions are
not equally fearsome in every case. For example, a sanctioned
company might rely on Japanese or European banks for most of
its funding. Thus, barring U.S. banks from extending credit to
the company would have little effect on its activities developing
Iran's or Libya's petroleum resources. Even a company that
obtains most of its funding from U.S. banks may be able to
substitute lenders and rely on Japanese or European financing.
If this substitution occurs with little or no increase in the
sanctioned company's cost of funds, then the sanction ends up
hurting only the former U.S. bank lenders who involuntarily
surrendered the company's business.
Conversely, because buying and reselling Treasury securities
can be highly profitable, a sanctioned financial institution that is
a primary dealer in U.S. government securities could be seriously damaged if the Federal Reserve revoked its primary dealer
status. As another example, a sanctioned company may rely on a
U.S. government license to export sensitive high-technology
equipment to China for the majority of its revenues. Failure to
receive the requisite export clearance could mean the company
would go bankrupt if it could not obtain the equipment from a
non-U.S. source. Accordingly, the President could punish this
person revoking its lucrative status. It seems implicit in the Act
that Congress expects the President to investigate thoroughly the
business situation of a particular person and then choose the
most appropriate mix of sanctions.
·
Because of the potentially serious damage that sanctions can
cause, perhaps the most important practice point about the
1996 Sanctions Act is that clients may seek and rely upon official
guidance. The Act invites companies to seek an advisory opinion
from the Secretary of State as to whether a proposed transaction
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would run afoul of the Act and thereby subject the transactor to
liability. 416 A company relying in good faith on a Secretary of
State's advisory opinion that determined the proposed transaction to be lawful is free to engage in the transaction and is
immune from sanctions. 417 Of course, the company should take
care not to deviate in practice from the terms of the transaction
that it presented to the Secretary of State and which the Secretary approved.
D.

The Long Extraterritorial Reach of the Sanctions

The secondary boycott imposed by the 1996 Sanctions Act
against Iran applies to "any person." This term is defined as any
individual, corporation, partnership, other. business entity, or
successor entity418 that the President determines has carried
out one . of several prohibited activities. 419 The word "any" is
particularly noteworthy, because it implicates non-U.S. pe:rSons,
thus rendering as extraterritorial the potential scope of the
secondary boycott sa.11ctions under the Act.
The extraterritorial scope of the .sanctions is even wider because of two conditions. First, sanctions may be imposed on a
parent or subsidiary of a person if the parent or subsidiary engages in a prohibited transaction with actual knowledge. 420 Second, sanctions may be imposed on an affiliate of a person who
is controlled in fact by that person and engages in a prohibited
activity with actual knowledge. 421 Thus, the 1996 Sanctions Act
416
417

See id. (Iran and libya sanctions, Sec. 7. Advisory opinions).
See id. (stating that those who rely on advisory opinions will not be subject to

sanctions). With respect to investments in Iran, seeking advice is particularly importanL
Even though section 5(e) of the Act requires the President to publish in the Federal Register
a list of all significant publicly tendered Iranian oil and gas projects, "the fact that a project
does not appear on the list does not indicate that the project is immune from or, ... any
less vulnerable to, sanction .... • H.R. REP. No. 104-523(11), at 15, reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.CAN. at 1317.
••• See 50 U.S.CA § 1701 note (Iran and libya Sanctions, Sec. 14. Definitions)
(defining parties to whom Act applies).
419
See id. (Iran and libya Sanctions, Sec. 5. Imposition of sanctions).
420

See id.

See id. The Department of Sta~ guidelines on the implementation of the Act clarify
that for corporate parents, "engages in" refers to the facilitation and authorization of entry
into a prohibited contracL For subsidiaries, it refers to actual participation in the
implementation of the contracL See Additional Information for the Iran and libya
Sanctions Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 66,067, 66,068 (1996) (defining sanctions on subsidiaries for
421
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is an excellent example, along with the Helms-Burton Act, of
the long reach of America's claimed extraterritorial jurisdiction
over unilateral trade actions. 422
The only caveat to sanctioning the parent and subsidiary is
the mens rea requirement of actual knowledge. 423 The only
Iran and Libya Sanctions Act).
422
To underscore why this long reach is dramatic and controversial, consider the
following example. Assume a French corporation, which has a Dutch subsidiary, is owned
by a holding company incorporated in Bermuda. The holding company, which is a shell
and in fact is controlled by senior managers of the French corporation, also owns a
company incorporated in Indonesia. The Indonesian company, in tum, owns a company
incorporated in Singapore.
Like the Bermuda holding company, the Indonesian and Singaporean companies are
controlled in fact by the French corporation. No Americans work for any of the companies.
Accordingly, the organizational structure is as follows:

Bermuda Holding Company
(Parent of French Corporation)

French Subsidiary
Corporation
(Masterminds the
prohibited activity)

Indonesian Subsidiary
Corporation
(Affiliate of the
French Corporation)

Dutch Corporation
(Subsidiary of the
French Corporation)

Singaporean
Corporation
(Affiliate of the
French Corporation)

Assume the French company engages in a prohibited activity. It masterminds the operation
and, thus, is sanctioned under the Act. Assume further that all of the other entities
participate in the prohibited activity, though some in minor respects, with actual
knowledge. Because they are affiliates of, and controlled in fact by, the French corporation,
the Indonesian and Singaporean companies also are sanctioned. As the parent of the
French corporation, the Bermuda holding company is sanctioned. As the subsidiary of the
French corporation, the Dutch corporation is sanctioned. The names of all of these
sanctioned entities will be published in the Federal Register. See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 note
(Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 5. Imposition of sanctions) (stating that President requests
Federal Register to publish names of those sanctioned).
423
See Marc. C. Hebert, Unilateralism as a Defense Mechanism: An Overview of the Iran and
Libyan Sanctions Act of 1996, 5 U. MIAMI Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 16 (1997) (proposing knowledge
that investment enhances development of resources, rather than knowledge that
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caveat to sanctioning the other affiliates is the mens rea requirement plus the control-in-fact requirement. 424 In many cases
arising under the 1996 Sanctions Act, it will be difficult for U.S.
authorities to satisfy these requirements. Moreover, it is not clear
whether a parent, subsidiary, or affiliate can have actual knowledge imputed to it if different officials in the parent, subsidiary,
or affiliate had partial knowledge but no single official had a
"bird's eye" view of the entire operation. Nor is it clear whether
a parent, subsidiary, or affiliate can have actual knowledge if it
is willfully blind to the engagement in the prohibited activity.425 Despite these uncertainties, however, the possibility of
sanctions is real and, therefore, it is quite appropriate that foreign corporations and their governments are concerned about
the long arm of the Act.

E.

The Investment Trigger Against Iran

Several types of transactions will trigger U.S. imposition of two
or more of the above-discussed sanctions. The 1996 Sanctions
Act spells out one prohibited direct foreign investment. transaction. The transaction entails (1) an investment worth $40 million or more, (2) made on or after August 5, 1996 (the date of
enactment), (3) with actual knowledge, where ( 4) the investment "directly and significantly" contributes to the enhancement
of Iran's ability to develop its petroleum resources. 426 Engaging
in this activity triggers sanctions that, absent a waiver, must be
imposed.
Examples of direct foreign investment transactions that probably would violate the Act follow from the definition of "investment." 427 This definition identifies three categories of illegal
transactions. The first category covers entry into a contract to
investment violates Act, is necessary for sanctions) .
... See id.
"" There is substantial case law on money laundering regarding both of these
uncertainties, and possibly U.S. authorities or corporate counsel might seek to analogize to
this law. See, e.g., United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987)
(holding aggregate knowledge of corporate components constitutes corporation's total
knowledge of particular operation).
426
See 50 U.S.CA § 1701 note (West Supp. 1997) (Iran and Ubya Sanctions, Sec. 5.
Imposition of sanctions).
427
See id. (Iran and Ubya Sanctions, Sec. 14. Definitions) (defining "investment").
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take responsibility for developing Iranian petroleum resources,
or a contract to guarantee another company's agreement to
develop these resources. 428 Contracting to build an oil rig or
pipeline or providing engineering consulting services would also
surely fall in this category.
The second category concerns acquisition of an equity interest
in an Iranian petroleum resources development company. 429
Accordingly, an oil company could violate the Act by purchasing
shares in another company that, in turn, develops Iranian petroleum resources. An example of this violation may have occurred
when Petronas, Malaysia's state oil company, acquired a 30%
stake in a $600 million project to develop the Sirn A and E oil
fields in the Persian Gulf. 430 To date, the United States has not
imposed sanctions in this case.
Legislative history regarding the second category states that
portfolio investments are not covered by the sanction mechanism. ~ Thus, for example, absent some other applicable prohibition, nothing in the Act bars a mutual fund from investing
in an oil company's equity or debt securities that itself is involved in the development of Iranian petroleum resources and
which runs afoul of the Act. What is not clear, however, is the
test for distinguishing direct from portfolio investments. Does
the distinction depend on the nature of the investor - an oil
company versus a mutual fund; the extent of control the investor has over the company responsible for developing petroleum
resources; controlling influence over management decisions and
the right to appoint members of the board of directors; the size
of the investment; majority versus minority stake? As indicated
4 1

428
See id. (stating first category of illegal investment is contracting to develop Iranian
petroleum resources).
429
See id. (stating second category of illegal investment is acquiring interest in such
development).
430
See james Kynge, Malaysia Angeml by U.S. Sanctions Threat, FIN. nMES, Nov. 1, 1996, at
6 (asserting that United States has no right to impose extra-jurisdictional sanctions on
other countries); U.S. Embassy Denies Sanctions Are Planned Against Malaysian Oil Fmn fur
Iranian Dealings, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1698, 1698 (Nov. 6, 1996) (reporting U.S.
government denial of intention to impose sanctions).
'-'' See H.R REP. No. 104-523(11), at 15 (1996), Tt!flrinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1311, 1318
(stating that House Ways and Means Committee does not intend that sanctions would
extend to portfolio investments made by any other person in sanctioned person).
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earlier, the safest strategy for dealing with these questions is to
seek an advisory opinion from the Secretary of State. 452 .
The third class of illegal direct foreign investment transactions
concerns the receipt of royalties, earnings, or profits from the
development of Iranian petroleum resources.m As in the previous category, the precise boundaries of this category are uncertain. Typically, earnings and profits would be received from an
equity interest in a petroleum resource development project. But
might this interest be characterized as a portfolio investment? A
company responsible for a petroleum development project would
pay royalties for the sale or license of patented techi10logy.
Presumably, a patent holder must take care not to sell or license
technology to a company for use in the Iranian petroleum resource sector.
Congress anticipated the possibility that businesses might seek
to circumvent the $40 million investment trigger sanction by
structuring a transaction in amounts less than $40 million. Accordingly, the prohibited activity also includes any combination
of investments of at least $10 million each, which, in a twelvemonth period, ~dd up to or exceed $40 million. 454
Congress also anticipated the possibility that the investment
trigger sanction might not induce other countries to develop
their own sanctions against Iran. Therefore, it included a stick
the possibility of an enhanced sanction. 455 If a country
agrees to impose economic sanctions and other substantial measures to inhibit Iran's efforts to support efforts of international
terrorism, then the President may waive application of the investment trigger sanction to individuals and businesses from that
country. 436 However, if a country has not undertaken
432

See 50 U.S.CA. § 1701 note (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 7. Advisory opinions)
(illustrating issuance of advisory opinions).
"" See id. (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 14. Definitions) (detailing third class of illegal
foreign investments).
,,. See id. (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 5. Imposition of sanctions) (describing
imposition of sanctions with respect to Iran).
'" See id. (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 4. Multilateral regime) (allowing President to
apply enhanced sanctions). The President is required to report to Congress regarding any
country to which the enhanced sanction is applied. See id.
36
'
See id. (allowing President to waive sanctions if country agrees to support sanctions
against Iran). The President must notify Congress of the waiver at least 3o days before the
waiver takes efiecL See id.
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substantial measures in this regard, then the President will apply
a mandatory enhanced sanction to individuals and businesses
from that country. 437 The enhancement consists of lowering
the threshold that triggers the sanction. 438 Instead of a $40
million aggregate limit on petroleum resource investments, the
limit drops to $20 million. 439 Likewise, the $10 million limit
applicable to combinations of investments drops to $5 million.
Hence, it becomes illegal to make a combination of investments
of at least $5 million each that, in a twelve-month period, equal
or exceed $20 million. 440
The existence of reasonably specific definitions of the terms
"investment," "develop," and "petroleum resources," and
Congress's anticipation of certain problems should not suggest
that enforcement of the 1996 Sanctions Act is mechanical. To
the contrary, there are important unresolved issues. For exam. pie, the Act does not provide any guidance as to what a "direct
and significant" contribution to the development of Iran's petroleum resources would be. The President, therefore, has
considerable discretion to impose the mandatory investment
trigger sanctions. In fact, the President must render a case-bycase judgment for each suspect investment to determine whether
it is bo\:h direct and significant in nature. Political considerations
will almost certainly play some role in these cases.
For example, in July 1997, the Clinton Administration announced it had no objections under the Act to the construction
of a $1.6 billion natural gas pipeline linking Turkmenistan and
Turkey via lran. 441 The pipeline, according to Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright, was "a way to help Turkey and
Turkmenistan." 442 Turkey, of course, is an important U.S. ally;
with respect to Turkmenistan, the United States has been "keen
to wean the former Soviet republics away from their economic
., See id.
... See id.
'"" See id. (noting lower threshold that triggers sanction) .
... See id.
.. , See Charles Clover, Azerbaijan Looks to U.S. to End Sanctions, FIN. TIMES, July 28, 1997,
at 4 (speculating on United States' shifting view of pipeline politics); Charles Clover &
Robert Corzine, U.S. Decision sparks a New Round oJPipelim Politics, FIN. TiMES, July 31, 1997,

at 4 (discussing United States's non-<>pposition to pipeline) .
... Clover & Corzine, supra note 441, at 4.
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dependence on Russia." 445 As a legal matter, the decision may
be defended because the pipeline will not help develop Iranian
petroleum resources - the pipeline will carry Turkmen, not
Iranian, natural gas. 444
To alter the example, suppose a country bordering Iran
builds a natural gas pipeline up to its border with Iran, and
· buys natural gas from Iran that will be transported in the new
pipeline. Does the transaction trigger the investment sanction?
The question is not hypothetical because Turkey is engaging in
exactly this sort of transaction. 445 In August 1996, just days after the Act took effect, a newly-elected Islamic government in
Turkey signed a twenty-twO-year, $20 billion natural gas contract
with Iran. 446 Under the contract, Iran agreed to sell roughly
140 billion cubic feet of natural gas per year to Turkey
beginning in 1998. 447 The gas will be delivered in a new
pipeline consisting of two parts. A 680-mile portion will run
from the Turkish-Iranian border into Turkey and will cost $1.2
billion. 448 A 170-mile portion will run· from the border into
Iran and cost $300 million. 449 Turkey is responsible for
building its portion of the pipeline, while Iran is responsible for
building the portion on Iranian soil. 450 The Turkish
government asserts it is not providing any assistance to the
Iranians to build the pipeline. 451 The United States has warned
Turkey that the transaction could violate the Act,452 but Turkey
... See id.
444
See It Will Bum Nicely, Anyway: Turltey and Iran: A Gas Pipeline Across Iran, EcoNOMIST,
Aug. 2, 1997, at 30 (explaining that in theory, Iran will receive only transit revenues to
avoid conflict with Act) .
..., See Steven Erlanger, Turlrey-Iran Gas Deal: A Test of U.S. Law on Tt:TTOr,, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 13, 1996, at A7; Turltey Sets Iran Gas Deal, Says It Doesn't Dt!J Ban, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12,
1996, at AI; Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Continues to Study Iran-Turltey Energy Pact to Determine
WhetMr It Vwlates U.S. Trade Law, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1353, 1353 (Aug. 21, 1996).
446
See Turitey Sets Iran Gas Deal, Says It Won't De!J Ban, supra note 445, at A7.
7
..
See id. There are discrepancies in media accounts of the exact amount of natural gas
Turkey will purchase each year. Two reports, for example, state that Iran will supply 105
billion cubic feet beginning in 1999, and the volume will rise to 350 biilion cubic feet by
2005. See id.
... See id.
... See id.
.
450
See james M. Dorsey, Iran-Turltey Gas Deal to Test New U.S. Law, WALL ST.J. EuR., Aug.
13, 1996, at A2 .
... See id.
4.12 See id.
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has a plausible defense. The contract is nothing more than a
trade deal - an exchange of natural gas for money - and the
Act does not prohibit trade deals. Nothing in the contract calls
for a Turkish investment m Iran's petroleum resource
development.
Turkey also has political factors in its favor. The United States
values Turkey's participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") and the continuing use of Turkish military
bases. Not only did these bases play an important role in the
Gulf War, but they were also used to enforce the "no-fly" zones
over Iraq.m Furthermore, the United States is wary of provoking anti-American Islamic extremists in Turkey. Thus, it seems
quite unlikely that the United States will interpret the Iran investment trigger language in the Act in such a way as to reach
Turkey's contract.
In the end, how the United States treats the transaction may
not matter because the Turkey-Iran transaction will be difficult
to complete. The proposed pipeline route traverses rugged terrain and hostile Kurdish territory. 454 Moreover, Turkey has
alternate sources of natural gas, such as Russia, Algeria, Qatar,
and possibly Egypt if a so-called "peace pipeline" from Egypt
through Israel, Lebanon, and Syria is built. 455 However, the
United States will be confronted with several other transactions
that fall in the "gray" area between investment and trade. One
probability will be natural gas supply agreements between Iran
and India, Iran and Pakistan, and Iran and Turkmenistan. 456
Mter all, Iran has the second largest natural gas resources after
Russia, and it is eager to develop these resources for export
purposes. 457 Surely the threat of U.S. sanctions will not intimidate Iran into halting this development.
453

See Terry Atlas, U.S. Finds Gulf War Still Isn't Over. Qinton Sends Warning to Hussein
with Second Volky of Missiles, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 4, 1996, at Al.
,,. See Shushan Bahree, Iran Takes Economic Steps in Response to U.S. Curbs, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 14, 1996, at A3 (discussing Iran's plan to sell natural gas to Europe and Turkey).
455
See John Barham, Turicey to Crack Down on IUicit Oil Tratk with Iraq, FIN. TIMES, Sept.
1, 1997, at 2 (reporting on other sources of natural gas for Turkey).
456
See, e.g., Robert Corzine, Turlunenistan Defies U.S. Ovl':f' Iran Gas, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 21,
1997, at 4 (discussing Iran's deal to supply natural gas despite U.S. objections).
457
See Iran Says Project Dpposed Uy U.S. WiU Earn $45 BiUion, ENERGY ALERT, Oct. 14, 1997,
at 12.
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Another gray area is the distinction between an invesbnent
contract and a service contract. Suppose Turkey had agreed to
provide routine maintenance on an Iranian natural gas pipeline.
Would this constitute a prohibited invesbnent? Guidelines on
the implementation of the Act published by the Deparbnent of
State suggest five inquiries to pursue to draw the distinction. 458
First. does the provider of management services put capital at
risk? Secmid, does the provider receive a share of income or
profits from the development? Third, does the provider receive
an equity stake in the petroleum resources? Fourth, does the
provider receive compensation based on invesbnent performance? Finally, does the provider receive a share of the assets
upon dissolution of the enterprise? An affirmative answer to
these questions suggests the contract is a prohibited invesbnent.
However, it is not entirely clear how the U.S. government might
resolve a case where some, but not all, of the inquiries are answered in the affirmative.
F.

The Investment and Trade Triggers Against Libya

The 1996 Sanctions Act spells out two prohibited activities
regarding Libya that would trigger U.S. imposition of two or
more of the abov~cussed sanctions. The first, an invesbnent
trigger, is identical in virtually all respe'cts to the invesbnent
trigger for Iran. It is illegal for any person to (1) make an invesbnent worth $40 million or more, (2) with actual knowledge,
that (3) directly and significantly contributes to the enhancement of Libya's ability to develop its petroleum resources. 459
The only difference between the Iranian and Libyan invesbnent
triggers is that no waiver exists for the Libyan trigger and, therefore, neither do enhanced sanctions. The President does not
possess the authority to waive the Libyan invesbnent trigger if a
country agrees to undertake substantial measures against
458

&e Additional Information for the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, 61 Fed. Reg.
66,067, 66068 (1.996) (listing factors that determine whether contract for management
services is investment rather than service contract); State Deparlmmt Issues Guidance Clariffing
Iron-Libya Sanctions Law, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1967, 1967 (Dec. 18, 1996) (discussing
State Department guidelines for implementing Iran-Libya sanctions).
459
See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 note (West Supp. 1997) (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 5.
Imposition of sanctions).
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international terrorism. 460 That authority applies only to the
Iranian investment trigger. 461 As a result, the stick to
encourage other countries to adopt measures against Libya the imposition of the enhanced sanction cannot cause
financial pain.
The reason for this distinction between Iran and Libya is not
apparent from the statute or legislative history. Business reality is
the most likely explanation. As suggested earlier, European companies have far more extensive dealings in the Libyan than the
Iranian petroleum industry. As a result, Congress probably realized there was little hope of inducing a multilateral sanctions
regime against Libya beyond the measures already adopted in
U.N. resolutions and, therefore, little point in applying the enhanced sanction.
The second prohibited activity concerns trade with Libya in
sensitive military items. The President must impose two or more
of the above-discussed sanctions if a person engages in the following transaction: (1) exports or transfers to Libya, (2) with
actual knowledge, (3) of goods, services, or technology denied
to Libya under U.N. Security Council Resolutions 748 or 883,
and ( 4) these exports significantly and materially contribute to
Libya's ability to develop its petroleum resources, maintain its
aviation capabilities, acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear
weapons or a destabilizing number of advanced conventional
weapons, or enhance Libya's military capabilities. 462 While the
prohibited transaction mentions petroleum resources and aviation, the clear thrust of the criteria concerns weapons. 463 In
essence, the trade trigger is a unilateral measure adopted by the
United States to reinforce the multilateral arms embargo already
implemented by the United Nations. Neither the Act nor its
legislative history casts doubt on the sincerity or efficacy of the
U.N. Security Council measures. However, the very existence of
the trade trigger sanction must be seen as just that:
460

See id. (stating that President may waive Iranian investment trigger, with no similar
provision for libya).
461
See id. (discussing investment trigger for inhibiting Iranian activities).
462
See id. (discussing sanctions for prohibited transactions) .
.., See id. (concluding sanctions were response to Iran's acquisition and threatened use
of weapons and libya's failure to comply with U.N. resolution mandating reduction of
weapons).
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congressional skepticism of the willingness of some countries
and their nationals to forsake profits and cease arms dealings
with Libya. Essentially, the trade trigger says to the world: "The
United States agrees with the multilateral measures against
Libya, but just to ensure compliance, the United States has its
own secondary boycott to keep everyone in line."
As with the investment trigger that contains the flexible but
undefined language "directly and significantly contribute[s]," 464
the trade trigger uses the phrase "significantly and materially. " 465 Again, this undefined phrase gives the President
considerable maneuvering room in deciding whether to impose
sanctions. Likewise, both triggers contain the same mens rea
requirement of actual knowledge. 466 Thus, the proof problems
of actual knowledge noted earlier regarding the investment
trigger are certain to recur in the context of the trade trigger.
An obvious question is why Congress chose to include a trade
trigger for Libya, but not for Iran. Mter all, this choice means
that the secondary boycott of Iran is narrowly tailored to petroleum resource investments, whereas the secondary boycott of
Libya includes these petroleum investments plus exports in a
wide array of other goods and services. The legislative history
explains the reason for the differential treatment of the two
countries.
In the case of Iran, the [House Ways and Means] Committee believes that it will be more effective to impose sanctions on companies that invest in Iran's oil and gas resources ...
However, the Committee did not believe it was wise to include a requirement in the bill [H.R 3107, the final version
of the Act] that the President sanction trade with Iran (the
so-called "trade trigger") because the cost to U.S. interests of
imposing such a broadly based secondary boyeott would be too high.
For example, monitoring international trade with Iran, especiaUy
in common goods like driU pipe and driU bits, would be a difficult if
not an unworkable task. The number of trade transactions wiU be
significantly higher than the number of investment contracts and the
flow of components impossible to trace. The incidence of sanctions
required by the trade trigger would be greater. The Committee believes
... ld.
... Id.
... See id.
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it would be so high as to cause serious damage to our relations with
trusted aUies. By contrast an invesunent trigger is more work-

able for the President and more potent when applied.
Equipped with an invesunent sanction the President is in a
better position to convince countries trading with Iran to join
the U.S. in denying Iran the opportunity to earn hard currency from its petroleum resources.
Libya represents a different case by virtue of multilateraUy agreed
trade sanctions adopted by the United Nations Security [Council]
Resolutions, which prohibit trade in weapons, aviation equipment, and oil equipment significant to the refining sector.
For Libya, the bill establishes a mandatory sanction framework for violations of the internationally agreed regime. 467
In sum, the different economic histories and geopolitical circumstances account for the different treatment of Iran and Libya.

G. Duration and Termination of Sanctions
Any sanction imposed under the 1996 Sanctions Act must
remain in effect for at least one year from the date imposed. 468
In general, the Act establishes a minimum two-year duration for
sanctions. 469 However, the Act also allows for the possibility
that the President may determine and certify to Congress that
the sanctioned person is no longer engaging in a prohibited
transaction and has provided reliable assurances that it will not
knowingly violate the Act in the future. 470 In this event, the
President may lift the sanctions, subject to the requirement that
they remain in effect for at least a year. 471 In effect, this requirement ensures the imposition of a minimum penalty and
prevents a sanctioned person from skirting sanctions by temporarily ceasing an illegal activity and providing a disingenuous
assurance of future compliance.
The Act lays out two further bases for terminating sanctions
that, unlike the focus on the sanctioned person, allow for termination if Iran and Libya reform their behavior. First, the
467

H.R. REP. No. 104-523(11), at 14-15 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. 1311, 1317
(emphasis added).
468
See id. at 18, reprinted at 1996 U.S.C.CAN. at 1320.
469
See 50 U .S.CA § 1701 note (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 9. Duration of sanctions;
Presidential waiver).
470 See id.
471 See id.
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requirement to impose sanctions will cease to exist if the
President determines and certifies to Congress that Iran no
longer supports acts of international terrorism, and has
abandoned its efforts to obtain nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons, and ballistic missiles and launchers. 472 Second, the
requirement to impose sanctions will terminate if the President
determines and certifies to Congress that Libya has satisfied the
requirements of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 731, 748, and
883. 473
If the President refuses to make any of the three aforementioned determinations and certifications, then the sanctions may
remain in place for considerably .longer than two years. How
much longer, however, is not clear. The Act contains a sunset
provision stating that the Act lapses five years after the date of
enactment, which was August 5, 1996. 474 However, one reading
of this sunset provision is that it precludes the imposition of
new sanctions after August 5, 2001, but not the continued enforcement of sanctions imposed prior to that date. Thus, at least
in theory, there is no fixed termination period on sanctions.
This possibility raises an interesting problem: while a decision
to impose sanctions is not reviewable by any court, 475 could a
sanctioned person challenge the sanctions long after the United
States imposed them if reasonable grounds exist to believe their
continuation is unwarranted? The answer seemingly depends
partly upon how a court defines the statutory words "to impose."
Do they refer narrowly to the initial presidential decision to
impose sanctions, or do they also encompass a refusal by the
President to determine and certify that the criteria for terminating sanctions have been met?
The presence of a sunset provision should not give false hope
to critics of the Act that it will become legal history after August
5, 2001. Congress clarified its reason for the sunset provision in
the legislative history to the AcL The House Ways and Means
Committee never intended the Act to be permanenL 476 Even
.,. See id. (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 8. Tennination of sanctions) .
., See id.
474
See id. (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 1!1. Effective date; sunset) .
.,. See id. (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 11. Detenninations not reviewable).
476
See H.R. REP. No. 104-523(11), at 19 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1311,
1322.
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in this sensitive policy area, five years is sufficient time to gauge
how effectively the Act achieved its objectives. 477 The Committee believes "it will be important for Congress to revisit the issue
in five years and to evaluate the behavior of Libya and Iran and
the effectiveness of this bil1." 478 In other words, a renewal of
the Act appears to be as likely a scenario as its termination.
At the same time, the sunset provision should encourage U.S.
petroleum companies because of the diverse underlying national
security considerations of the Act. At some undetermined point
in the future, possibly when new political leaders assume control
in Iran and Libya, the United States will abolish the sanctions
because they will no longer be necessary. In the meantime,
nothing in the Act prevents U.S. petroleum companies from
maintaining and cultivating business contacts in these countries.
As long as the Act remains in place, a farsighted U.S. company
should endeavor, to the extent politically possible, to network in
Iran and Libya. Indeed, Mobil Oil, Amoco, and Conoco appear
to be positioning themselves for the inevitable post-sanctions era.
In May 1997, they sent mid-level officials to an Iranian-sponsored
energy conference in Isfahan. 479

H. Waiver and Delay of Sanctions
The 1996 Sanctions Act provides three circumstances under
which sanctions may be waived. First, the President can waive
the imposition of sanction if a waiver "is important to the national interest of the United States." 480 This waiver authority appears
to be quite broad; it is not limited to a national security interest, but rather can be invoked for any sort of national interest.
The legislative history indicates that the President might consider use of this waiver authority if the imposition of sanctions
would threaten U.S. intelligence sources and methods, hinder
the intemational cooperation and the intemational obligations
of the United States, or lead to unacceptable costs to U.S.

477
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See id.
/d.

'"' See Daniel Pearl, U.S. Oil Finns Attend Conf1!J1!'11U in Iran, WALL ST. J., May 12, 1997, at
All.
480
See 50 U.S.CA. § 1701 note (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 9. Duration of sanctions;

Presidential waiver) (emphasis added).
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economic interests. 481 For example, the President could find
that imposing sanctions is contrary to national interest because it
would result in an unacceptably high loss of sales or profits to
U.S. businesses or cost too many Americans their jobs.
The only real constraint on the President's national interest
waiver authority is that he must report to Congress about the
waiver determination at least thirty days before the waiver takes
effect. 482 The report must discuss certain specifically listed
items, such as a description .of the illegal transaction, an
estimate of the extent to which the transaction helped Iran or
Libya, and a discussion of how the President would handle a
repeat offense by the sanctioned person. 483
Second, the President can waive sanctions if the imposition
would harm the U.S. govemment;s ability to obtain critical
goods and services. Regarding defense procurement, the United
States need not and should not impose sanctions upon a person
who is a sole source supplier of an essential defense article or
service if (1) there is no readily or reasonably available alternative source, or (2) the defense article or service is being provided under an existing contract and is essential to the national
security of the United. States. 484 Similarly, regarding nondefense related items, the President can waive sanctions for persons supplying medicines, humanitarian items, spare parts, component parts, or information technology essential to U.S. manufacturing that provides routine servicing and maintenance on
products without another readily or reasonably available
source. 485 In short, this waiver of authority ensures that a U.S.imposed secondary boycott of Iran or Libya does not eventually
damage the Pentagon or U.S. manufacturers.
Finally, as discussed earlier, nationals of a country may escape
sanctions if their country has "agreed to undertake substantial
measures, including. economic sanctions, that will inhibit Iran's
481

See H.R REP. No. 104-523(11}, at 18, nprinted in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. at 132().21.
See 50 U.S.CA § 1701 note (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 9. Duration of sanctions;
Presidential waiver) .
... See id.
484
See id. (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 5. Imposition of sanctions).
485
See id. It should be noted that the statute incorrectly numbers the items in subsection (f), omitting an item (5). See id. The correct numbering should finish with item
(6}, which should cover medicines.
482
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efforts" to sponsor acts of international terrorism. 486 This waiver possibility does not apply to libya.
To restate, the President's determination to impose sanctions
is not reviewable by any court. 487 Consequently, it is impossible
for a sanctioned person to delay imposition by attempting to
bog down the President in a lawsuiL However, the Act sets forth
conditions that are largely under the control of the President
and the government with primary jurisdiction over the
sanctioned person, under which imposition may be delayed for
up to 180 days. By allowing for delayed imposition of sanctions,
Congress provided an avenue to soften the unilateral blow of
the Act.
Specifically, Congress urges the President to consult with the
government that has primary jurisdiction over a person the
President determines to be liable under the Act immediately
after he makes that determination. 488 In order to do so, the
President can delay implementation of sanctions for up to ninety days. 489 Sanctions need not be imposed if, after consultation,
the President determines and certifies to Congress that the foreign government has taken effective actions to terminate the
foreign entity's involvement in the illegal transaction. 490 The
President can delay implementing sanctions for a further ninety
days if he determines and certifies to Congress that the government "is in the process of taking" these actions. 491

V. THE PRAGMATIC QUESTION:
Do NATIONAL SECURI1Y SANCfiONS WoRK?

Clearly, the United States has not been, and will not be, shy
about enacting legislation authorizing unilateral trade action
against another country in the interest of national security.
These invocations of statutory authority must be judged by more
488

See id. (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 4. Multilateral regime).
See id. (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 11. Determinations not reviewable); H.R REP.
No. 523(1), at 17 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1296, 1306.
488
See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 note (Iran and Libya Sanctions, Sec. 9. Duration of sanctions;
Presidential waiver).
489
See id.
490 See id.
••• See id. The President must report to Congress on the status of consultations and any
additional 9Q.day delay. See id.
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than their appropriateness in the post-Uruguay Round multilateral trading system, and their consistency with the rules of that
system. Mter all, from this perspective, the judgment is rather
obvious: the language of GAIT article XXI is not a serious
constraint on the use of national security sanctions, and only the
good faith of WTO Members to avoid abusive invocation in the
interests of the multilateral system provides some measure of a
GAIT-based constraint.
Rather, a practical issue emerges from the earlier discussions
of trade remedies in support of national security aims. The
United States's use of national security sanctions ultimately must
be judged by a bottom line question: does unilateral action in
support of national security aims work? The empirical evidence
concerning unilateral action pursuant to statutes other than
section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 suggests that such action is
not nearly as effective as its advocates would hope or believe. 492
Indeed, unilateral trade action often has a negative effect on the
U.S. economy.
One recent study, conducted by the Institute for International
Economics, examined the impact of unilateral U.S. sanctions
imposed against twenty-six countries, including Cuba, Iran, Libya, and Burma. 495 It concluded that in 1995, the sanctions cost
. the United States between $15 and $20 billion as a result of lost
exports and higher-priced substitute import sources and between
200,000 and 250,000 lost export-related jobs. 494 These self-inflicted wounds are sure to worsen with the tightened unilateral
ban on new U.S. investment in Burma.
The day after a prohibition on new U.S. investtnents in
Burma was announced, the heads of several [non-U.S.] oil
companies operating in the country sat down to dinner at
one of Rangoon's new luxury hotels. They were salivating but not because of the succulent lobster on offer that evening.
... See supra note 170 and accompanying text (discussing unilateral statutory actions) .
.., See Robert Corzine & Nancy Dunne, U.S. Business Hits at Use of Unilateral Sanctions,
FIN. nMES, Apr. 16, 1997, at 10 (discussing Institute of International Economics study).
494
See id.; see also Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Sanctions Against Other Countries Cost &cpurters Up to
$19 Billion, Study Says, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 736, 736 (Apr. 23, 1997) (discussing Institute for International Economics study).
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Instead, they were discussing how to caiVe up exploration
rights held by U.S. companies, rights the U.S. companies will
most likely have to give up under the new rules . . . .
In the absence of the U.S. companies, "it's all there for
the taking. No project will not be taken up," says an executive with a Malaysian conglomerate. 495
Interestingly, the Institute for Intemational Economics study
triggered the creation of a coalition of 440 U.S. companies and
trade associations called "USAENGAGE." 496 The mission of
USAENGAGE is to "fight the imposition of unilateral sanctions
by the United States." 497 As its chairperson, Donald V. Fites,
the chief executive officer of Caterpillar, Inc., states, "the evidence is clear ... [that] [t]he proliferation of U.S. unilateral
sanctions undermines American leadership and competitiveness,
costs U.S. jobs, and results in significant losses to the economy."498 Recently, USAENGAGE supported congressional legislation that would curb U.S. use of unilateral sanctions. 499 The
legislation would require an assessment of the economic impact
and likelihood of success of such sanctions before they are imposed, and authorize the President to waive sanctions if they are
not in the U.S. national interest. 500 Any sanctions imposed
would be reviewed annually and lapse after two years unless
renewed by Congress.501
A second recent study, conducted by the National Association
of Manufacturers, reviews sixty-one laws or executive actions
ordering unilateral U.S. sanctions against thirty-five foreign countries - including Cuba, Iran, Libya, and Burma. 502 Those thirty-five nations represent 42% of the world's population, or 2.3
billion potential consumers of U.S. goods and services in export
markets worth $790 billion annually. 505 "[I]n only a handful of
495
496

497
498
499

Ted Bardacke, Burma- The Sick Man Gets Sicker, FIN. TIMEs, Apr. 29, 1997, at 6.
See Yerkey, supra note 494, at 736.
ld.
Id.
See Nancy Dunne, U.S. Industry Tries to Curb Sanctions, FIN. nMES, Oct 24, 1997, at

16.
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See Nancy Dunne, U.S. Companies Plan Attack on Sanctions, FIN. nMES, Sept 15, 1997,

at 4.
See id.
See Claude E. Barfield & Mark A. Groombridge, Unilateral Sanctions jeopardize U.S.
Economic and Diplomatic Interests, BARRON'S, Oct 13, 1997, at 70.
"" See Gary G. Yerkey, Unilateral Sanctions Ta~t $790 BiUion Potential Export Marllet a
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cases can it be argued that the sanctions changed the behavior
of the targeted governments." 504 Thus, "[u]nilateral sanctions
are little more than postage stamps we send to other countries
at the cost of thousands of American jobs," 505 and they "give
U.S. companies the 'stigma' of being unreliable trading partners."506 The obvious conclusion is that while these sanctions
may make some Americans feel good, they do not work.
Both studies might well have added two other key concluding
points. First, unilateral trade actions rarely have positive diplomatic results to offset the costs they impose on the U.S. economy. To date, for instance, the ruling regimes of Cuba, Iran,
Libya, and Burma have made no significant changes in their
policies. Typically, unilateral action turns an already recalcitrant
regime into an outright defiant that attracts both admiration
and sympathy from many in the Third World.
Second, unilateral trade actions have no effect on trade imbalances. To be sure, national security or human rights concerns
motivate some unilateral actions. But a nagging concern about
imbalances also plays a role in such actions. The truth that must
be acknowledged is that macroeconomic factors are the key
determinant of the direction and size· of the U.S. trade balance.507 Our chronic trade deficits are caused by variables such
Year, Study Finds, 14 lnt'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 421, 421 (Mar. 5, 1997).
504 ld.
"" Yerkey, supra note 503, at 422 (quotingjeny Jasinowski, President, National Association of Manufacturers).
For another study discussing the economic consequences on the United States of
unilateral sanctions, see PREsiDENT'S EXPORT COUNCIL, UNilATERAL ECONOMIC SANCilONS:
A REviEW OF ExlSTING SANCilONS AND THEIR IMPACTS ON U.S. ECONOMIC INTERESTS WITH
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POUCV AND PROCESS IMPROVEMENT (1997) (concluding that negative economic impact on United States from unilateral sanctions could be reduced if Unit·
ed States more skillfully designed sanctions and avoided extraterritorial measures and secondary boycotts).
506
See Yerkey, supra note 503, at 422 (paraphrasing Tracy O'Rourke, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer, Varian Associates, Inc.). However, another study, conducted by the
American Chamber of Commerce in japan, concludes that "[o]nly 13 out of 45 U.S.:Japan
trade agreements signed since 1980 have succeeded in helping U.S. businesses penetrate
the Japanese markets, while 10 accords were failures." Toshio Aritake & Mark Felsenthal,
Only 1J of 45 Accurds with japan Succeeded in Marl!et Ace&U, Bwiness Group Repurts, 14 lnt'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 76, 76 Qan. 15, 1997). Many of these accords were negotiated "under
the gun" of an actual or threatened section 301 action.
507
See THOMAS 0. BAYARD & KIMBERLY ANN EUJOIT, RECIPROCllY AND RETAUATION IN
U.S. TRADE Poucv 53-54 (1994) (discussing role of macroeconomic factors in trade imbal-
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as "relative rates of economic growth, fiscal and monetary choices at home and abroad, tax, savings, investment and exchange
rate policies made ·individually or collectively around the world,
and the internal cultures of important U.S. industries." 508 To
say that unfair trade barriers are not the principal obstacle to
U.S. exports is an understatement. In fact, "unfair trade practices account for only 5 to 15% of the trade deficit. " 509 Suppose
Japan removed all of its unfair trade barriers. At best, the bilateral U.S. trade deficit with Japan might decline by approximately
8 to 14%.510
It is also important to appreciate that a trade deficit also
results from non-economic factors, such as social and cultural
attitudes and perceptions of product quality. For instance, many
Japanese consumers have traditionally been reluctant to buy rice
from California, in part because they feel it is inappropriate in
sushi and other Japanese cuisine. During the heated 1995 auto
parts dispute, some Japanese officials remarked that U.S. car
manufacturers did not make right-hand drive vehicles for the
Japanese market and were generally of inferior quality to Japanese cars.511 A unilateral trade action cannot alter foreign obance). Bayard and Elliott elaborate on their reasoning:
[T]rade policy cannot correct trade imbalances. For instance, if resources in an
economy are fully employed, export promotion may affect the composition of a
country's exports but is not likely to increase the level of exports. If Country
A's economy is not at full employment, or if trade barriers in Country B raise
that country's level of saving or reduce its domestic investment, trade policy
may raise the level of Country A's exports. But with floating exchange rates,
again there will be little impact on the trade balance because Country A's currency will appreciate, causing exports to decrease and imports to increase.
Fundamentally, the trade balance is a macroeconomic phenomenon, determined by the balance between saving and investment by government, industry,
and citizens, and it is usually not significantly affected by trade policy ....
ld.
508
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setvations and attitudes regarding American goods. Finally, according to evidence from USAENGAGE, America's unilateral
economic sanctions contribute to the U.S. trade deficit simply by
virtue of foregone export opportunities. 512
In sum, unilateral trade action persists despite considerable
evidence demonstrating it is ineffective, and often counterproductive. Nevertheless, this evidence has not prodded U.S. trade
policy officials or jurists to rethink their fidelity to unilateral
trade actions and is unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future.
CONCLUSION

National security and international trade law are inextricably
linked. By virtue of GAlT article XXI, the link is written into
the constitution of modem international trade law. However, the
link is not one between two equal forces. Article XXI provides
little effective restraint on WTO Members from enacting national security sanctions legislation. Put bluntly, even in the international trade law constitution, international trade law is subordinated to national security.
The United States is exploiting this subordinate relationship.
In the post-Soviet Union, post-Red China era, it is threatened by
new groups of bad guys - drug kingpins, rogue dictators, and
state-sponsored terrorists - who are less monolithic and more
diffuse than the old bad guys. The United States is confronting
this threat by deploying international trade law measures, including secondary boycotts, as a weapon. Unfortunately, America's
companies, allies, and trade partners are being hit by friendly
fire. The weapon is neither outrageous nor splendid. Neither
supporters nor critics of the weapon are entirely on target with
their arguments. But it does not appear to be particularly effective. Because its operation causes so much controversy and its
results are modest at best, the burden now falls on U.S. trade
policy makers to modify or scuttle the weapon.

The japan-United States Auto Parts Dispute, 45 KAN. L REV. 591 (1997) .
.,. See Sanctions Contribute to Trade Deficit, Group Says, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1113,
1113 Uune 25, 1997).

